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ABSTRACT
A

STRUCTURAL CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY:
THE CARTER AND REAGAN YEARS

SEPTEMBER 1987

WILLIAM

F.

GROVER, B.A., MORAVIAN COLLEGE

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by:

Professor Glen Gordon

This project critiques the major twentieth century theories of the

presidency and lays the groundwork for an alternative model centered on
the relationship between the office, theories of the state, and the

structure of the political economy.
related state imperatives

of

Case studies analyze the inter-

economic growth and national security as

illuminated by the Carter and Reagan administrations' handling
occupational safety and health policy and the MX missile.

concludes that

a

of

The work

theory giving analytic primacy to the structure

underlying the constitutional arrangement

of

political institutions --

deeper structure than conventional theories examine -- offers

a

a

richer,

more insightful account of the presidency than orthodox interpretations.

Moreover, it suggests we need to rethink and challenge the prevailing

priorities
understood,

of
if

economic growth and national security, as currently
the crisis of the state, and hence the crisis of the

presidency, is to be overcome.
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introduction
Energy in the executive is a leading character
in the definition of good government.
-- Alexander Hamilton

Alexander Hamilton was ahead

of

his time.

The twentieth century

has seen his conception of the presidency become

political science.

a

celebrated maxim

of

Yet his late eighteenth century advocacy of broad

executive power -- expressed, though

somewhat muted terms, in the

in

famous passage from Federal st No. 70 above -- did not fit the theory
i

and practice of the next hundred years.

1

This is not to say that his

vision of modern commercial expansion and American empire was absent
from the nineteenth century scene.

were pursued with vigor.
of

2

On

the contrary, these objectives

But the notion of the presidency as the locus

institutional initiative for pol

i

ti cal

theory of the executive and his vision
should be

—

of

-economi

c

ends -- joining his

what kind of society America

did not gain wide acceptance until

after the Spanish-

The preceding decades, with the notable exception of the

American War.

Civil War period, generally are characterized by political scientists as
the era of

"congressional government." 3

The shift in power and importance from Congress to the presidency
can be demonstrated in the writing of Woodrow Wilson.

In

1855 the young

Princeton professor's classic work, Congressional Go vernment, was
published.

In

it

he argued that

government is simply

a

"the actual

form of our present

scheme of congressional supremacy.

1

4

"Congress

2

[is]

the dominant, nay, the irresistible, power
of the federal

system...." 3

The president, according to the early
Wilson, was

a

comparatively minor official whose business, though
"occasionally great,
is usually not much

above routine," not much more than "mere

administration, mere obedience of directions from the masters
the Standing Committees."-

considerably.

By

1908,

of

policy,

however, his thinking had changed

Reflecting on Theodore Roosevelt's tenure

in

the White

House, the rise of the regulatory function of the state, and the

enhanced stature of the U.S. in the world, he revised his earlier
assessment.

The thrust of his Constitutional Government

States concerns the political supremacy
as

"at

of

In

The United

the president, who he now saw

liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big

a

man as he

can ." 7

The President can never again be the mere domestic
figure he has been throughout so large a part of our history.
The nation has risen to first rank in power and
resources.
The other nations of the world look askance
upon her, half in envy, half in fear, and wonder with a
deep anxiety what she will do with her vast strength...
Our President must always, henceforth, be one of the
great powers of the world, whether he act greatly and
wisely or not. ..We can never hide our President again as
a mere domestic officer. ..He must stand always at the
front of our affairs.... 8

Here is

a

thoroughly Hamiltonian view

of

executive constituting the unifying force

the presidency, with the chief
of

the government, since

"there is but one national voice in the country, and that is the voice
of

the President.

whole.

"

9

.

.Only the President represents the country as

a

3

By the time Wilson himself

reached the White House the presidency

thus had risen dramatically as an institutional component of the

government.
a

Yet for all

the heightened attention given to the office as

practical focal point for policy leadership, it did not receive

concomitant amount of attention as an area
science.

of

a

study within political

That change took place only in light of the lengthy tenure of

Franklin Roosevelt, the chief executive who, in the words
historian, "re-created the modern presidency."

10

Emboldened by crisis

conditions, Roosevelt operated in highly personal terms.

unprecedented expansion

of

the federal

everyday lives of Americans.

one

of

He oversaw the

government directly into the

As Theodore Lowi

aptly puts it, the

Roosevelt years inspired "the new sense that the president is the

government."

11

FDR also bequeathed to American politics an

institutional and attitudinal apparatus that has been termed the

welfare-warfare state.

His successors inescapably have had to come to

grips with the rich stylistic and substantive heritage of the activist

Roosevel

ti an

Describing this legacy, historian

approach to the office.

William Leuchtenburg argues that all postwar presidents must labor "in
the shadow of FDR.

12

Not only presidents have been shaded by Roosevelt, however.

Subsequent scholarship has been profoundly affected as well.
postwar period studies of the presidency became something

industry in political science.

Clinton Rossiter's "own feeling

institution" in his seminal

a

the

growth

Much, if not most, of this writing touts

the beneficence and efficacy of the office.
of

of

In

of

Thus,

for example,

we

learn

veneration" for "this astounding

13
1956 text on the presidency.

While not

4

all

theorists shared Rossiter's effusiveness -- he characterized
the

president as "a kind of magnificent lion" -- they were by and
large
sanguine about the prospects of activist chief executives. And perhaps
rightly so.

For the chief executive analysts had uppermost in their

—

minds when they examined the modern office almost invariably was FDR
a

paragon of presidential power and authority.

that the U.S.

emerged from World War

II

Add to this the fact

as the globally preeminent

political, economic and military power and you have

a

confluence of

forces that encourages heady optimism about American political

institutions.
The reality of the postwar period was, of course, much more

sobering.

hegemony in the world political economy did not go

U.S.

unchallenged.

When the tapestry of economic and military superiority

began to unravel in the late 1960's and early 1970's, American

superpower status, and the power of the presidency as the guarantor
and economic security,

both national

Watergate

were severely tested.

of

Vietnam and

particular, and economic stagnation in general, combined to

in

help turn sour the dominant opinion of the presidency.

Electorally, one

candidate based his campaign for the office on the belief that people
had lost confidence in their government.

"It is obvious that the best

way for our leaders to restore their credibility is to be credible, and
in order

for us to be trusted we must be trustworthy!" wrote Jimmy

Carter in 1975*

1

^

More than halfway through his presidency he still

felt the need to warn the public about the "crisis of confidence

1

in

the

American spirit which loomed as "a fundamental threat to American
democracy.

13

And in political

science, paeans to presidential power

5

were replaced by more cautious assessments that the presidency had

become "imperial," "a puzzle," "an illusion," "rhetorical,"

"impossible," and "plebiscitary."

16

This shift in conventional thinking about the nature of

presidential power serves as the focus

dissertation.
on

of

the first chapter of my

Two main schools of thought have dominated the discourse

the postwar presidency.

One school

-- the expansi vi sts -- generally

held sway from the time of FDR through the late 1960's.

Tracing their

twentieth century origins back to Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt,

expansivists were energized by FDR's leadership.
ideal

They celebrate the

the purposive, active, power-wielding, yet benevolent chief

of

executive, and tend to downplay the threat
much power.

of

a

president amassing too

Though they are aware of the need for countervailing power

within the mix of governmental institutions, expansivists clearly

endorse
hand.

a

political system within which the president has the upper

The other school of thought

—

the restricti vists

—

are

a

more

recent phenomenon within the discipline, although they do include some

theorists who wrote with FDR's years fresh

in

mind.

Their twentieth

century roots are most firmly planted in William Howard Taft's

relatively narrow conception

of

the office.

the growth in presidential power,

Restr i cti vi sts are wary of

and point to the excesses of the

Johnson and Nixon presidencies for confirmation
in

such growth.

They seek

a

restoration

executive and legislative branches.

of

of

the danger inherent

balance between the

And they hope to deflate public

expected to
expectations about what any president can reasonably be

accomplish in today's world.

6

By contrasting the expansivist and restricti vist approaches
to illuminate the range of

I

want

debate and analysis that dominates prevailing

notions of the presidency within political science and to argue that
this range is much too limited to adequately explain the dynamic forces

buffeting the chief executive.

Specifically, the conventional

literature has three major interrelated deficiencies.

The first

shortcoming

of

Such

foster.

mainstream theories is the narrow scope

of
a

debate they

confined intellectual space provides little room for

orientations that seek to question the assumptions and settled

understandings upon which previous theories have rested.

Second,

conventional accounts of the presidency are fixated on institutionalism.
They focus primarily on the institutional balance

of

president and Congress, making their difference one
of

kind.

power between the
of

degree, not one

Finally, such orientations are intoxicated with process,

tending to treat presidential power as
They view the office as

complexities

of

a

a

problem

of

means, not ends.

management issue, contending that the

the world have made the job of achieving the nation's

goals too big for any one man.

While this may be true, the goals

themselves are taken for granted.

Seldom are the ends of presidential

power critically questioned, or seen as contributing to the difficulties

confronting the president.
-- indeed
While not dismissing the two leading approaches

acknowledging some debt to particular aspects

of

them

—

chapter two

alternative framework that
widens the scope of inquiry to move toward an
the presidency and the
is sensitive to the relationship between

structure

of

17
the American political economy
.

This structural, approach

7

is differentiated from what passes for

orthodox political science.
view structure in

structure.

a

"structural" analysis within

The two dominant models of the presidency

shallow sense, as

a

reflection of constitutional

The balance of forces between the established political

institutions, particularly between the executive and legislative
branches, is accorded analytic primacy.

Such conventional notions thus

regard events like Watergate or the Iran-contra scandal as indicative of
the most profound dangers facing American democracy.

Yet while

undoubtedly important, these political crises can obscure more basic
systemic ills.

The shallow notion of structure fails to analyze the

core assumptions and interests under lying governmental institutions and

their periodic instability.

It

cannot see the forest for the trees.

Structure understood in the deeper, more fundamental sense intended

in

this work, by contrast, explores and questions these basic principles

which typically are taken as givens, directing the focus of study to the

context of the political economy

of

liberal democratic capitalism.

Used in this deeper sense of the term, structural analysis of the

presidency draws much

of

concerned with the theory

its sustenance from the large body of work
of

the state.

For

if

Lowi

is correct that

presidents now view their office as the "state personified,"

it

makes

sense to explore the imperatives of the state to discover the dynamics
of

presidential action

10
.

The chapter considers three major variants of

non-pl ur al i st theories of the state which, despite their important

divergence in emphasis, highlight the structural continuities among all
presidents that transcend whatever differences they may have over party,
policy and personality.

Conventional theories

of

the presidency place

8

great weight on these differences;

structural theory focuses on the

deeper continuities.

While analysts seldom attempt to place the presidency within the

context

of

state theory, when this encounter has been forged, two

intertwined priorities of the state

—

promoting economic growth and

national security -- have commanded attention for their centrality to
the president's issue agenda, regardless of who occupies the White

House.

As provision of

growth and security has become increasingly

problematic in light of changes in the context

of

U.S.

postwar economic

and military supremacy, however, both the state and the presidency have

been in crisis.
of

a

Structural theory thus can help us sketch the contours

perspective on the office in general, and particularly

in

an era of

declining hegemony, the setting inherited by presidents Carter and
Reagan
The next two chapters are policy case studies that employ the

structural approach to assess the efforts
the fundamental

new setting.

of

Carter and Reagan to pursue

imperatives of growth and national security within this

Chapter three examines occupational safety and health

policy as an example of how the two administrations confronted the

problem of reconciling the mandate
Act of

of

the Occupational Safety and Health

1970 with the pursuit of economic growth.

The story of these

administrative attitudes toward OSHA policy reveals much about the
pressure business priorities put on presidential policymaking.
sacrificed and what is preserved in the name

of

What is

promoting economic

growth has important consequences for the workers of America.

And the

because they
tradeoffs involved in OSHA policy are especially troubling

9

can create

situation where, as some analysts contend, worker safety

a

and health is subordinated to the quest for national economic health,

cruel

a

twist of logic for those on the receiving end of presidential

power

Chaper four focuses on national security through the issue of the
MX

missile.

Like OSHA, the MX is

a

program with

a

relatively short

history involving consequences that literally can affect life and death.
And like OSHA,

the MX also has been

a

lightning rod for intense debate

over the direction of national policy.

One of the most controversial

weapons systems of the 70's and 80's, the MX has had
bizarre history.

a

Both Carter and Reagan spent considerable time and

energy trying to justify the need for this counterf orce
weapon.

quite

a

rocky, almost

,

war-fighting

The extent and quality of their efforts at justification reveal
bit about how leaders view the connection between our security

and our military capabilities.

Moreover, the MX debate illustrates how

little difference there is between competing postwar definitions
national security within the mainstream
as with OSHA and

of

of

"responsible" thought.

Thus,

the imperative of economic growth, the MX debate shows

us the narrow nature of

the range of the possible for presidential

policy, and the overriding continuities between administrations with

ostensibly different political agendas.
The fifth and final chapter draws conclusions about the presidency

from the policy experiences of the two administrations.

Of

central

importance here is the extent to which each chief executive came to
terms with

a

job constrained by the dual

imperatives of the state.

For

especially
Carter, and his version of the liberal agenda, this was an

10

painful process.

After roughly two years in office he embarked on the

domestic and foreign policy course that would become Reaganism.

The

similarity between the two presidencies is at times striking, as is the
very different public perception of them.

The point in looking at these

similarities and differences is to highlight the dilemma faced by
Carter, Reagan and future presidents who are judged by criteria that are

increasingly difficult to fulfill.
What are the prospects for

a

presidency whose power appears

structurally directed toward the ends

of

economic growth and national

security as they are conventionally understood?

How are these

imperatives affected as the political economy undergoes major

transformation?

What are the implications of

a

citizenry that does not

hold its president accountable for policy failures because
felt need to believe in the efficacy of the office?

legitimacy

of

the office

(and the state)

of

a

strongly

How might the

be affected if

its imperatives

could not be met without fundamental change in the political economy?

These and corollary queries lie at the heart

contention is that the two leading theories

of
of

the final

chapter.

the presidency cannot

adequately confront such basic issues because neither is capable
questioning the premises

of

My

of

the system within which the president

operates.
A

structural approach improves upon the prevailing theories; it

critiques the fundamental dynamics that exist independent

of

And it squarely confronts the possibility

president at any given time.

that the current crisis of the political economy may require

rethinking and redefinition

the

of

a

serious

the guiding priorities of liberal

11

democratic capitalism.

that sense,

In

it

is

radical theory.

a

With

this in mind, we should be less concerned with the question of
what kind
of

president our society needs, and more attuned to the question

kind of society we want to be.

If

of

what

my dissertation helps orient

political science toward the latter issue,

it

will have made a

contribution to the discipline.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF PRESIDENCY FETISHISM

The day of enlightened administration has come.

—

In

Franklin

D.

Roosevelt

1941 Henry Luce proclaimed the dawning of the "American

Century."

With political

science in mind, he might have heralded the

"Presidential Century."

Franklin Roosevelt's tenure stimulated

a

veritable love affair

between political science and studies of the presidency.

revolution" not only overturned entrenched notions
between government, economy and society.
of

American government scholars.

It

of

The "Roosevelt

the relationship

also refocused the vision

His handling of the dual crises of

depression and world war permanently elevated the office to heights
unimagined in the nineteenth century, save for periods of temporary
urgency.

With the coming of the Roosevelt administration, political

scientists spent considerable time gazing up at the heights, often
semi-awe.

The era of presidential

government had arrived.

in

1

was
Like any historic change, however, the rise of the presidency

not without its antecedents.

While FDR routinely is credited with

creating the modern office

the presidency and solidifying its

of

be the first chief
activist character, Theodore Roosevelt is thought to
2
in outlook.
executive who legitimately can be termed "modern"

of

His view

notions of the president
the office was filled with Progressive Era

14

15

as the guarantor of

reform and innovation.

There is, in fact,

a

direct

link between Theodore Roosevelt's enlarged conception of the
office and

the expansion of the modern positive state, whose interventions to

rationalize the economy preceded similar New Deal efforts by several
decades.

Roosevelt explains his energized view of the presidency in

his autobiography.

The section where he enunciates his "stewardship"

theory is worth quoting at length:

The most important factor in getting the right
spirit in my Administration, next to the insistence
upon courage, honesty, and a genuine democracy of
desire to serve the plain people, was my insistence
upon the theory that the executive power was limited
only by specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or imposed by the Congress
under its Constitutional powers.
My view was that
every executive of f i cer
was a steward of the people
bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could
for the people, and not to content himself with the
negative merit of keeping his talents undamaged in a
napkin.
1
declined to adopt the view that what was
imperatively necessary for the Nation could not be
done by the President unless he could find some
My belief was that
specific authorization to do it.
it was not only his right but his duty to do anything
that the needs of the Nation demanded unless such
action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the
Under this interpretation of executive power I
laws.
did and caused to be done many things not previously
done by the President and the heads of the departments.
did not usurp power, but 1 did greatly broaden the
I
use of executive power. 4
.

.

.

Roosevelt's expansive theory of the president's powers gave the chief

executive wide latitude to pursue his idea
prohibited by specific legal barriers.

of

the public good, unless

On this reading of

the

presidency, the White House could become the "bully pulpit" Roosevelt
relished.

"I

believed in invoking the National power with absolute

high
freedom for every National need," he asserted, while maintaining

16

regard

-for

the Constitution as

a

tool

for

social progress,

strai ght jacket cunningly fashioned to strangle growth

."

"not as

a

55

Roosevelt contrasted his theory of the presidency -- what he
termed the

Jackson-Lincoln" school -- with the more circumscribed

vision of the "Buchanan-Taf t" school.

The latter outlook held the

narrowly legalistic view that the President is the servant of Congress
rather than of the people, and can do nothing, no matter how necessary
it

be to act,

unless the Constitution explicitly commands the action.

Roosevelt's successor upheld this second, more confined notion
presidency.

William Howard Taft saw great danger

domination" in Roosevelt's stewardship theory.

encouraging presidents to hold inflated opinions

of

In

of

of

A

the

"executive

addition to
--

their own worth

he chided Roosevelt for equating himself in any way with Lincoln

—

Taft

believed that making the president responsible for the general welfare
of

the nation stretched the power of the chief executive well beyond

reasonable limits, establishing him as
judgments are beyond reproach.

a

"Universal Providence" whose

Roosevelt's view

of

"ascribing an

undefined residuum of power to the President is an unsafe doctrine,"
Taft reasoned, one that "might lead under emergencies to results

of

an

7
arbitrary character, doing irremediable injustice to private right ."

far safer notion of executive power would limit the scope of

presidential discretion, as Taft here asserts:

The true view of the Executive functions is, as I
conceive it, that the President can exercise no power
which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some
specific grant of power or justly implied and included
within such express grant as proper and necessary to its
Such specific grant must be either in the
exercise.

A

17

Federal Constitution or in an act of Congress passed in
pursuance thereof.
There is no undefined residuum of
power which he can exercise because it seems to him to
be in the public interest....
The grants of Executive
power are necessarily in general terms in order not to
embarrass the Executive within the field of action
plainly marked for him, but his jurisdiction must be
justified and vindicated by affirmative constitutional
or statutory provision, or it does not exist.®
It

was FDR's presidency that ensured the triumph of the earlier

Roosevelt’s conception
America.

of

the office in the expectations of postwar

Coming to power in the wake of three passive Taft-like chief

executives, Franklin Roosevelt stood for virtually everything the more

restricted model opposed.

He had an abounding faith in the stewardship

approach, believing in presidential leadership as the best hope for the
material and spiritual revival of the country.

On the eve of

the

election of 1932 he offered this well known assessment of the historic
role of the presidency:

The Presidency is not merely an administrative
It is more than an
That's the least of it.
office.
It is preengineering job, efficient or inefficient.
All our great
eminently a place of moral leadership.
Presidents were leaders of thought at times when certain
historic ideas in the life of the nation had to be clarified.

Henceforth, the presidency would be both enormously expanded
scope of operation

—

the government would take on

a

in

its

host of functions

previously either beyond its purview altogether or not formally

institutionalized

—

and greatly enhanced as

society's basic principles.

a

source of affirmation for

The president would provide the enlightened

administration espoused by FDR, the chief executive who,
one observer,

Americans.

1

°

in

the words of

"first made the office 'real' in the daily lives of

18

The broad vision of Theodore Roosevelt, as etched
into American

political life by FDR, and the narrower view

of

Taft, both have since

served to delimit the range of thinking about the presidency.

Political

scientists typically locate the office, analytically and normatively,
somewhere between the poles articulated by these two presidents.

The

former position endorses an active chief executive who expands the reach
of

the office for the sake of achieving widely shared programmatic

goals.

This expansivist view is presidency-weighted, regarding the

maximization

presidential power as virtually the sine qua non

of

American politics.
power, viewing

a

of

The latter perspective seeks to rein in presidential

relatively restrained chief executive as more closely

attuned to the intentions

of

the framers of the Constitution and less

prone to abuses of authority.

Greater balance between the branches

of

government, particularly the executive and legislative, forms the basis
of

this restrictivist position.

11

Versions

of

these approaches have

survived in the wake of FDR, right on through the presidency
Reagan.
of

of

Ronald

This chapter surveys some major works within these two schools

thought, beginning with the expansivists -- those analysts who sought

to consecrate in theory,

Expansivist Theories

of

what the presidency had become in practice.

the Presidency

Scholarly doubts about the ascendancy and virtue

of

presidential

initiative in postwar American politics were few and far between.

By

the early 1960's the expansivist view of the office as an engine for the

pursuit
science.

of

agenda seemed firmly entrenched in political

the liberal
One can get

a

sense of the spirit and substance of the

19

expanisvist outlook from the work of James MacGregor
Burns.
Presidential Government

,

Burns develops

a

rooted in the ideas of Alexander Hamilton.

"implied

In

model of the modern presidency
The Hamiltonian model

federal government revolving around the Presidency,
and

a

depending on energy, resourcefulness, inventiveness, and

a

ruthless

pragmatism in the executive office...."

a

model

1

*

He hopes such

might

serve as an antidote to the "delay and devitalization" of government he

discerned in an earlier work analyzing the "deadlock" built in to the

constitutional machinery

of

American democracy 13
.

For Burns, Lyndon Johnson represented the glory of presidential

government.

Writing at the outset of Johnson's Great Society program,

Burns confidently claims the presidency to be "at the peak

prestige."

government,"

Johnson's tenure marks the "triumph
a

of

of

its

presidential

kind of government geared to the achievement of new

qualitative goals of liberalism which FDR, another Hamiltonian chief
executive, had failed to achieve.

These goals include "a concerted and

sustained and expensive effort to impart values like those

of

Johnson to

the barren lives of millions of Americans, middle class as well as

deprived," accompanied by the diversion of "the kind of resources into
cultural, recreational, and educational activities that we have in the
past poured into economic recovery, or even into national defense ."

1

'1

Burns wrote, of course, before the massive pouring of resources into the
effort of imparting "values like those of Johnson" to the "barren" lives
of

millions of Vietnamese.
At

times, Burns' affection for presidential assertions of power

goes even farther

--

perhaps too far.

It

reaches nearly absurd

20

p<

oportions in his reflections on an earlier progressive president,

Theodore Roosevelt.

He laments:

For a man with Theodore Roosevelt's need for personal fulfillment it was a sort of tragedy that he had
no war -- not even a Whiskey Rebellion.
Not only would
war have given him immense psychological gratification,
it would also have brought his means and ends into better

relation. 10
This regret for the needs-gr ati

championed the use

f

cati on of

a

president who unflinchingly

America's Big Stick to achieve its supposed

of

destiny as the global policeman.
of

i

It

takes little imagination to think

the means Roosevelt would have employed to secure his ends, given his

record of allowing U.S. military interventions short of war to defend
the "civilized world's" standards of law and order.

patronizing attitude toward the "damned dagoes"

of

His racist,

Columbia, or the

"Chinese halfbreds," "Malay bandits," "savages, barbarians,
ignorant people" of the Philippines provides

a

a

wild and

hint on this score 16
.

Despite his exalted view of presidential government, Burns admits

Americans generally are ambivalent toward an energized, expansivist

administration like that

the Hamiltonian Johnson

of

ambivalence rooted in the fear that "a current

or

However, such fear

Burns reasons, for as it turns out,

government, far from being

a

a

bulwark of individual

liberty, an agency of popular representation, and
." 17

"presidential

threat to American democracy, has become

-the major single institution sustaining it

talent and leadership

Roosevelt),

future strong man in

the White House might threaten American democracy."
has been misplaced,

(or

a

magnet for political

When tempered by an abiding concern for

21

Jeffersonian purposes, this situation can endure, to the benefit

of

the

office and the public.
Burns saw an entire "epoch" of presidential government on the

horizon.

His endorsement of the expanisvist view proved to be

especially ironic, though, since Johnson's presidency marks the
beginning of the decline --

if

postwar political science.

To appreciate the precipitousness of

not the end -- of expansivist theories in

decline it is useful to examine some
Burns followed.
will

of

this

the major theorists whose tracks

Harold Laski, Clinton Rossiter and Richard Neustadt

be the focus of

my attention.

They certainly do not exhaust the

supply of expansivist writers, nor do they include all the variations on
the expansivist theme. 10

But they do represent classic defenses of this

major approach to the presidency.

British political scientist and Labor Party leader Harold Laski
was one of the first analysts to posit the unique character of the

presidency.

His 1940 book The American Presidency shuns any simple

comparisons between the chief executive and institutions

parliamentary systems.

117

Believing the essence

of

of

European

the presidency to be

its organic development within an American environment and historical

traditions, Laski contends that there is no foreign institution against
which it can be compared "because, basically, there is no comparable

foreign institution.

11

The presidency is novel:

United States is both more and less than
and less than

a

prime minister." 20

a

king;

"The president of the
he is,

also, both more

The special nature of the office

places an enormous burden on its occupant.

Citizens expect direct

thought and action from the president on the key issues

of

the day,

22

since the officeholder symbolizes the entire nation.

But while

embodying the hopes and dreams of the people as the head of state, the

president stands alone as head

of

the government, shouldering the

responsibility for the success or failure

of

government policies.

No

one shares the blame if policies go awry, certainly not cabinet

officials.
if

"In England,

things go wrong, or

a

we blame an anonymous entity

'the Government'

mistake is made," Laski points out, whereas "in

the United States it is the president who is blamed

." 21

Hence, Laski

sees an unusual degree of risk for presidents who would be bold and

innovative.
More than this risk, though, Laski everywhere sees limits to the

expansion of presidential influence.
when he states that "the day of

which the president ceases to be

question of the freedom of

a

He has these constraints in mind

successful election is the day on

a

a

free man."

Setting aside for now the

person before being elected, among the many

constraints on the officeholder is the deep-seated American aversion
toward strong governmental leadership.

Laski notes Americans'

traditional fear of centralized authority, manifest in the scheme

federalism and checks and balances established by the framers
Constitution.

of

of

the

The institutionalized fragmentation of power and

authority has long been noted, and usually celebrated, as one
defining features

of

Laski takes

democracy in the U.S.

such impediments to coherent leadership.

In

the

dim view of

particular, he finds

Congress an annoying barrier to presidential action.
role of the U.S.

a

of

The oppositional

legislature (unlike the unified parliamentary

its
government in Britain), combined with its sectional orientation and

23

will
up

to assert its own power,

makes tor tactionalized politics.

Summing

the relationship between the two branches ot government, Laski

unambiguous about his opinion

ot

Congress.

is

"Its own instinctive and

inherent tendency is, under all circumstances, to be anti -pr esi denti
he says,

al

,

adding that it constantly seeks ways to ditter trom the

president, tor in so dittering it is

"

affirming its own essence" and

"exalting its own prestige ." 22
Along with the divisive role of Congress, Laski cites the power of
big business as especially troublesome for presidents.

the "interstitial

He contends that

connections between business and politics in the

United States" color every facet of the context

of

political life.

Congress is affected, directing its energy to the maintenance

conditions

of

confidence which business men approve."

equally deferential to the business ethos:

"those

of

Parties are

"tSlince the Civil War the

dividing line between them has never been real....

The truth is,

I

think, that these major parties have been essentially the agents of the

property interests of the United States ...." 23

And,

of

president must "pay continuous attention to the attitude
itself."

Laski writes:

he is not

a

to run

'sound'

course, the
of

business

"The president who arouses the suspicion that

man from the angle of business philosophy is bound

into heavy weather

." 24

Forms of "heavy weather" can vary, but he

clearly has in mind some kind of investment strike on the part

of

capital, with the attendant "rapid repercussion upon unemployment and
the standard of life."

The general

idea here simply is that any

government program for innovative social reform must prove acceptable to
big business,

or

risk confronting coordinated business efforts to

24

undermine the conditions of economic health upon which such reforms must
est

r

Aligned against the risk of presidential initiative, the historic

distrust of centralized power, and the effective veto power

of

the

business community is what Laski sees as the modern imperative of the

positive state, directed by strong presidential leadership.

presidencies

of

Citing the

Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, Wilson and FDR, Laski

argues that strong executive leadership has occurred in the U.S. during

periods of crisis.

Indeed, it is

a

measure of the beauty of the

American political system that "so far, it is clear, the hour has
brought forth the man."

His point is that the time has come for the

sustained exercise of presidential initiative.

"America has now entered

the epoch where the requirements of the positive state can no longer be

denied," he writes.
strong president

a

Political, economic and social forces have made

necessary and enduring part

of

a

the nation's future.

And there is no question that he thinks of Franklin Roosevelt and the

New Deal

as the kind of

For Laski,

example
was

a

of

president and program such conditions demand.

the first

100 days of FDR's term stand as the greatest

presidential leadership ever, including wartime.

positive president with

a

Roosevelt

gift for knowing how to "prick men into

thought" and into enthusiastic support for his programs.

But because

U.S., once
the tradition of negative government is so entrenchd in the

congressional and
the most immediate dangers of depression had passed,
the Roosevelt
other opponents of the New Deal were able to constrain

second term.
administration in numerous ways, especially during his
Laski

quality
wants America to overcome this cyclical, boom-bust

of

25

assertions

executive power through the establishment

of

unified, presi denti

al

1

y-1 ed government.

of

strong,

For as he contends,

"a

government does not prove its adequacy because it can transcend its own

principles in an emergency; its adequacy is born
prevent the outbreak of emergency

.

255

of

its ability to

Central to this goal is

"radical realignment of parties" in America.

a

Absent the formation of

a

truly progressive party, the "forces of privilege" will continue to

dominate the scope of political choices.

But with disciplined parties

a

strong president will find the institutional support, especially in

Congress, for executive leadership.

No longer would parties simply

"enthrone the conservative forces in permanent power."
Such

shift ultimately depends on popular support among the

a

people, however, and it is here that Laski looks for the real staying
power of

a

president's claim to enhanced authority.

Again with FDR as

the model, he asserts the need for presidents to draw upon the vigor of

movements for social and economic change to ensure
reform.

Roosevelt's passion for change aroused the "dynamic

democracy,"

a

dynamic with "an ener gy

.

.

.

mor e powerful

than the dynamic of any other form of state." 2 *

unleashing such
of

a

Laski

of

and more pervasive

claims that

powerful democratic force is the answer to the problem

generating the presidential leadership necessary for the nation

the difficult times ahead.
of

constituency for

a

an

It

can spark the interest and moral concern

ordinarily uninterested populous.

concerns of the common person with which
lead the nation successfully.

in

And it is,
a

after all, the

president must be in touch to

Those concerns, and the object of broad

executive initiative for future generations, will center on the

26

expansion of the positive state.

Expanded presidential power will be

the vehicle for its realization.

A

As Laski

weak presidency will not suffice.

explains:

weak president, in a word, is a gift to the forces of
reaction in the United States.
It enables them to manipulate and maneuver between every difference that is provoked by the absence of a strong hand at the helm.
It
arrests the power to transcend the negativism which the
scheme of American government so easily erects into a
principle of action.
A weak presidency prevents that
transcendence of the limitations of 1787 which the
compulsions of our generation demand. 27

A

It

is,

finally, in this potential transcendence that we can locate

the essence of Laski

's

case for the expansion of the presidency.

Only

a

president with broader power can confront the problems plaguing the
nation.

Only

a

president can rise above the pervasive obstacles to

progressive reform.

Laski

is mindful

of

the possible dangers of

increasing the power of the chief executive.

The temptation to abuse is

Yet he sees power as an opportunity as well, an opportunity that

great.

must be granted if the country is to achieve its highest aspirations.

"CGlreat power alone makes great leadership possible" he concludes;

provides the unique chance of restoring America to its people." 20
argument for the transcendent ability

of

to as the ability to "suspend the normal

system")

the office

"it

This

(elsewhere referred

assumptions of the American
Two weaknesses

seems thin, though, upon closer examination.

are particularly damaging to his argument.

First, Laski offers no critical assessment of the dynamics of U.S.

foreign policy and how they impinge upon

a

president

s

power.

He is

correct to point out that in matters of international affairs the

27

president has
of

"decisive hand."

a

He informs us that

"in no other part

American political life has the separation of powers counted for so

little as in the definition of this part." 2 *

proceeds to accept without
U.S.

a

True enough.

note of dissent the proposition that the

had developed, even before the Spanish-American War,

"consciousness
pursues.

of

a

But he

a

world-destiny" which the presidency reflects and

Apparently this American outlook is unproblematic -- no need

for presidential

transcendence here.

It

is puzzling,

though, why

someone who grounds his analysis of the domestic side of the office in
some kind of moral framework would accept without qualification the

premise of American empire.
an

Moreover, even

if

he is simply expressing

implicit hope for American resolve and aid in the face

of

growing

tension in Europe over the expansion of Nazi Germany (and it is not
clear that he is), he should not ignore altogether the connection

between U.S. foreign policy and the domestic economy, particularly the

interests

of

big business.

If

these interests constrain the president

in

the domestic sphere, as he suggests, it bears notice how they do so

in

the foreign sphere.

This raises

analysis.

a

second, more significant, weakness of Laski's

While it may be true that

a

strengthened president working

within an invigorated party system might provide the unified leadership
the framers tried so hard to foil, it is less clear how such unity could

elude the reach of big business, whose powerful position he contends has
given it "an economic and psychological authority unexampled.

country in the world."

.. in

any

Laski repeatedly refers to the maintenance of

business confidence as imperative for the realization

of

reform.

Vet he

28

also wants activist presidents -- emboldened by the ongoing equivalent
of

crisis conditions -- to overcome the interests

privilege and the

of

propertied classes in order to extend the positive state.
attempt to resolve this tension.

Hence his prescription for the

presidency rests on too sanguine
Systemic reforms can have
The New Deal
stop well

He makes no

a

a

view of the possibilities of reform.

tremendous impact on people's lives.

experience has taught us that.

But the limits of reformism

short of the transcendence of the basic structure of the

political economy, which is another New Deal lesson.
FDR -- Laski's model

of

After all,

was

it

liberal reformism -- who offered perhaps the

most lucid summary of the status quo bounds of such

a

philosophy.

"The

most serious threat to our institutions comes from those who refuse to

face the need for change," he declared while campaigning for reelection
in

1936.

"Liberalism becomes the protection for the far-sighted

conservative....

'Reform if you would preserve.’

conservative because

I

am that

kind of liberal." 30

I

am that

kind of

The consequences of

these limits affect both presidents and programs they would pursue.
They are explored in the rich literature of the "corporate liberal"

perspective on 20th century history. 31

Laski anticipates no such

obstacles to political change; he overstates the efficacy

of

a

popular

president infected with the reforming spirit.
Whatever the shortcomings of Laski's work, he at least thought it

important to grapple with the issue of how the political economy

constrains the scope

of

presidential initiative.

Clinton Rossiter's

1956 book The American Presidency gained a far wider audience and much

more praise while providing less analytic content.

As another

major

29

expansi vist theorist, Rossiter applauds the accretion of
presidential
power since the founding of the nation, while describing in
near-

worshipful tones the contributions
that increase.

individual chief executives to

of

His sketches of the most influential presidents

(e.g.

Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, FDR) at times approach hagiography.

Of

this tendency, we are forewarned:

I

would be less than candid were

"I

not to make clear at the outset my own feeling of veneration, if not

exactly reverence, for the authority and dignity of the Presidency

Rossiter's influential text thus has

a

."

52

civics book quality about it,

which may, in part, account for its popularity 55
.

Rossiter describes the president as

a

man wearing many "hats."

The hat imagery aptly summarizes the thrust of the book, for his purpose
is to explain the many roles a president must,

assuming office.

by necessity,

play upon

This emphasis on the president's roles proved so

popular an approach that, at one time, it could be written that it

constituted "the most prevalent and academically respectable way
viewing the presidency....

office." 5 *

of

[I]t may be dubbed the received view of the

Rossiter cataloges presidential roles, or functions (he uses

the terms interchangeably), in order to draw attention to "the

staggering burden he bears for all of us."

all,

ten major roles are

The first five roles comprise the "strictly constitutional"

discussed.

functions

In

of

the office, and include chief of state, chief executive,

commander-in-chief, chief diplomat, and chief legislator.
provocative themes can be found here.

For instance, being the head

both state and government -- fusing "the dignity of
of

a

prime minister"

—

Many

a

c

king and the power

carries with it complex issues of accountability

30

of

power.

Likewise, the historically controversial commander-in-chief

position poses fundamental problems not only with Congress, and its

competing authority to declare war
nuclear age must face

a

,

but also with the people, who in the

president swollen to “nothing short

constitutional dictator'" in wartime.
are,

of

a

Yet as pressing as these issues

Rossiter makes no attempt to scratch below their surface.

He is

enumerating, not analyzing.
Together these five roles give the president formidable political
muscle.
an

Citing Harry Truman, Rossiter says the responsibilities "form

aggregate

power that would have made Caesar or Genghis Khan or

of

Napoleon bite his nails with envy ." 33

president's arsenal.

To the original

functions he believes round out

president's job:

a

But these do not exhaust

five Rossiter adds five additional

realistic assessment of the

chief of party, voice of the people, protector of the

peace, manager of prosperity and world leader 36

These roles have

.

arisen from historic exigency, not constitutional design.
of

a

The manager

prosperity role stems from the need for overall economic stability to

prevent depression, the role of world leader from our post World War
stature, and so on.

II

Nevertheless, he accords them equal status with the

constitutionally grounded functions.
Having briefly touched upon the ten presidential roles he then
He finds

steps back to see what they add up to.

"something more than the arithmetical total

of

single office that is the presidency itself.
this finding:

"I

feel

something like

a

all

a

"seamless unity,"
its functions,"

a

He is almost giddy with

professor

who has just ticked off the ingredients of

a

of

nutritional science

wonderful stew." 3/

31

Sometimes the ingredients do not mix well with one another, however,
causing presidents to use their leadership to find the proper balance

between them.

Rossiter shifts metaphors to make this point:

the Presidency is a chamber orchestra of ten pieces,
played by the leader, he must learn for himself by
hard practice how to blend them together, remembering
always that perfect harmony is unattainable .... 30
If

all

Such

a

blending of musical instruments, or stew, adds

a

tremendous

administrative responsibility to the already "monstrous" burden resting
on

the president's shoulders.

That burden is made more manageable by

the vast executive bureaucracy which has flourished in the twentieth

century.

But it is not removed.

The office remains

a

"one-man job."

Truman's famous sign on his desk -- "The buck stops here" -- captures
the essence of the presidency for Rossiter.

Despite great power and responsibility the president is not
agent.

Rossiter follows his account of the president's roles with

discussion

of

free

a

a

the limits that balance these powers, serving as

safeguards that "keep the President's feet in paths

righteousness."

of

constitutional

He highlights seven major centers of power restraining

the chief executive.

Congress, the Supreme Court, the federal

bureaucracy and political parties offer

a

check on the level of national

government, while individual states, free enterprise and public opinion
present other potential barriers.

Most of the seven provide partial

restraint, or serve only as an irritant.

The Supreme Court, for

example, usually ends up "rationalizing most pretensions" of presidents,

amounting to "one of the least reliable restraints" on executive
behavior.

Free enterprise

—

broadly defined to include, among others,
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corporations, small businesses, consumer groups and unions
plays

a

modest part in checking the president.

To be sure,

—
a

similarly

president

must seek the support of this "fabulous galaxy" of free enterprise

organizations.

But beyond that Rossiter does not explain the nature of

the relationship involved, except to criticize the performance of labor

free enterprisers John L. Lewis

("the last of the robber barons")

and

Philip Murray.
The two centers of countervailing power that actually play

significant ongoing role are Congress and public opinion.

a

Congress is

a

"fiercely independent" institution that vigorously wields its many

weapons to check and confine presidential initiative.

Summing up its

powers, Rossiter says:

C T 3 h e
most reliable single limitation on the American
Presidency is the independent existence of a proud,
jealous, watchful coordinate branch.
No President ever
lived who would not have agreed, reverently or ruefully,
with this statement. 39

If

Congress is the most reliable constraining force, however, public

opinion constitutes,
the President."

"over the long run," the "most effective check upon

Granting the chief executive's power to shape public

sentiment, Rossiter thinks there is
not be led.

a

point beyond which the public will

That point marks what he several times calls the "grand and

durable pattern

of

private liberty and public morality."

By this he

intends to draw attention to the importance of ends and means that are

"characteristically American," or "fair, dignified, traditional, and
familiar," or "within the common range

of

expectations," namely ends and

means which "at least do not outrage the accepted dictates of

33

constitutionalism, democracy, personal liberty, and Christian
morality.

4°

While Rossiter is vague on what these terms entail, he

does single out those who contend that FDR should have nationalized the

banking system in 1933 as holding
an

a

view that would have fallen outside

acceptable range of liberty and morality.
However powerful

a

check public opinion is, it most effectively

limits presidential initiative not in isolation, but when it operates

through one of the other major centers of restraint, as when the public

pressures Congress to act against the wishes

of

an administration.

Indeed, these institutional constraints are enfeebled and "often

useless" without the weight of public opinion to buttress them.

But

even allowing for the efficacy of an aroused public voicing its opinions

through centers of countervailing power, Rossiter finds the ultimate
limit on the chief executive to be internally generated, not externally

imposed.

Personal beliefs, conscience, and

form the human constitution that ensures
with established norms.

a

a

sense of history together

president will act in accord

These sel f -1 i mi tat i ons

,

in

conjunction with the

more formal barriers, thus keep the American presidency moving "with the

grain of liberty and morality."

exposition of the interplay

of

The imagery we are left with after this

presidential power and its limits is

vintage Rossiter:

President is not a Gulliver immobilized by ten
thousand tiny cords, nor even a Prometheus chained to a
He is, rather, a kind of magnificent
rock of frustration.
lion who can roam widely and do great deeds so long as he
41
does not try to break loose from his broad reservation.
[T Ihe
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Rossiter's ensuing account of the history
amounts to

a

celebration

great deeds.

of

of

the presidency

those who have roamed widely and done very

With George Washington in mind as the person who would be

chosen as the first U.S. president, the authors of the Constitution made
a

series of key decisions enabling

proceedings in Philadelphia.

a

strong executive to emerge from the

And while those basic contours of the

office remain unchanged, there have been shifts in the character of the
office that have left the presidential picture "a hundred times

magnified."

These changes reflect the growth of the power and prestige

the office,

of

policy.

and its centrality to the process of making government

Rossiter sees an inevitable upward trajectory for the status

the chief executive, propelled by several

The growth of the state as

accounts for one area

of

a

of

exigent forces of history.

regulator of economic and social life

enhanced executive authority.

Americans

repeatedly turn to their president and "beg" him for help in solving
their many problems.

Another force magnifying presidential power has

been the nation's "self-elevation" to the position of
power.

The mandate of

a

principle global

international relations guarantees that "as the

world grows smaller, he will grow bigger."

Third, domestic and

international emergencies, ranging from strikes to full-scale war, add
to presidential

status.

The relative decline of Congress from its

nineteenth century grandeur represents

a

fourth factor.

And finally,

-- the
the rise of the presidency as the preeminent democratic office

most popularly elected office as well as the one most suited to serve as
a

vehicle for the people's designs

all

others in importance.

has meant that it would eclipse

By themselves,

none of these farces necessarily would have

strengthened the office

if

the challenges they ushered in were not met

by leaders willing and able to exercise authority with resolve.

Fortunately for the nation, according to Rossiter, we have been blessed
with exceptional presidents when the times called for them.
and personalities have been synchronous.

hour-has-brought-f or th-the-man " thesis.

Situations

Here he echoes Laski's "theHe counts eight presidents who

merit the adjective "great," and six other "notable" ones, who together

helped build the "office of freedom."

His brief portraits of these men

offer tribute to their legendary achievements, achievements that

Rossiter stands in awe of as he glorifies them:

Each is an authentic folk hero, each a symbol of some
Together
virtue or dream especially dear to Americans.
they make up almost half of the company of American
giants, for who except Christopher Columbus, Benjamin
Franklin, Daniel Boone, Robert E. Lee, and Thomas A.
Edison in real life, Deerslayer and Ragged Dick in
fiction, and Paul Bunyon and the Lonesome Cowboy in myth
Washington the
can challenge them for immortality?
spotless patriot, Jefferson the democrat, Jackson the
man of the frontier, Lincoln the emancipator and
preserver of the Union, Theodore Roosevelt the AllAmerican Boy, Wilson the peacemaker -- these men are
symbols of huge interest and value to the American

people 42
.

Myths and symbols certainly play an important role in any society.
No one would argue with that.

But Rossiter nearly leaves the realm of

earthly existence in lavishing praise on these luminaries.
to be an end

in

Myths seem

themselves when he writes, "The final greatness

of

the

incredible
Presidency lies in the truth that it is not just an office of
power but

a

breeding ground

of

indestructable myth."

drawbacks to the preservation of

a

Are there any

mythical aura surrounding our most

36

elevated political figure?

Apparently not.

Even the presidents that

historians and political scientists routinely cite as the worst
Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, Ulysses
receive, as consolation

experience,

a

of

sorts,

Grant and Warren Harding --

S.

kind words:

gentle man," and so on 43
.

if

rich

This hero worship confirms

"cardinal fact" of historical scholarship:

written,

"a man of

a

"American history is

not always made, by men of moderate views, broad interests,

and merciful

judgments

The merciful

1,44
.

judgments continue for the three figures Rossiter

examines at some length in

a

Truman and Dwight Eisenhower.

section on the modern presidency -- FDR,

Presidential modernization entailed the

incorporation of five key changes (on top

the ones listed earlier)

of

over the quarter-century since Rossevelt first took the oath of office.

The first change is the further erosion of Congressional power vis-a-vis
the executive branch.

New Deal economic management, in particular,

solidified expectations that the president would play
the legislative process, virtually becoming

a

a

crucial role in

"third House of Congress."

This blossoming responsibility was aided by the concomitant development
of

radio and television, the second dimension

"miracles of electronics" opened up channels
the president in touch with the people in
way.

a

of
of

the modern office.

communication that put

more intimate and sustained

Regular press conferences were one immediate outgrowth

technologies.

The

of

the new

Henceforth, the president would mold public opinion as

never before.
A

third change is the increased use of the president as

"Protector of the Peace," one of the ten original roles that define the
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office.

The citizenry now demands the president be

a

"one-man riot

squad" able to go anywhere and do anything necessary to maintain

domestic tranquility.

Although numerous applications come to mind, the

one Rossiter is most clearly pleased with is the power of president's to

intervene, with force

if

need be, to resolve labor disputes. 48

He

applauds the executive's willingness -- both pre- and post-Taft Hartley
Act -- to quell

strikes, the gravest threat to liberty and morality from

Rossiter's perspective.

Rounding out the modern alterations are

presidential efforts on behalf of civil rights and civil liberties, and
the conversion of the office into

a

Executive Office of the President.

bureaucratic structure

of

the

The former development establishes

the president more firmly as "a friend of liberty;" the chief executive
has no choice but "to serve as the conscience and strong arm of American
The bureaucratic evolution institutionalizes the office,

democracy."

surrounding the presidency with the personnel to carry out its

burgeoning duties.
The three modern chief executives overall fared well

environment.

in

this new

Rossiter counts FDR and Truman among the aforementioned

"great" presidents, while Eisenhower falls in with the next echelon of

"notable" ones.
eyebrows.

Roosevelt's place in the pantheon

But Truman is

a

more debatable choice.

on the grounds that despite his many controversial

giants raises no

of

Rossiter defends it

decisions in foreign

affairs, none, not the use of atomic weaponry nor the Korean War, "has
been proven wrong, stupid, or contrary to the best judgment and

interests of the American people."

philosophy of presidential power"

Moreover, he had

a

"clear-cut

(the power to persuade people to do
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things)

and the commitment to use that power even while frankly

admitting his sparse abilities as
of

a

leader.

Rossiter sees in him proof

the democratic principle that an average person can fulfill the

obligations

of

the toughest job in the world.

As for Eisenhower,

while

certainly not an average person by any standard, the general ranks just
outside the "magic circle

of

presidential greatness."

he failed to

If

use the powers of the office to turn his vast popularity into real

influence, he did succeed in being conservative.

—

literally
in

he methodically conserved the modern role of the government

the new, managed economy, and conserved as well the expanded role of

the U.S.
an

Rossiter means this

in

the world.

He was not exciting;

he was

a

plodder of sorts,

anti-intellectual whose contribution was not innovation, but

maintenance.

He succeeded,

in

short,

"on his own terms,

and they were

never the terms of creative genius."
What are we left with, then, after Rossiter's discussion of the

roles of the presidency and the men who filled them?

reflection is one of conservative

(in

His own final

the above sense of conserving the

status quo) contentment, expressing his "deep note of satisfaction" with
the office and predicting "a long and exciting future for the American

Presidency."

His expansivist optimism rests on his belief that "all the

great political and social forces that brought the Presidency to its

present state of power and glory will continue to work in the future,

ensuring that "we will turn to the Presi dent
46
problems that fall thickly upon us ."

... for

help in solving the

The strong, active chief

executive, reminiscent of the great ones who have come before, is
certainty:

"There is

a

Presidency in our future, and

it

is the

a

39

Presidency

of

Jackson and Lincoln rather than

of

Monroe and Buchanan, of

Roosevelt and Truman rather than of Harding and Cool idge.
and vigorous presidential

1,47

Persistent

leadership thus serves as both description and

prescription for Rossiter, who opposes any effort to weaken the
institutional centrality

of

the office.

The stakes are simply too high:

tAlny major reduction now in the powers of the President
would leave us naked to our enemies, to the invisible
forces of boom and bust at home and to the visible forces
of unrest and aggression abroad.
In a country over which
industrialism has swept in great waves, in a world where
active diplomacy is the minimum price of survival, it is
not alone power but a vacuum of power that men must fear. 40

The presidency Rossiter endorses

"richly blessed"

democracy."

It

—

—

the office with which Americans are

represents "a choice instrument of constitutional

is ascribed totemic

qualities.

To tamper with this

"peculiar treasure" in any fundamental way is to court disaster.

"Leave

Your Presidency Alone" -- this is Rossiter's fundamental counsel.

Though Rossiter's stature in the field of presidency scholarship

remains strong, the evolution

of

discourse on the presidency veered away

from his approach with the publication in 1960 of Presidential Power

.

perhaps the most influential book ever written on the topic and

certainly the most forceful statement of the expanisvist position.
Written by Rossiter's friend and colleague Richard Neustadt, the book

represents

a

self-conscious attempt to break with the hitherto dominant

way of conceptualizing the office.

Rather than adopting

constitutional orientation to the presidency, viewing
of

formal roles to be carried out within

a

it

a

traditional

as an amalgam

matrix of competing

40

institutions, Neustadt sought to see it as
major purpose -- to wield power.

a

more unified whole with one

He writes:

My theme is personal power and its politics:
what it
is, how to get it, how to keep it, how to lose it.
My
interst is in what a President can do to make his own
will felt within his own Administration .... 30

He has written what amounts to

a

prescription for presidential power

(his first working title for the book was "Primer for Presidents")

broadly defined as "personal influence on government action."
on

Drawing

case studies of the Truman and Eisenhower years, he proceeds by

examining examples

of

presidential weakness and contrasting them with

the type of executive behavior he believes could have resulted in more

effective policy outcomes.

The latter are reinforced by examples of

successful presidential action in roughly similar circumstances, with
FDR often serving as the model efficacious actor.
For Neustadt,

persuade.

the essence of presidential power is the power to

The extent of this power depends upon the ability to

influence the behavior of people in government, with such influence
becoming the measure
a

problem with

of

president's power to persuade;

a

However, Neustadt sees

presidential leadership.

automatic ability acquired once in office.

it

is not

simply an

Formal constitutional

"powers" do not guarantee power in the day to day affairs of the

president.
an

For

a

chief executive to turn formal power and status into

operative political tool for achieving desired results, more must be

done than issuing commands from on high.

Presidents must engage in

earthly give-and-take of the persuasive endeavor, in effect bargaining
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with various constituencies which include executive officialdom,

Congress, party officials, citizens at large and citizens abroad.
The connection between persuasion and bargaining is central to

Neustadt's thesis.

He locates the imperatives of this nexus in the

constitution, which created
sharing powers.

a

government

of

separate institutions

This relationship of reciprocal need among separate

institutional actors defines the parameters within which the president
must persuade.

Of

course, the authority inherent in the job enhances

president's persuasiveness.
come with the territory.

a

An enormous amount of respect and esteem

Yet as Neustadt stresses,

a

president also

depends upon those who must be persuaded; their authority and power are

necessary for effective presidential leadership.

Thus,

in

Neustadt's

view, the operation of government hinges on "relationships of mutual

dependence,"

As he summarizes:

Persuasion is a two-way street....
The power to persuade is the power to bargain.
Status and authority yield bargaining advantages.
But in a government of "separated institutions
sharing powers," they yield them to all sides 31
.

Given an environment of pressures and counter pressures, of

interaction among influential people with differing vantage points, how
does

a

9
president wield influence and garner support for programs

does

a

president persuade?

One method,

perspective, is through command.

How

least desirable from Neustadt

As shown in the case of

MacArthur

s

s

troops to
dismissal, the seizure of the steel mills, and the dispatch of

Little Rock,

a

president can on occasion command certain actions that

result in quick compliance.

From

a

presidential perspective, these

42

three cases involved orders which were self-executing.

Yet despite the

fact that commands can work, Neustadt says they do so only under
certain

circumstances.

Conditions under which the necessary factors combine to

produce compliance are relatively rare.

typically occur as

a

Moreover, cases of command

last ditch effort after all other options have

failed or been discarded, in sum constituting political failure rather
than success.

Results may be produced, but the quality

of

the result is

strategically poor, often inconclusive and usually costly to future
programmatic aims.

Neustadt concludes that anything accomplished via

the persuasion mechanism of command necessarily will prove to be

transitory, thus

Command is but a method of persuasion, not a substitute, and not a method suitable for everyday employment. 32
As

a

means of effective persuasion, Neustadt prefers the

aforementioned technique of bargaining.

The need for bargaining in the

formulation of government policy stems from the underlying motive
persuasion:

of

self-interest 33 Because policy actors have differing
.

outlooks and loyalties,

a

president seeking to persuade must convince

them "to believe that what he wants of them is what their own appraisal
of

their own responsibilities requires them to do in their interest, not

his."

People with divergent interests must come together and hammer out

policies that not only embrace their desired objectives, but also appear
form consonant with their individual situations.

Truman

s

handling

in

a

of

the Marshall Plan is used to illustrate the meshing of policy form

and content,

the need for bipartisan policy agreement and the success

43

such accomodation can produce.

how

a

And this also serves as an example of

president can best protect the chances of achieving favorable

policy results.

Such protection, Neustadt postulates, can be obtained

only through the choices

a

president makes.

Power to persuade is thus

intertwined with choices, for "a President's own choices are the only
means in his own hands of guarding his own prospects for effective

influence."
in

Vet to understand how

a

president can guard personal power

bargaining relationships through specific choices, one must first

touch upon the two other key power sources:

professional reputation and

public prestige.
For Neustadt,

a

president's professional reputation (reputation

within the Washington community)

is a central

factor in the exertion of

influence because the power to persuade depends upon what other people
who share governing power have come to expect of the chief executive.

president's reputation is always evolving.
be paid to presenting an overall

image of

Accordingly, attention must
"tenacity" and "skill."

Mistakes are inevitable, but the impression

of

judgment must be avoided at all costs.

and poor

toward establishing

a

recurring inconsistency
A

president with an eye

durable reputation should seek to "maximize

uncertainties in future opposition, to minimize the insecurities
possible support, and to avoid the opposite effect
course,

a

positive reputation

persuasion.

A

in

in

of

either case."

Washington does not guarantee effective

But it can make life at the top much smoother.

Neustadt

emphasizes that the responsibility for reputation is almost entirely

president's own affair.

Of

Since words and actions can damage one

professional image, the responsibility is fraught with risks.

5

The

a

44

point, though, is that
can change,

purposeful

a

president's reputation is not immutable.

as Eisenhower changed his in

1959 with the emergence of

"New Eisenhower" following more than

over budgetary matters.

It

is this potential

a

a

a

year of equivocation

to alter

through executive decisions which lies at the heart

opportunity as

It

of

a

reputation

a

president's

reputation-builder.

Public prestige offers another measurement by which the Washington

community gauges

president's performance.

a

Personal power depends on

the president's standing outside Washington as well as within.

terms

a

president's popularity among the citizenry

"a

jumble of

imprecise impressions held by relatively inattentive men."

disparate collection

of

Neustadt

Yet this

subjective judgments directly influences the

responsiveness of policy actors to the president's programmatic aims.
president's prestige as an element
comparable to that

of

decide the outcome of

of

A

influence, Neustadt contends, is

his professional reputation -- neither one may
a

particular situation, but both may have an

impact on the possibilities in those situations and thus are pivotal to
power prospects.
To protect his or

her

public prestige

be concerned with people's perceptions of

a

president must not merely

the presidential

personality;

the image of the office itself, and what it ought to be, must be

protected.

He emphasizes this connection between popular prestige and

people's notions of the role of the presidency because he believes the
private lives

of

-citizens -- their personal dreams and anxieties

greatly color their expectations of the president.

weakens one's public image.

Popular discontent

Therefore, to protect public prestige

a

45

president must be attuned to their hopes and the objective conditions

of

their real world existence, such as "paychecks, grocery bills,

children's schooling, sons at war" and other concerns
America,

of

Main Street

Unable to control all these elements of people's lives, the

president must become

a

teacher of the public through words and, more

importantly, actions, in effect convincing people to "accept the hard

conditions in their lives, or anyway [to] not blame him."

In

short, to

have influence inside government, the president must "shape the

thoughts" of those outside government.
Given that tactical choices provide the most essential means of

guarding

a

president's three power sources -- bargaining relationships,

professional reputation and public prestige

analysis

of

—

Neustadt turns to an

how the chief executive can gain the greatest benefit from

these choices.

His advice hinges on the simple proposition that

president makes the most

of

available choices by first comprehending the

power stakes involved and acknowledging their implications.
must perceive the possibilities of power and influence:
can be served,

it

a

must be seen." 34

A

president

"Before power

president who senses power and

A

sees policy risks stands ready to decisively plan the future course

government action.

of

And here Neustadt definitely means for the president

to undertake these activities personally.

These are not tasks for

President to see save as he helps

advisers:

"nobody and nothing helps

himself."

As the examples of Eisenhower's budget day fiasco in

a

Truman's Korean War strategy shift in 1950 display, when

a

1957 and

president

erode
neglects personal power stakes the policy results can seriously

executive influence.

Presidents should be wary

of

relying exclusively

46

on

the advice of experts and advisers, even when the issues are far

removed from their experience.
field of personal power.

stakes"

a

Only the president is an expert in the

By developing

"a

consciousness

of

power

president will protect self-interest, clarify vision and

improve the capacity to make choices.
Having discussed the philosophy behind, and importance of

presidential choice-making, Neustadt asks how

operationalizes his suggestions.

A

president actually

fundamental ingredient of self-help

executive is information.

for the chief

a

By

information, Neustadt does

not simply mean the policy briefings and other routine data produced by

advisers.

Presidents need all this, but also need more.

stay abreast of

"the odds and ends of tangible detail

They need to

that pieced

together in his mind illuminate the underside of issues put before him."
Being generally informed is not enough for the power-seeking president.

Knowledge
key.

of

the nitty gritty substance of policy formulation is the

This implies the president should shy away from delegating all the

dirty work of information gathering to advisers who report back only
clean, capsulized version of reality.

Presidents need the dirt too.

They ought to be their "own director of [their! own central

intelligence."

As Neustadt explains:

Presidents are always being told that they should
Exposure
It is dubious advice.
leave details to others.
frame
the
provides
to details of operation and of policy
effective
be
To
of reference for details of information.
as his own director of intelligence, a President need be
He need be both, that is to
his own executive assistant.
BS
say, if he would help himself.

a
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Of

course, time constraints incessantly impinge upon

ability to secure such

a

a

president's

broad view of government operations.

Neustadt believes it is possible for

a

But

president to deal with time

pressure and still attend to personal power stakes.

He grounds this

belief in the figure of Franklin Roosevelt and his competing advisers,

self-created deadlines and other administrative devices.

Roosevelt's

use of power and extraordinary administrative success, according to

Neustadt, depended upon the development of his "interior resources,"

comprised

of

his acute sense of power, his abounding self-confidence and

his sense of direction.

Any president who desires to both wield and

protect power, who seeks to be an influential leader, must marshal
interior resources effectively.

And it helps if the president exudes

the hunger for the office -- and has as much previous experience

—

as

did Roosevelt.

Neustadt concludes his study of presidential power by stressing
the increasing need for the chief executive to bring to the office the

qualities of governmental experience and an intense drive for personal
power.

Although he thinks that expertise and ambition, to be effective

components of power, must be kept in perspective by the proper
temperment, he still reduces presidential efficacy to the extremely
personal pursuit of power.

The power-seeker must be able to accept the

inevitable frustrations of the job.

But save for that qualification,

the chief executive's "unremitting search for personal power" remains
the engine of enlightened administration.

And when it comes to American

case
presidents who have searched unremittingly for power, the exemplary
for Neustadt

(as it

is

for Laski

and Rossiter)

is FDR,

the president

48

whose call for enlightened administration frames this chapter at the
outset.

FDR,

Of

Neustadt writes:

No President in this century has had a sharper sense of
personal power, a sense of what it is and where it comes
from; none has had more hunger for it, few have had more
use for it, and only one or two could match his faith in
his own competence to use it.
Perception and desire and
self-confidence, combined, produced their own reward.
No
modern President has been more nearly master in the White
House 36
.

Elsewhere he commends FDR's qualities, his insatiable appetite for
power, as the cornerstone of presidential greatness, citing the fact
that he “wanted mastery,"

"wanted power for its own sake," brought

a

"taste for power," to the job, and so on.
Just what

a

president is supposed to do with all this personal

power once the thirst for it has been quenched is not clear from

Neustadt's discussion.
with the attainment of

He does equate the determined quest for power

"viable" public policy, primarily because the

president's political vantage point is so broad he should naturally
pursue balanced, feasible policy directions.
"in the sphere of
a

And he also argues that

viability our system can supply no better expert than

President intent on husbanding his influence -- provided that he

understands what influence is made of

." 37

But the terms "viable,"

"balanced," and "feasible" seem hopelessly vague.

Indeed, the language

he employs to clarify such terms sounds reminiscent of Rossiter

s

ambiguous words, particularly when he tells us the president should be
certain administration policy moves with "the grain

especially obscure phrase.

history," an

of

Disappointment awaits anyone hoping to

30
discover an analysis of the ends of presidential power
.

Neustadt has
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collapsed questions

of

ends into the the quest for "viability."

Presidential power is thought of in purely instrumental terms.

What is

doable is what should be done.
In

sum,

Neustadt wants his readers to follow him in placing their

faith in the president as the political system's "Great Initiator."
job of

The

the "President-as-expert" is to reconcile the seemingly

irreconcilable factors which the nation's problems entail,

a

task the

chief executive is suited to perform if an awareness of power stakes and

viable policy is maintained.

experience and consciousness

While
of

a

president's expertise through

personal power provide no panacea for

the country's ills, they offer our best hope for

"effective" policy.

If

there is any danger in all of this it "does not lie in our dependence on
a_

is

man;

it

lies in our capacity to make ourselves depend upon

inexpert."

man who

"Inexpert" performers in the White House are what

Neustadt fears most.
top,

a

American democracy is addicted to expertise at the

expertise available only from

a

small group of

"experienced

Such proficiency ensures the

politicians of extraordinary temperment."
status quo will not be disturbed, for

[Presidential] expertise assures a contribution to the
The
The system, after all, is what he knows.
system.
3,7
it
know
not
do
danger lies in men who
.

Neustadt ends his original edition

of

Presidential Power with

these thoughts on the need for expertise at the commanding heights of
the political

system.

Subsequent editions have added three chapters

"Later Reflections," leaving the original study intact.

of

His reflections
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are just that -- reflections of what he said earlier.

In

no significant

way do they enhance or shed new light on his original thesis.

The first extra chapter deals with the presidency of John

Kennedy.

While acknowledging the difficulty of assessing

cut short by tragedy,

a

F.

presidency

Neustadt generally gives JFK high marks,

particularly for his handling of the Cuban missle crisis.

He sees in

the crisis an affirmation of one of JFK's fundamental goals -- bottling
the "nuclear genie."

Events leading up to the crisis, however, receive

little or no attention.

The ficticious "missile gap," which expressed

and contributed to both the cold war atmosphere of American politics and

Kennedy's election campaign, is not mentioned.
invasion receives comment only as
public relations image,

a

his "superb" treatment of

a

And the Bay of

Pigs

"severe check" on the president's

check which in any event Kennedy overcame with
its aftermath.

&°

In

this nearly contextless

missle crisis, though, Neustadt finds Kennedy's most enduring legacy,

contending that he paved the way for all modern chief executives

shouldering the daily responsibility for decisions that could put the
entire world in jeopardy.

This burden moves the president even further

from the reach of ordinary citizens and reinforces Neustadt's basic

message:

Regardless of the dangers, presidential power, even
in this new dimension, still has to be sought and
We now are even more
used; it cannot be escaped.
mind and temperment of
the
dependent than before on
1
.*
the man in the White House
We remain

adds

a

just as dependent on the president when Neustadt next

chapter, this time looking at Johnson and Richard Nixon.

The
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disasters of their tenures were rooted principally in their selfindulgence and insecurity.

Changes in the domestic and international

setting they inherited have not altered Neustadt's basic premise "that

Americans cannot escape an active federal government because so many

of

them want so much from it, and that activity in Washington calls for an

active President..."

But in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate the

ability of the presidency to achieve its aims has declined.
"gap between responsibility and capability grows wider."

Hence, the

To close this

gap Neustadt looks to some combination of media technology and stronger

relations between the president and party leadership.

"When we find

a

President who handles television as well as [Theodore Roosevelt] did the
press," Neustadt notes, "let us encourage him to try to put his friends
in Congress,

and encourage them to try to build

help but hear

a

leadership he cannot

114,2
.

Jimmy Carter's presidency foundered in part because he could

master neither television nor Congress (and
as Neustadt explains

in

his third and final

a

Democratic one at that),

supplemental chapter.

Moreover, he succumbed to the "hazards of transition" to the office,
wasting valuable time with misdirected planning which led, within the
first year of his term, to the resignation of his Budget Director Burt
Lance.

The Lance affair badly damaged Carter's administrative image and

weakened his moral stature, upon which he had based so much
campaign.

his

Yet Neustadt suggests that Carter was done in by something

bigger than any one incident or personal weakness.

president was
of

of

a

He argues that the

victim of expectations, in particular the expectations

Washingtonians.

People expected too much

of

him,

and continue to
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expect more than an^ president can deliver.
in

his work has the ring of special

But if this note of caution

pleading on behalf of politicians he

personally supports, it is becasue the trajectory
prepared us for such

a

revision.

significantly to the kinds

of

of

his thesis has not

Indeed, Presidential Power confrihutpH

expectations Neustadt begins to view as in

some way undermining the presidency itself.

He is caught

in

a

bind he

helped create and of which he is only dimly aware.

In a relative but real sense one can say of a President
what Eisenhower's first Secretary of Defense once said of
General Motors: what is good for the country is good for
the President, and vice versa. 63

This thought -- especially the "vice versa"

spirit of Neustadt's classic text.

It

—

is the

perfectly captures the

expansivist clarion call.

The Restricti vist Reply

Neustadt's eleventh hour second thoughts about the wisdom

expansivist outlook give
to the enchanted

and early I970's,

a

of

the

hint that something went awry along the way

land of presidential

government.

By the late

1960's

defectors from this perspective were legion.

It

is

common for political scientists to credit the twin debacles of Vietnam
and Watergate with providing the impetus for the intellectual retreat.

Erwin Hargrove's comments on the "crisis of the contemporary presidency"
are representative of the changed climate in the aftermath of these two

events:

this chapter were being writen in 1960 by a political scientist of liberal persuasion it would surely
But today [19741 the words
eulogize presidential power.
Our optimistic assumptions about the
do not come....
If
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happy fusion of power and purpose have been exploded.
It
is not only that power has been abused but also that we
trusted too much in it. 64

Reflecting on the terms

Johnson and Nixon, Hargrove warns, "we must

of

not be beguiled again by men of power."

Others more explicitly sought to refute the expansivist notion of

presidential government as an enduring chapter in American political
history.

"The 1970's marked the end of the presidential era in American

politics," writes Lester Salamon in an essay directly addressed to the
kind of position Burns endorsed so enthusiastically.

He continues,

[TIhe illusory quality of presidential government
ceased being a cause for concern and became instead
something to be applauded.
The reason:
for a brief
period, the illusion of presidential government came
close to being translated into reality, and the
results turned out to be far different, and far more
frightening, than its champions had expected. &s

Clearly the times warranted some measure of rethinking on the part

presidency scholars.

In

of

the face of presidential excess and abuse of

power, the idea that the reach of the office should be restricted gained

credence.
It

would be shortsighted, however, to consider the restrictivist

orientation as simply
fact,
of

its intellectual

Edward

President:

S.

Corwin.

reaction to the strife

a

of

the 6Q's and 70

In

s.

origins can be found decades earlier in the work

Written in 1940, with numerous later editions,

The.

Office and Powers expressed Corwin's concern that the office

had become dangerously personalized,

resembling, on occasion,

a

its powers enlarged to the point of

"primitive monarchy."

the deliberately loose grant of

Corwin contends that

"executive power" in Article

II

of

the

54

Constitution has been stretched by the accumulated impact

of

the handful

of

truly great presidents who have occupied the office, especially those

of

the twentieth century.

He thus finds that,

history of the presidency is
of

a

"Taken by and large, the

history of aggrandizement." 6 *

The fruits

aggrandizement are passed on from strong chief executives to less

dynamic ones through the "accumulatd tradition of the office," hence

"precedents established by

a

forceful or politically successful

personality in the office are available to less gifted succesors, and
permanently so because
amended." 67

of

the difficulty with which the Constitution is

For this reason, the potential

threat posed by such

presidents as FDR is not likely to diminish over time.
Corwin brings

a

legalistic approach to the study of the office.

He focuses much attention on Supreme Court cases which contributed to

the evolution of the president's constitutionally granted powers from
1787 onward.

Concern for the ensuing expansion

of

the president's

various roles brings this volume in contact with Rossiter's work,
although Rossiter does not share Corwin's skepticism about the scope

presidential power.
in

the role of

We get,

for example,

a

"organ of foreign relations."

of

discussion of the president
Here we see the founding

fathers issuing "an invitation to struggle for the privilege

of

directing American foreign policy," the struggle taking place between
the chief executive and Congress.

While such power is formallly

divided, the president's portion has waxed inexorably for

a

host of

reasons, leaving the office with "the lion's share" of responsibility
for shaping the substance of foreign policy.

The disparity in power is

the
even more pronounced during wartime as the president assumes
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commander-in-chief role.
of

Then the executive benefits from the accretion

inherent powers lodged in the leadership position of

a

sovereign

state.
As

a

result of this growth in presidential prestige, people come

to view the chief

circumstance,

executive as the architect of the nation's every

"looking upon the Chief Executive as the author of peace,

prosperity, and good crops, or, in the alternative, of war, depression,
and famine."

Even in light of the institutionalization of much of the

administrative dimension of the job, "the office remains highly
personal."

conception

For Corwin,
of

personalization signals the dominance

a

the office as an autonomous center of activity, with the

citizenry embod i ed in the executive.

legislative power and the notion
Congress.

of

of

The casualty of this supremacy is
the people being re-presented in

Ironically, the legislature has collaborated in its own

evisceration, delegating vast amounts

of

power and responsibility to the

president in the name of meeting the demands placed on the modern state
by the public.

Presidential aggrandizement therefore encourages the

marasmus of the most cherished constitutional principle for Corwin, and
for all

restrictivists -- the separation of powers.
Corwin insists upon the need to stabilize the relationship

between these two branches

of

government.

too deeply into American political

The presidency has encroached

life, a problem made no less

troubling by the knowledge that it has come, by and large, with the
blessing of popular opinion.
threat to personal

While not certain the encroachment poses

liberty, he remains wary of its advance.

sense of unease that restrictivists share.

It

is this

Corwin's writing thus led

a
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the way for what later became
in

a

parade of scholars seeking to restrain,

some measure, the political dominance of executive authority.

follows is an exploration of three representative members
wagon -- Arthur Schlesinger

Jr.,

,

of

What

this band-

Thomas Cronin and Theodore Lowi.

The first thing to note about Schlesinger is how fitting it is to

picture him climbing aboard
Imperial Presidency

.

bandwagon in writing his renowned book The

a

He was not always given to cautious appraisals of

the scope of presidential power, serving as the "official historian" of
the Kennedy administration, to use Noam Chomsky's apt phrase connoting
his criticism of Schlesinger

'

s

generally effusive praise for Kennedy's

presidency and his uncritical attitude toward the administration's
foreign policy initiatives, especially in Vietnam. 60

Schlesinger admits

a

For his part,

degree of complicity in the furtherance of

expansivist notions of the office.

Lamenting the "rise of the

presidential mystique," he faults political scientists and historians,
including himself, for giving "historical sanction" to an "uncritical
cult of the activist presidency" in postwar scholarship.

think of him, then, as
Schl esi nger

'

s

a

We should

sort of born again restrictivist.

shift away from the expansivist school was prompted

by his revulsion against what he saw as the deformation of

the

Constitution caused by the growth of presidential power, especially
foreign policy.

The specific deformation

—

in

the underlying theme of the

entire book -- is the extent to which postwar presidents have besieged
the separation of powers.

While many factors contributed to the

historic destabilization of the institutional balance
the president and Congress, they seemed to coalesce in

of
a

power between

White House
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fueled by Nixon's "compulsive internal drives."

Vietnam and Wategate

drew attention to the glaring decay of presidential accountability

which, under the intense pressure of worldwide crisis, created the

imperial presidency.

Schl esi nger

'

s

only explicit definition of the

"imperial presidency" comes in an epilogue to
he says that

it

a

mid-1974 edition, where

"may be briefly defined as the condition resulting when

the balance between presidential power and presidential accountability
is

destroyed." 70

It

is absolutely crucial

to note that what concerns

him throughout is the draining of countervailing centers of power

notably congressional powers) out of the political system.
is an
of

institutional one.

The presidency has run amok.

the book tells the story:

'

s

The problem

Hence the title

the office has become imperial, not the

nation's foreign policy or the political economy
Schl esi nger

(most

it

supports.

work traces the history of changes in the balance

between the president and Congress, with the modern period marked by an

outright presidential "appropriation" of powers granted the Congress in
the Constitution.

This appropriation is particularly striking in

foreign afairs, the aspect

of

political life that provided the "decisive

impetus" to the imperial presidency.

However difficult it might be to

ascertain the intent of the framers, Schlesinger points out that they
surely intended to divide control over the war powers.

division that has come under attack since the early days
republic.
is an

Yet it is this
of

the

What presidential power really amounts to, we are reminded,

outgrowth of practice

.

not theory.

And the practice has been to

increase the occurance of presidential war.
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Actually the increase has not been
more accurately as

a

a

steady one.

cycle of action and reaction:

can be seen

It

the president

engages in some type of military activity which leaves the office with
the upper hand in foreign policy matters, and then Congress tries to

recoup some of the power taken by the president.

The key is that the

power lost by Congress is never completely recovered.

And each new

presidential recoil against congressional reassertions of power elevates
the office in the conduct of

international relations.

upward trend by fits and starts.

The result is an

As Schlesinger writes:

Nearly every President who extended the reach of the
White House provoked a reaction toward a more
restrictive theory of the Presidency, even if the
reaction never quite cut presidential power back to
its earlier level. 71
Thus we have the nineteenth century examples (there are dozens more) of

presidential war in the case of the bloody annexation

of

Texas, the

destruction of San Juan del Norte (Greytown), Nicaragua, and the Civil
War.

Each of these assertions of presidential war-making power came at

the expense of

a

serious congressional role in these matters.

The case of the leveling of San Juan del Norte in 1854 is

instructive for what it says about both U.S. foreign policy (especially
given the Reagan administration's onging war against the Nicaraguan

government) and about Schlesinger

s

approach to his thesis.

The U.S.

naval bombardment of the town came as an act of revenge after an

incident in which an American official was insulted.

Not wanting to

back down to pressure from Congress and Britain, President Franklin

Pierce eventually defended this wanton destruction by defining the
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inhabitants of the town as, after all, only uncivilized barbarians
"pretended community."

of

a

The incident speaks volumes about the American

attitude toward Latin America, and toward the rest

of

the world we

define as the Other when it suits our expansionary ambitions.

It

is an

antecedent of the kind of foreign policy the nation would carry into the

twentieth century as well.

But for the purposes of Schl esinger

'

analysis the incident serves only as another case where Congress was
denied

a

role in authorizing military conflict.

The issue for him is an

institutional one.
Institutional jockeying continued after the Civil War, when

Congress "makes

a

comeback," asserting its power in the areas of treaty-

making and requests for executive information.

But the Congressional

once again with the Spanish-American War and the proliferation

star fell

executive agreements under William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt.
Also, Congress generally took

a

back seat during the strong tenures of

Roosevelt and Wilson, provoking "the inevitable reaction"

congressional resurgence between the time
Pearl Harbor.

of

of

the Versailles Treaty and

With the coming of the Second World War, though, the

institutional ebb and flow begins to diminish, in part because

of

unfavorable reaction to congressional neutrality legislation which had
tied Franklin Roosevelt's hands in the critical years leading up to the
war.

In

acted as

trying to act as
a

a

check of the executive, Congress instead had

"straight jacket" on the nation's foreign policy, leaving "the

verdict of history" to be one of congressional failure.

"No one for

long time after would trust Congress with basic foreign policy,"

Schlesinger writes.

"Congress did not even trust itself

." 72

a

60

Against this backdrop, the build up

of

foreign affairs became nearly irresistible.

facilitated

a

presidential power in
The bombing of Pearl Harbor

major shift in FDR's conception of presidential power.

Prior to the war, he sought congressional collaboration for most of his
New Deal
war,
of

and foreign policy initiatives.

But after Congress declared

he used his commander-in-chief powers to expand the unilateral use

executive authority.

asserts,

As it had so often in the past,

“war nourished the presidency."

Sch 1 esi nger

'

s

Schlesinger
concern, of

course, is with the unilateral aspect of the president's power, since
its growth was accompanied by

power.

a

corresponding decline in legislative

But as with his earlier articulation of this procedural

position, he forecloses many fundamental issues.

instance, his

For

preoccupation with purely tactical questions leads him to obscure the
importance of policies such as the decision to intern

Americans during the war
"removal,"

a

Japanese

(Schlesinger chooses to refer to their

curiously sanitized word choice).

decision received the approval

of

Here

a

"shameful" policy

Congress and the Supreme Court,

leaving in doubt the salience of his thesis on the centrality of the

separation

of

powers issue.

basic question at stake when

a

prison camps, or is there also
U.S.

the emergency power of the president the

Is

segment of the population is put in
a

crucial question about the nature of

foreign policy and the ideology that underlies it at home?

Schlesinger confines his criticism to the first issue.
Indeed, Schlesinger consciously tries to sidestep questions about
the values and interests behind policy decisions of the government.

Thus in

a

section on postwar America he admits that in order to secure
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congressional passage of aid for Greece and Turkey, Truman used the
tactic of trying to "scare the hell out of the country" with appeals to

anticommunism and international peril.

But some 30 pages later,

assessing the national climate in the wake of the Korean War and the
crisis atmosphere of threats to "national security," the fact that the
Soviet threat was to
at

a

great extent simply

a

promotional strategy aimed

the American public is no longer of importance.

Of

the Cold War, he

writes:

It

is not necessary here to argue whether crisis was
or imagined and the foreign policy decent or

real

imperialistic.
Surely all those adjectives applied
one time or another....
But whatever the motives
and merits of American foreign policy in these years,
our present analysis requires us only to assess the
impact of that policy on American political institutions. 73
at

The resulting elevation of

"national security" to

"supreme value"

a

certainly merits attention, as does the concomitant expansion

of

executive prerogative to combat alleged threats. But since Schlesinger
can offer no evidence that Congress

—

the branch losing power in the

face of an inexorable executive power grab -- could have responded to

different set of imperatives or would have offered

a

a

different, less

contrived account of Soviet foreign policy aims in particular and the
world situation in general, the willful dodging of "the motives and

merits of American foreign policy" weakens his argument considerably.
He ignores the deeper

level

of

analysis for the sake of an exclusively

institutional focus.

Schlesinger continues to confine his inquiry to procedural
questions in his analysis of Nixon's presidency, especially his handling
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of

Vietnam and Watergate.

missile crisis, and Johnson

Fed by Kennedy’s "brilliance" during the
s

use of executive power to order troops

into the Dominican Republic and again to manufacture the circumstances

surrounding the Tonkin Gulf resolution, the presidency becomes
"rampant," "revolutionary," and an outright threat to democracy under
the sway of Nixon's "agitated psyche."

Commander in Chief had acquired almost
to Schlesinger,

"By the 1970s the title
a

sacramental aura,"

according

"translating its holder from worldly matters into an

ineffable realm of higher duty." 74

Nixon wrapped himself in the aura to

defend his unilateral assertions of power in Vietnam and Cambodia,
using the phrase commander-in-chief "as if it were an incantation."

But

Schlesinger is not without his own enchanted language, with "separation
of

powers" casting its spell of constitutional closure on the issues

involved.

For it is, we must keep in mind, the "legal need to go to

Congress before leading the nation into war" that Nixon's presidency so
brazenly ignores.

The presidential

nature of Nixon's "presidential war"

offends Schlesinger most profoundly, not the war itself or the dynamics
that engender it.

As Schlesinger frames the problem:

The Nixon theory of presidential war. ..had
effectively liquidated the constitutional command
that the power to authorize war belonged to the
Nixon had thereby erased the most solemn
Congress.
written check on presidential war. 7 ®

Though clearly rooted in foreign policy, Nixon's assault on the

balance of power between the executive and legislative branches

eventually found domestic equivalents.

His efforts to control

appropriations through impoundment and his enlargement

of

claims of

63

executive privilege stand as two examples

of

Nixon's desire to "make

Congress as impotent in domestic affairs as it had come to be in foreign
affairs."

Reinforced by

a

host of other historic forces tending to

transfer political power to the executive, Nixon's personal compulsions
drove him to seek ever-greater control

of

national priorities.

sought, Schlesinger asserts, nothing short of

a

revolution in American

politics, its essence being "power to the presidency."
have entailed was the establishment of

a

He

What this would

"plebiscitary presidency"

—

since Nixon personified the majority of the citizenry, his own beliefs
about the best interests of the nation justified any course of action he

deemed necessary, accountability coming only at election time.

This

type of personal rule renders any opposition inherently undemocratic.
And its logic legitimizes the types of

illegal activities the

administration undertook in the Watergate affair.
Fortunately for the nation, Watergate eventually put
advance of Nixon's revolutionary agenda.
are supposed to play

a

a

halt to the

The other institutions that

vital role in the polity -- the judiciary, the

press, Congress, and the executive agencies -- "all drew new confidence
as

institutions from the exercise of power they had forgotten they

possessed."

With constitutional vigor restored, the nation is still

left to grapple with the question of the relationship between democracy
and foreign policy.

For Schlesinger this question boils down to an old

argument over "the location of the war-making power."
on

The problem turns

the precise distribution of power between the two branches who are

supposed to share this authority, with the distribution meant to ensure
that no one person exercises such monumental power.

I
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In

searching for

a

solution Schlesinger provides

critique that moves beyond the rigidities
The answer, he finds,

of

a

glimpse of

a

his procedural orientation.

"lay not in machinery but in policy."

Perhaps we

need to rethink the "messianic globalism" traditionally associated with
our foreign policy.

Perhaps it is time for "a redefinition of American

interests abroad" to diminish America's "will to unlimited global

intervention."

"If

such things took place," he speculates,

"then the

imperial heat would be off, and Congress would have the oppor tuni ty

.

.

.

to

reassert its role in the constitutional scheme ." 76
The feebleness of Schl esinger

'

s

commitment to such major foreign

policy revisions quickly becomes evident, though.

To begin with,

principle objection to American pursuit of empire is that

it

his

tends to

"deform and disable the Constitution," centralizing power where he

prefers to see power shared.

And we learn that it was the Nixon

administration that fumbled the opportunity to do the basic rethinking
and redefinition necessary to change U.S.
if

international objectives, as

the major practitioner of the imperial presidency would be

predisposed to challenge the foundations

of

imperial logic and interest.

Finally he argues that to regain democratic control over foreign policy,
the "ultimate answer lay in the restoration of the constitutional comity
so badly breached by the imperial

Presidency and so nearly destroyed by

the revolutionary Presidency ." 77

The rebirth of comity calls for such

measures as the revival of the State Department, the reassertion
Congress as at least

a

of

junior partner in the formulation of policy, and

a

loosening of the "secrecy system" that gives the executive branch such

a

tight hold on information.

Yet while these moves might help the
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president understand that "foreign policy was not his personal
property," Schlesinger gives us no grounds for reasonably expecting
that
if

it

—

became shared property

with Congress or the State Department or

anybody else -- decisions would be based on anything other than status
quo assumptions about national

security and the national interest which

have proven so compatible with the imperial presidency.

rethinking

of

His call

for

a

"messianic globalism" thus seems purely rhetorical,

divorced as it is from any sustained, penetrating analysis of the

historic, systemic roots of such motives.
Looking to the future of the presidency Schlesinger foresees not
only the need for constitutional comity, but also the need to foster
less deferential public attitude toward the chief executive.
the country needs today is

a

a

"tWlhat

little serious disrespect for the office of

the Presidency," he contends, calling for "a decline in reverence" to

reverse the decline in presidential accountability.
Nixon's dark tenure had

a

Seen in this light,

very bright side to it -- "Watergate was

potentially the best thing to have happened to the Presidency in
time."

If

a

long

the right lessons are learned, then the Nixon years will be

viewed as "a culmination" of American society's "compulsion toward

presidential power."

The point is not to prevent the exercise of

presidential power, however.
an energetic chief

required both

a

Rather it is to strike

executive and

a

a

balance between

constitutional one, for "the nation

strong Presidency for leadership and the separation of

powers for liberty."

If

such

a

balance can be restored, Schlesinger

feels people will come to speak not of "the shame of Watergate," but
"the glory of Watergate."

The glory, of course,

lies in the conclusion
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that the nation

caught.

Or

democratic institutions work.

s

Bad guys eventually get

as Schlesinger puts it:

It seems to me wholly possible that the historical
generalization to be derived from this epoch will be,
not that citizens are impotent and President's invincible,
but that Presidents who abuse their power will suffer
retribution.
Retribution may be a long time coming.
But
it gets there in the end.
Ask Johnson.
Ask Nixon. 70

Schl esi nger

'

s

misgivings about the relative growth of presidential

power and his advocacy of greater accountability and constitutional

balance are standard fare for the restrictivi st school
special

thought.

His

place in the literature comes from the urgency of his message.

The phrase "imperial presidency" became something of

those concerned that the nation's institutional
in

of

the swirl of events of the early 1970's.

It

a

rallying cry for

integrity was at stake
was one of his

subthemes, though -- the necessity of diminishing public reverence for

presidential authority -- that received fuller development in the
writing of Thomas Cronin, particularly his The State of the Presidency

Published in 1975, Cronin's book posed

scholarship on the pr esi dency 79
a

a

.

major challenge to orthodox

He charged the academy with presenting

standard, hopelessly idealized version of the office, which fostered

exaggerated public expectations about presidential efficacy.

contribution to the restricti vist cause was to make

a

His

case for lowering

substantially those expectations.
Writing at

a

time of heightened public awareness of the dangers of

executive usurpation of power, Cronin sets out to explain "the
presidential puzzle."

Noting

a

marked drop in public confidence in the

credibility of presidents, he warns of widespread cynicism and confusion
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if

the veil of

is

not lifted.

illusions and misplaced hopes surrounding the president
From the outset he makes his pitch for realism:

To understand the presidency, we need to
appreciate the limits of the presidency, the constraints on presidents, and the exaggerated expectations we visit on both.
We overestimate powers
of the office, and underestimate the economic, social
and cultural factors that shape presidential perfor-

mance. BO

Healthy skepticism is in order
some kind of reasonable focus.

should be that of

a

if

the office is to be brought back in to

And he makes it clear that such

a

focus

microscope under which chief executives and the

office they hold should be placed.
the root of the puzzle Cronin finds

At
of

a

series of paradoxes born

public expectations and demands which place presidents in no-win

binds.

These binds have grown especially confining in recent decades,

as the public came to expect presidents routinely to live up to the

Rooseveltian image of bold, innovative leadership, while simultaneously
not overstepping the limits of acceptable constitutional behavior.

The modern (post-Franklin Roosevelt) presidency
and constrained by various expectations
bounded
is
Presidents and
paradoxical.
decidedly
that are
balance themconstantly
must
candidates
presidential
could
C 1 3 1
demands....
conflicting
selves between
the
and
expectations
well be that our paradoxical
presischizophrenic
for
imperatives of the job make
01
dential performances.

Public expectations which are "exaggerated or hopelessly contradictory"

create

a

climate conducive to presidents attempting to reach too far,

thus leaving them subject to criticism when they inevitably come up

short
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Cronin cites

a

dozen such presidential paradoxes, with the idea

that "a more sophisticated and tolerant consideration" of the office

might lift
It

is not

a

portion of the disabling burden from presidents' shoulders.

necesary to delve into all of them;

thrust of his argument.

contradictory dynamic within which
the role of the

difficult to pull off.

sampling conveys the

For instance, the public demands

"the decent and just but decisive and guileful

and tenderness:

a

"

a

ki

leader."

a

president be

This sets up

a

president is torn between toughness
ndhearted son of

a

bitch" is

Likewise, we expect an "inspirational but don't

promise more than you can deliver leader."

president hanging between the job

of

This paradox leaves the

raising people's hopes and dreams,

and tempering them so that they are not shattered by reality.

Qverpromising seems to be the most frequent result

of

this paradox.

"The common man who gives an uncommon performance" is another paradox.
It

calls for

a

folksy leader who can perform heroic deeds -- the

Apparently Truman successfully handled this

"uncommon common man."

conflicting demand.

Carter surely could not.

Finally, there is the

traditional constitutional paradox that confers on the president the

dilemma of being both "national unifier and national divider."
of

As head

state and head of government, the president must at least try to

create the impression of rising above politics while leading
political administration

president is left in

a

(and also serving as party chief).

a

decidedly

Again, the

difficult position -- perched above the fray yet

standing up to his neck in it.
Together these and the other paradoxes constitute an imposing

challenge to presidential leadership.

Asked to be all things to all
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people, the president has both too much and too little power to get the
job done.

When public expectations are not met by our elected

"pseudomessiah,
"It

"

we react politically with

“the wrath of our vengence."

almost ritual destruction," Cronin explains.

is

presidency, but we destroy our presi dents. BZ

11

[

W

]

e

venerate the

Cronin overstates the

fury of public retribution here, given the remarkable and troubling

unwillingness of public opinion to bury the corpse

of

the nation's most

resilient presidential Lazarus, Richard Nixon, whose books and presence
seem never to fade from the public eye.

useful:

the political

Yet Cronin's main point remains

system is geared toward the coronation of

person of superhuman qualities every four years.

responsibility for this distortion
People constantly search for

a

of

a

He locates the

reason in the minds of the people.

"savior-hero."

"The paradoxes of the

presidency do not lie in the White House," he asserts, "but in the
emotings, feelings, and expectations of us all."
One prime consequence of inflated public expectations is what

Cronin refers to as "the textbook presidency."
is

an

The textbook presidency

interpretation of the office replete with myths about the

"benevolent, omnipotent, omniscient, and highly moral" chief executive.
A

product of post-FDR political science, this "romantic -- benevolent

father, Big Daddy" version was extolled in college textbooks of the
1950's and 60's.

Cronin examines more than 30 such books to glean the

common ingredients of this mythical scholarly model.

He finds

surprisingly little variation on the pr esi dent-as-great-man theme.

What resulted very often was a storybook view that
whatever was good for our president must be the right
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thing.

We were told the president is the embodiment
that is good in America:
courage, honesty,
integrity, and compassion.
We began to hail the powermaximizing president. 03
of

all

Standard texts portray the president as the engine of national
progress, leading the people as their teacher and preacher, and

advocating
justice.

a

wide government presence to ensure prosperity and social

The vision presented is that "if Americans could only

indentify and elect the right person, their loftiest aspirations would
be fulfilled."

Some accounts even described the president as

a

person

physically transformed by election to the office, as in Theodore White's
classic Making of the President series.

Cronin quotes White's 1969

impressions of the newly elected Nixon as vintage textbook orthodoxy:

He seemed, as he waved me into the Oval Office, suddenly
on first glance a more stocky man than I had known on the
campaign rounds.
There was a minute of adjustment as he
waved me to a sofa in the barren office, poured coffee,
put me at ease;
then, watching him, I realized that he
was not stockier, but, on the contrary, slimmer.
What
was different was the movement of the body, the sound of
voice, the manner of speaking -- for he was calm as 1 had
never seen him before, as if peace had settled on him....
Now he was in repose, and the repose was in his speech
also -- more slow, studied, with none of the gear-slippages
of name or reference which used to come when he was weary;
his hands still moved as he spoke, but the fingers spread
gracefully, not punchily or sharply as they used to. 04

Rossiter and Neustadt both are grouped with White as purveyors

textbook conventions. as

of

the

Summarizing this academic concoction, Cronin

highlights two dimensions which together describe the textbook ideal
type president.

The "omnipotent-competent dimension" holds that the

president is the strategic catalyst for national progress, and that only
the president can fashion public policy to meet the crises plaguing the
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republic.

On the

"moralistic-benevolent dimension" the president is

viewed as the true personal and moral leader of the people, and

if

the

right person is found for the job, all will be well.
In

hindsight the textbook perspective seems woefully inadequate,

even somewhat silly.
on

And one would think that it would have foundered

the shoals of the Vietnam and Watergate debacles.

this orientation is alive and well,

if

But Cronin thinks

perhaps less assured.

period of disillusionment within the public,

After

a

"the prevailing view once

again took hold that only the president can get things done, only the

president can lead legislatively, only the president can negotiate

effectively with other nations, and only the president can make the
country governable ." 06

Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter tried

a

more

austere presidency, Cronin thinks, but the voters repudiated their
attempts.

Public expectations just will not let the larger than life

image of the president die, for

Americans still long for dynamic, reassuring, and
Watergate notwithstanding, we still
strong leadership.
celebrate the gutsy, aggressive presidents -- even if
many of them did violate the legal and constitutional
niceties of our separati on-of -powers ideal 07
.

Cronin attributes the persistence of the textbook model to several

mutually reinforcing factors 00
.

of

our experience in World War

sense of mission grew out

An American
II,

resulting in the prevalent image

the president as "leader of the free world"

—

an

of

image enhanced to an

enormous degree by the solidification of nuclear weapons as an element
in

the calculation of U.S.

foreign policy.

A

second factor is the

enduring human tendency to believe in the ability

of

"great" people to
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guide

a

nation through difficult times.

is played

by the president

as a

An important psychological

"national symbol of reassurance,"

leading Americans to place certain chief executives "on
rather than under

microscope."

a

scholars come into play as
liberal

a

role

a

pedestal

The personal values of presidency

third force.

Predominantly beholden to

ideology, many authors trumpet the activist presidents,

particularly FDR.

Congress has made

a

fourth contribution to the

resilience of the textbook view, yielding portions

executive branch because

of

of

its power to the

its ability to act faster and with more

unity than the much more cumbersome legislative body.

Fifth, Cronin

contends that the natural desire for national stability insulates the
president from

a

great deal of criticism.

Once elected, the winner

receives automatic deference as the nation rallies behind its new leader
in

a

"ritualistic unification."

The modes of analysis employed are

another influence on the textbook perspective.

Authors typically use

some combination of the public record, biographies, prior texts,

executive department staff memoirs and memos, interviews with Washington
officials, and newspaper and magazine articles
likely to encourage

a

—

sources which are

more positive picture of the president.

Political

insiders, when not steadfastly trying to protect their president, often
will

discuss mistakes and dirty laundry only

the record.

dramatically.

And finally,
It

if

such information is off

television has magnified the president

places in the president's hands tremendous powers

"over reality, perception, and over the whole way in which issues are

presented and discussed in America.

Thus the textbook presidency has
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become

a

"prime-time presidency" as well,

a

tact that the Reagan

presidency has verified many times over.
These aspects of textbook orthodoxy have consequences about which

Cronin has serious reservations.

One cost of such an exaggerated

version of the office is the extent to which it cheapens the quality of
citizen participation, or stifles it altogether.

Many people come to

regard the president as "the national chaplain," therefore above
reproach.

This inhibits the development of an active, involved

citizenry, since the president should be able to handle whatever

troubles arise.
it

The flip side of such an attitude, of course,

sets up people for cynicism and despair when

a

is that

president fails to

measure up to our lofty expectations.

And such reactions can weaken the

legitimacy of political institutions.

The textbook imagery also affects

presidents, who run the

risk,

presidential invincibility.

of

actually believing the mythology of

Expecting reverence from the people,

president's perspective on the world can become distorted.

a

And White

House aides often reinforce this danger by shielding their boss from

outside influences.

Both the Johnson and Nixon administrations have

been critiqued on the grounds that they eventually lost contact with

reality.®’
But of

the costs of the textbook phenomenon, Cronin is most

all

troubled by the publicity imperative it engenders

presidential" as he calls it.
presidential is

a

—

"looking

What follows from the need to look

public relations "script," which emphasizes style over

substance, or "selling the appearance of leadership."

This can entail

number of elements, among them constantly cultivating the impression

of

a
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doing something important, accentuating the sense of crisis,
selecting

problems for their potential credit value, creating
image and assailing the press

if

statesmanlike

a

public confidence in the president

wanes or if it offers unfavorable coverage.

The priorities of public

relations often lead presidents "to 'act,' to fake and to mislead as
they try to live up to the illusory notion that the right person in one
job single-handedly can solve the nation's problems

manipulation of images is elevated to

a

truth becomes dangerous," and hence

casualty.

a

."

90

high art form,

Moreover, when
"telling the

Cronin concludes that the most fundamental issue raised by the

illusions surrounding public perceptions of the president -- reinforced
as

they are by uncritical scholarship

—

is how the nation's political

leadership and its citizenry can be brought back into

a

healthier

relationship more closely approximating democratic ideals.
bit like Schlesinger he stresses the need for

a

Sounding

a

strong but accountable

president, with an informed, vigilant public an essential ingredient in
any meaningful

notion of accountability.

As he asserts,

"The presidency

must not be allowed to become the only, or even the primary, instrument
for the realization of government of,

by,

and for the people ." 91

Social

change occurs as often from the active commitment of "militant

mobilizers" and "political prophets" as it does from "visionary

presidents."

The contributions of

"extragovernmental pressures" such as

movements for civil rights, women's rights, consumer and environmental

protection are valued for their consciousness-raising and their

challenge to vested interests -- interests to which presidents often are
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beholden.

For in order to get elected aspiring presidents must play by

the rules of the game,

a

game they get locked in to.

One would like Cronin to explore the linkages between presidents
and these dominant interests,

as well

as the problems faced by mass

movements which hope to fundamentally alter some aspect
quo.

of

the status

Such an examination would situate the president and the public

within

political, economic, and social context that clarifies the

a

structural dimensions of life.

But he offers only these sketchy

impressions, almost as afterthoughts.

His final point reiterates that

he is in no way denying the importance of dynamic presidential

leadership.

On the contrary,

presidential leadership remains at

a

premium:

of course, need a strengthened and effective
We shall, of course, need brilliant,
presidency.
But we need to deflate the notion
talented presidents.
that presidents can provide all or even the major amount
of our national leadership 92

We shall,

.

Hence, Cronin urges people to take the political initiative, looking
less to Washington for solutions to problems.

He proposes that

a

balance be struck between presidential leadership and citizen activity,
lowering our expectations of the former and raising our faith in the
later.
The work of Theodore Lowi

discuss
Cronin.

,

has

a

,

the last restrictivist thinker

close affinity to the ideas

of

I

will

both Schlesinger and

Like Cronin, he fears that public expectations of the president

have surpassed by far any reasonable chance of being met.

And like

out of
Schlesinger, he senses that the entire political system is
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balance, weighted too heavily toward the president.

Indeed, he argues

that the combination of these factors actually has changed the very

nature of the American political system, nearly creating as

condition what Schlesinger saw as only
Nixon --

a

a

plebiscitary republic, led by

"Already we have

general

dangerous possibility under
a

plebiscitary president.

virtual cult of personality revolving around the

a

White House," he observes darkly in the preface

Personal President

a

.

his 1985 text The

of

The book traces the rise of the personal

presidency, assesses its impact on political life, and offers

a

overcome the "inherent pathologies" it has created.

recent

publication it provides an indication

of

And as

a

way to

where the restrictivist

perspective might be heading as its proponents look to analyze the
office in the 1980's and beyond.
Lowi

contends that the dramatic expansion

presidency since the New Deal cemented

a

at

a

its core."

"redefinition

of

the powers of the

connection between big

government, strong presidents and democracy.

tantamount to

in

The connection is

democratic theory with the presidency

President-centered politics created an entirely new

social contract whereby the president provides services to the people

while the people, in return, identify directly with their leader.
is the personal

presidency," Lowi explains, "an office

of

"This

tremendous

personal power drawn from the people -- directly and through Congress
and the Supreme Court -- and based on the new democratic theory that the

presidency with all powers is the necessary condition for governing
large, democratic nation."’' 3

But the personal

costs, for it breeds frustration by its nature.

a

presidency carries high

Unavoidable barriers

77

prevent presidents from making good on all their promises to the

electorate, yet to the extent that they fulfill any of them,

expectations climb even higher.
the appearance of success.

what Cronin delineated.

Presidents are left trying to fashion

The outcome is

a

no-win situation, much like

"The harder presidents try to please their mass

constituency, the more alienated that constituency becomes," according
to Lowi

,

It

Lowi

and the situation arises regardless of who holds office. 94

was not always like this in American politics.

Throughout what

terms the "traditional system," from 1800 to 1933, Congress reigned

as the dominant national

institution.

Patronage handed out by

congressmen and committees was the glue that held everything together,
as policies were framed to provide resources for distribution to

clients.

In

importance.

this "patronage state" the president was of secondary
The patronage state went into decline by the late

nineteenth century, though, as public pressure for government action
mounted, first in the state capitals but eventually in Washington.
was moribund by the arrival

of

the New Deal.

It

And since FDR's time

"every president has been exceptional, as compared to presidents under
the traditional

state, however.

system."

Roosevelt did not give up the patronage

Rather he added to it what Lowi calls the "regulatory

state" and the "redistributive [welfare] state," whose new functions

"finally brought the national government into

relationship with the people."
-- even the legitimacy -- of
to deliver

services became

a

A

a

directly coercive

new criterion for judging the success

government was established as the ability
test of government effectiveness.**

the president supplanting Congress as the central

With

institution of the
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ever-expanding federal government,

a

new sense emerged that "the

president is the government."
Roosevelt
of

s

adept use of the available communication technologies

the time helped ossify this revolutionary attitude.

Lowi

sums up his

legacy in the concept of the plebiscitary presidency, indicating that
FDR achieved his goals through "direct mass political methods."
not novel

for presidents to assume such great power.

It

was

Schlesinger, for

example, amply documents the accretion of power to the chief executive
in

wartime.

What was new was the combination of national security and

economic security as
presence.

In

a

dual

rationale for

a

sustained government

the absence of vibrant political parties -- manifested by

the spread of split-ticket voting, the rise of the independent voter,
and the like -- the presidency seeks to carve out its own personal,

independent constituency which further weakens the party structure.

The

public, for its part, vigilantly watches the executive branch to see
offers this

that agencies come through with the promised services.

Lowi

observation on what he terms the resulting "Republic

Service

of

Delivery"

CSlince the president has become the embodiment of government, it seems perfectly normal for millions upon
millions of Americans to concentrate their hopes and
It is no
fears directly and personally upon him.
such a
developed
has
wonder that the United States
and his
president"
tremendous stake in the "personal
personal capacity to govern.
The proliferation of presidential primaries has augmented the

focus of the political system on the chief executive.

leaders

a

With party

marginal player at best, candidates individually compete to
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amass delegates who really have nothing in common with either the

candidate or each other, save tor their pledge

support.

ot

The base of

support that comes out ot this process bears little resemblence to

genuine coalition.

Lowi

to describe independent,

compares it to

a

"flux,"

a

word used in physics

unrelated particles revolving around

temporary center ot gravity.

a

a

The plebiscitary president is not actually

"made," however, until atter the primaries, during the campaign when

television exposure magnifies the politician's persona and shapes the
presidential mystique.

The specialness of people deemed worthy of the

office comes to the fore at this time.

Celebrity status and isolation

(the candidates increasingly want to appear to be "above" party, managed
by their personal

campaign organizations) coalesce to form the

presidential personality, which Lowi sees as
Christ and the Statue of Liberty:

hopes and fears.

Bring

me_

"a

combination of Jesus

Bring m^ your burdens.

your search for sal vati on

.

"

Bring me your

7

Once such demigods reach the White House Lowi finds they all

behave essentially the same way.

This is not to say that presidents all

have the same psychologicl composition.

cannot be identical.

But Lowi

Obviously their characters

marvels at the surprising degree of

regularity in their behavior despite character divergence.

continuities are institutionally reinforced.

All

The

presidents strive to

keep the programmatic intiative, and further, to restrict it as much as

possible to the White House proper, as opposed to the larger cabinet.
Thus it is common to hear about "the president's program, the
-- again,
president's budget, the president's administrative initiative"

personalizing and centralizing the responsibility for government.

Lowi
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posits that the resulting dynamic sets up job demands and public

expectations which are "pathological, paranoid, and perverse."

He adds:

The president is the Wizard of Qz.
Appearances
become everything....
The more the president holds to the initiative
and keeps it personal, the more he reinforces the
mythology that there actually exists in the White
House a "capacity to govern." 98
is precisely this capacity to govern that Lowi

It

drained from the political system by the onset

presidency.

of

thinks has been

the plebiscitary

The loss affects both domestic and foreign policy.

Domestically, the presidency is based on the assumptions

of

liberalism.

Liberal presidents want to expand the scope of government intervention.

Increasingly, though, Lowi sees liberalism as an unrestrained set of
values,

a

philosophy unable to establish priorites among competing

claims for government programs and thus, unable to say no to any groups
seeking support.

influenced

—

Such indiscriminant expansion of government has

captured, actually

—

conservatives as well as liberals.

the presidencies of avowed

Hence we have the example of Nixon,

the hard-nosed Republican, presiding over the growth of

regulatory programs.

a

host of

Likewise, Lowi places the even more conservative

Reagan in the same category, calling his espoused desire to get the

government off the backs of the people "completely phony."

On this

reading, all Reagan has done is shift the priorities of the government
from social

spending to defense expenditures.

to alter the liberal

presidency," according to Lowi.

embraced and confirmed it.
liberals....'"99

"Reagan has done nothing
"In fact he has

He has in fact been as carte blanche as the
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As

foreign policy, Lowi identifies several "syndromes"

-for

afflicting presidents regardless of their political stripe.

The "star

syndrome" compels the White House to resist most resolutely any sharing
of

"

foreign policy initiatives.

ant i -d

i

p

1

Similarly, presidents succumb to the

omacy syndrome," relying heavily

—

and in crisis situations

almost exclusively -- on the Secretary of State, special assistants for

national security or special envoys, at the expense of developing an

independent professional foreign service trained in diplomacy.
importantly, presidents face "the oversell syndrome"

Most

(lying in state).

They simplify and dramatize appeals to international challenges they

perceive, overselling every threat and always finding "a commie in the

woodpile."

The danger here is that if proclamations of threats mount,

the president may end up locked into
are expected,

a

position where, because "results"

military escalation is the only course

of

action.

When weighing the costs and benefits of the plebiscitary

presidency in foreign and domestic policy, Lowi turns up mainly costs.
The expectations placed on the president virtually guarantee the

cultivation of deceit.

Moreover, since the presidency and the state are

viewed as essentially synonymous, any opposition to the president's will
To remedy the

can be construed as to some extent unpatriotic.

situation, Lowi concludes with an appeal to restore the balance between
the president and other institutions -- particularly Congress and

parties.

Restoring the balance would bring the presidency back down to

earthly dimensions, an absolute necessity as far as Lowi is concerned.
Interestingly, Lowi does not share Schl esi nger

stimulated

a

fundamental move toward this end.

'

s

optimism that Watergate

Watergate did not
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cleanse the political system;

ultimate workability

it

did not teach us lessons about the

the constitution.

of

On the contrary,

[Nlo substantial direct lesson can be learned •from
Watergate except not to engage in illegal activities
or be caught doing so. ...In every respect other than
the extent of illegal activities, there is a Watergate
of some kind everyday in the life of a president 100
.

Lowi

faults Schlesinger for emphasizing the personal dimemsion of

Watergate and the imperial presidency.
"aberrant,

He rejects the view of Nixon as

illogical, or psychopathol ogical

power was not the issue.

In

.

“

Personal usurpation of

fact he thinks Nixon was operating in

a

"consistent, logical, and normal" manner under the plebiscitary

assumptions of the office.

Those assumptions hold that the president is

state personified, that the powers of the office should match its

crushing responsibilities, that the president should not be bound by
normal
of

legal

restrictions when the state is at risk, and that opponents

the president are disloyal.

writes,

Acting on these assumptions, Lowi

"then his [Nixon's] actions,

including his crimes, are entirely

consistent and rational, quite possibly motivated by the highest sense
of

public interest."

Lowi

is not being

soft on Nixonism.

But he is

trying to foster appreciation of the fact that the modern plebiscitary

presidency must routinely cope with enormous, unrealistic pressures from
many quarters,

including "the greatest source of everyday pressure on

the presidency -- not the Soviet Union, not world leadership, but the
101
American people and their expectations ."

Dealing with these expectations requires reform and Lowi proposes
such measures.

First, though, he dismisses as inadequate the War Powers

83

Resolution of

1973, the Budget and

Impoundment Control Act of

several older plans such as the proposal for one six-year term and

presidential cabinet.

establishment

of

Real

a

reform, as he sees it, requires the

responsible multiparty system.

a

and

1974,

Enumerating nine

myths about the existing two party system, he contends that "nothing
about the present American party system warrants the respect it

receives." 102

Enacting changes which would facilitate

a

multiparty

system (he thinks the most workable number would be three) would have

a

number of advantages, most notably reviving parties as meaningful

institutions.

This might be accomplished by retaining single-member

districts while changing the requirement for victory from the current

plurality standard to an absolute majority, thereby requiring run-offs
or

second elections.

details

of

a

is not to

lay out the

new set of party rules but simply to argue that the

parties would be

rei nvi gorati on of

presidency.

His point, however,

a

big step toward “building down" the

Multiple parties, Lowi says, would reduce the need

parties to appear to be all things to all people.

expected to have

a

of

They would be

more limited, hence more realistic scope of coverage

which would mean that "presidential candidates would no longer have to

appear omnicompetent."

multiparty system would give the presidency a base
It would also bring
both in Congress and in a party.
the presidency back toward human scale by providing
an adequate, democratic basis for real collective
responsibi 1 ity. 103
A

Collective responsibility is the key concept here.
scholars share

a

Restr icti vi st

common desire to take some of the burden off the

84

president's shoulders by parceling
parties and other institutions.

a

It

portion of it out to Congress,
is hoped that this would tame the

tendency toward fixation on the president
of

as

—

whether currently conceived

"imperial," "textbook" or "personal."

Lowi's prescription for change seems provocative for its

commitment to creating the space for the institutional airing
political alternatives ("Why,

a

of

couple of the parties might even be

radical!" he exclaims at one point).

He assumes,

at

least implicitly,

that the policy alternatives currently available are in some way

insufficient.

But the value of his proposals depends upon

a

much closer

examination of the reasons whv presidents have so much difficulty
getting things done.
a

What structural

president's objectives?

ends

.

if

any,

forces inhibit the fulfillment of

How are those objectives decided upon?

are given policy priority and what does this tell us about

the competing interest groups he claims vie for government favor?
to such

questions

and given only

What

a

—

It

is

questions largely ignored by expansivist theorists

surface treatment by

r

estr i cti vi sts -- that

I

now turn

my attention.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE STRUCTURE OF THE PRESIDENCY

The life of the nation has grown infinitely
varied.
It does not centre now upon questions

governmental structure or of the distribution of governmental powers.
It centres upon
questions of the very structure and operation
of society itself, of which government is only
the instrument.

of

-- Woodrow Wilson

The Idea of Structure

Woodrow Wilson's cogent 1912 observation belies his conventional
intent in moving beyond governmental structure.

This slice of campaign

rhetoric -- taken from his speeches and subsequently compiled in book
form -- introduces

a

critique of the rise of monopoly corporations in

the American political

economy around the turn of the century.

1

His

attempt to redirect people's attention to the structure underlying the

operation of governmental institutions involved, at times, very harsh
words for the giants of U.S. capitalism, as this classic Progressive Era

indictment of monopoly power shows:

The masters of the government of the United States are
the combined capitalists and manufacturers of the
It is written over every intimate page
United States.
of the records of Congress, it is written all through
the history of conferences at the White House, that the
suggestions of economic policy in this country have come
The benevolent
from one source, not from many sources.
guardians, the kind-hearted trustees who have taken the
troubles of government off our hands, have become so
conspicuous that almost anybody can write out a list
of

them.

2

93

94

But the venom Wilson reserved for big manufacturers,

bankers, the great

railroad combinations and other trusts should not, of course, be
mistaken for

general rejection of the business ethos or the basic

a

structural arrangements
all

of

that.

not deed,

the political economy.

of

What he opposed

as a movement

—

He sought to preserve

what progressives opposed, in word

-- was the pernicious effect of

if

monopoly on

market competition and business opportunities for smaller enterprises.
"I

a

am for

big business,

and

I

am against the trusts," he added,

distinction which reveals the limits

of

his examination of

structure and operation of society itself."

distinction in

drawing

"the very

He elaborates on this

passage that fetishizes big business:

a

Big business is no doubt to a large extent necessary
and natural.
The development of business upon a great
scale, upon a great scale of cooperation, is inevitable,
But that is a very different
and, is probably desirable.
matter from the development of trusts, because the trusts
They have been artificially created;
have not grown.
they have been put together, not by natural processes,
but by the will, the deliberate planning will, of men
who were more powerful than their neighbors in the

business world

.

.

.

Big business is natural,
to the natural

3

even organic; trusts are

forces of the market.

clear how Wilson could campaign on

emancipation

of

a

a

contrived impediment

With this understanding it becomes

platform calling for "the

business" which would usher in "The New Freedom"

of

capital, of free enterprise, of individuals' human energies, and still
often have the flavor of
For Wilson,

then,

a

progressive, or even

a

populist, politician.

his focus on the structure of society beneath

the mere governmental structure entailed an essentially conservative

reading of the political economy.

He admits as much in an explanation

95

o+

what it means to be

a

"progressive," stating that "if

did not

I

believe that to be progressive was to preserve the essentials of our
institutions,
it
a

in

I

for one could not be a progressive ." 4

can be said that Wilson had

shallow notion.

a

As

a

consequence

thin notion of structure, or better yet

Were trusts the lone cause of skewed economic policy

the halls of Congress and conferences in the White House?

Or must

politics in capitalist society necessarily favor the interests of
capital over the interests of others?

Would the elimination of monopoly

and concomitant preservation of big business cure "the problem," or

would this simply leave different, perhaps less self-conscious elites as
"the masters of the government?"

really

Did Wilson's version of pr ogr essi vi sm

forward, or was it actually

look,

a

lapse into

a

supposedly

pristine past when markets, and the government, were free

of

coercion

from mammoth combinations of capital?

Obviously many other questions could be posed concerning Wilson's
position.

The point, though,

is to draw attention to the idea of

including an explicitly structural dimension in one's analysis of
political, economic and social phenomena.

And further, to note how

muddled the concept of "structure" can become, even when correctly
treated as something more than simply the way government institutions
are arrayed,

as with Wilson.

Structural analysis, in short, has not

received adequate attention in the discipline

of

political science as

a

whole, nor in the specific subfield devoted to study of the presidency.
The latter area is notable for its blind spot when it comes to the

structural relationship between the political economy and the chief
executive.

96

James MacGregor Burns' writing on the presidency is
point.

Burns' role as

a

case in

a

leading exponent of the expansivist theory of

the presidency has already been discussed in chapter one.

His book

Presidential Government is regarded as one of the very best treatments
of

the subject.

its necessary

(in

For Burns,

his view)

the problems confronting the presidency in

drive for expansion of its purview are

mainly structural in nature.

well-known work The Deadlock

This point was forcefully argued in his
of

recent book The Power to Lead:

Democracy

,

and has been renewed in his

The Crisis of the American Presidency

The basic premise of the latter text is that presidential
(and

leadership at other levels as well) today faces

a

.

leadership

severe crisis.

"The roots of the crisis lie in structural problems that have been noted

since the start of the system two hundred years ago," he contends.

symptoms

"The

the crisis take the long-observed form of political

of

disarray, institutional stalemate, and governmental ineptitude and
i

mpotence.

"

a

This is familiar turf for Burns.
that the constitutional

He is redeploying his argument

system of divided powers inherited from the

framers makes unified, programmatic government

a

rarity in the U.S., and

that the solution to this dilemma requires consideration of

parliamentary-style reshaping

of

a

more

power to render centripetal the forces

that currently pull apart governmental authority.

In

particular, often-

antagonistic relations between the executive and legislative branches
of political
must be harmonized, while concurrently reviving the role

parties as vital centers of debate and disciplined action.
for the presidency thus is "structural"

The problem

for Burns in the sense that it
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is embedded

in

the very structure of institutions either erected in
the

Constitution or flowing out
advocating

a

the founding period.

of

wholesale adoption

structuralists.

of

a

He refers to those

parliamentary system

in

the U.S.

as

And he terms his own more modest version of

strengthened parties, collective leadership and constitutional reform
"gradual structuralist."*
To be sure,

there is nothing wrong per se with probing the

institutional machinery of government for flaws and speculating on how
to remedy them.

Burns has made

lifetime of valuable contributions to

a

our appreciation of the high price paid for the fragmented allocation of

constitutional powers.

Whatever political direction one would like the

nation to take -- and Burns clearly favors Democratic presidents
(supported by principled parties)

advancing

a

liberal agenda -- an

understanding of how and why institutions function the way they do
obviously enhances the prospects

of

beginning the journey.

Where Burns

comes up short is in his preoccupation with government structures.
him,

analysis of the president

(or

any other component of politics)

For
is

confined to an understanding of institutional structure and proceses,
and the constitutional

theory undergirding them.

exclusive, the examination too shallow.

Such

the office itself

of

focus is too

The equation of structure with

political institutions leaves uncovered myriad issues

importance to making sense

a

the presidency.

is situated within a deeper

It

of

fundamental

neglects the fact that

structure of power and

privilege which shapes and constrains those who occupy it, regardless

of

whether or not the president operates in greater, or lesser, cooperation
with Congress.

Questions addressed by the structure-as-institutions
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perspective certainly are not unimportant.
a

They simply do not confront

host of alternative questions that shed light of

different hue on

a

the office.

Burns,

it

should be noted, is not alone in his treatment of the

presidency as comprehensible through an exploration
structures.

of

government

Political science generally has not had an easy time

figuring out how to study the office, or how to theorize about it

7
.

When the discipline has thought in terms of structure it has done so

almost exclusively in terms consonant with those of Burns.

So,

for

instance, we get books devoted to the crisis in American politics that

explore the "structural matters" and contemplate "structural change,"
with "structure" referring to the institutional division between the

president and Congress

9
.

Proposals for constitutional reforms to unify

divided government typically flow from such studies.

Similarly, we get

surveys of research approaches which cite various perspectives on the

office

—

empirical, legal-constitutional, psychological and

institutional are common ones -- with structural concerns discussed as
variant of the institutional orientation .'7

Or,

a

we see responses to the

growing cry to make presidency research more empirically grounded, which

designate "structural variables" as elements describing the

constitutional composition

of

different political systems (in the case
executive, party systems, power

of

comparative studies), such as type

of

dissolution, re-eligibility for office, and the like

of

10
.

Again, the importance of these issues is not in question.

them can be useful

in

All

furthering our understanding of the office.

However they stop short

of

locating it within

a

broader and deeper

of
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setting of the political economy and the
social and ideological

structures within which institutions operate.
uniformly, to offer atheoreti cal
mechanics.

,

They tend, almost

descriptive accounts

Such limitations are evident, as well,

political

of

in the major

works of

those theorists discussed in chapter one as representing
expansivist and
r

es t r

i

ct

i

v

i

schools

st

thought.

of

This is the case even though some of

them implicitly, and at times even explicitly, display

regard for the force of
Harold Laski
first chapter

Wilsonian

structure beneath government institutions.

illustrates the problem nicely.

Laski

,

a

a

includes some elements of

a

As noted in the

broader structural

analysis in his book on the presidency.

He refers to the need of

executives to maintain the confidence

the business community, and

sees political

parties as captured by properied interests.

these insights suggest

a

than the office itself.

anything approaching

structure of economic power more fundamental
But the points remain on the level of

a

coherent argument.

His most critical

potential for

insights

into vagarity while the president appears as someone able

off

to transcend whatever obstacles to effective action emerge.

abandoned.

Both of

They are sprinkled throughout his work, never fused into

suggestion.

thus trail

of

chief

a

The

more meaningful structural analysis is lost, curiously

For such potential

squarely the implications
am advocating would

of

ask Laski

to value the interests of

to be realized, Laski

business power.

would need to face

The structural

approach

whether the president is in fact compelled

business above all others, how such compulsion

actually manifests itself, and what this implies about the quality

democracy in the U.S.

I

of
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Much the same may be said of Clinton Rossiter's work.

An

expansivist like Laski, Rossiter is most comfortable simply enumerating
and celebrating the chief executive's diversity of roles,

very well.

Yet even he alludes to real

a

job he does

structural constraints.

His

repeated references to "private liberty and public morality" as

restraining

a

president's course

of

action imply, but do not explore,

substantive limits placed on the office by public opinion.

Moreover,

his famous metaphor of the president as "a kind of magnificent lion"

also includes boundaries to presidential roaming, since the chief

executive is warned against trying to "break, loose from his broad

reservation."

The nature of this reservation, though,

unexamined, perhaps because Rossiter assumes it as

left

given, an

But whatever the reason, precisely at the point

unassailable truth.
where thin notions

a

is

structure draw away from inquiry -- where

of

cherished commitments to "free enterprise" or conventional defenses

of

America's national interests abroad are asserted -- deeper structural
analysis forges ahead.
Arthur Schl esi nger

presidency runs into

a

'

s

restrictivist critique

similar problem of depth.

impressed with the scope of Schl esi nger

s

of

One cannot help but be

genealogy

congressional relations in foreign affairs.

the imperial

of

His grasp of the

constitutional issues involved in the changing cycles

legislative balance

of

power is impressive.

incorporates into his account

forecloses

a

of

presidential-

of

executive and

But for all the depth he

presidential usurpation

of

power, he

the
host of other questions that penetrate more deeply into

dynamics of the office.

The rationale behind American foreign policy,
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in

general

and specifically in Southeast Asia;

and ideological

security

dimensions to traditional definitions of U.S.

concerns;

the morality of U.S.

behavior in Vietnam, and

home in defense of that behavior abroad -- such issues are not

addressed, and in some cases are dismissed, in Schl esi nger
of

the imperial presidency.

All

'

s

elucidation

complex, deeply troubling questions are

reduced to their singular effect on the central
at

"national

the authenticity of frequent postwar invocations of

the threat of communism;
at

the economic, political

(for

Schlesinger)

issue

stake, the constitutional balance of power between the White House

and Congress.

The causes of the imperial president thus boil down to

congressional timidity in the face

of

challenges to its institutional

integrity, or trail off into accounts of Nixon's psychology.

Such

a

theoretical strategy reinforces conventional foreign policy assumptions
and doctrines by confining analysis to tactical,

institutional, questions.
reading -- that

a

in this

And it assumes -- wrongly, on

instance
a

structural

more active, resistent Congress would have made

national security judgments based on criteria different from those
the aberrant Nixon.

particularly

weak,

Left unexamined, such an assumption is

peg on which to hang

a

of

a

theory of the presidency.

The proclivity of expansivist and restrictivist theorists to

either ignore outright, or mention in passing without investigating in
depth,

structural

questions that implicate the office in an ensemble of

political, economic and social relations should be clear at this point.
We need only think of

The State of

Thomas Cronin's observation near the end of his

the Presidency:
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The reality is that all too often on the long road
to the White House our sometime-to-be-presidents become
the servants of what is, rather than the visionary
shapers of what could be.
In the long process of working their way up and learning to operate within the
system they become rewarded for playing along with the
dominant interests and for playing within the traditional rules of the game. 11

These pregnant sentences hold out the promise of, but do not in fact

reflect, an analysis of the presidency that fully considers structural
issues beyond governmental institutions, even though Cronin skillfully

exposes many myths surrounding the office, and even though he does make
mention

of

some "extr agover nmental pressures" that influence the

president's policy agenda.

In

sum,

structural concerns are not wholly

absent in mainstream theories of the presidency.

They simply are so

marginal, so underdeveloped, that they appear only as afterthoughts, not

meriting close elaboration.
brief example will help illuminate the difference between

A

mainstream approaches to the presidency and an approach that puts
structural concerns at the forefront.

Consider President Ronald

Reagan's decision to seek $100 million in lethal aid to the rebels (the
contras)

attempting to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua,

part of his ceaseless six-year campaign to oust

1986

,

regime he views as

a

Spanning the spring and summer

great menace to U.S. national security.
of

a

this initiative received considerable coverage in the media and

involved Congress actively as the body whose approval
needed to complete the program.

What,

if

the presidency from this one presidential

of

the money was

anything, can we learn about

initiative?

Expansivist and

restr i cti vi st theories probably would draw fairly similar lessons.
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Rossiter's orientation would direct our attention to Reagan's
role
as

chief

legislator, guiding Congress in its lawmaking duties.

might point to the aid package as
as commander-in-chief,

a

manifestation

of

Or,

he

the president's job

developing our military strategy.

Similarly, he

might see Reagan wearing his "hat" as world leader, warning the western
world of the dangers of communism encroaching into our territory and

threatening our freedom.

His framework would be very congenial to the

Reagan program since its ostensible goal is to protect the liberty and
assert the morality of U.S. objectives.
be because of

If

he dissented at all

it

would

the Reagan administration's decision to ignore the World

Court's ruling against the U.S. mining

of

Nicaraguan harbors, thus

flouting the rule of law which Rossiter cherishes highly in his work.
But this does not bear directly on the aid question, and Rossiter might
well

support the administration against the Court anyway, since its

legitimacy has been denied by U.S. officials.
Neustadt's expansivist analysis would focus on the tremendous

persuasive ability of the president.

As he has so often during his

first and second terms, Reagan deftly exercised his power to persuade

within the Washington community (though his success in the public at
large is more questionable), winning support for the military funds,
after much debate, in both the House and the Senate.

His victory

reconfirmed his professional reputation as "the great communicator."
Neustadt might ponder why it is President Reagan seemingly always wins
his case on issues related to Nicaragua

(or

Central America in general),

and accordingly might study his information-gathering systems within the

executive branch, his personal power drive, his mastery

of

television as
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medium of communication, and the like.

a

And most certainly Neustadt

would wonder more generally about Reagan's ability to use Rooseveltian

means to achieve decidedly un-Roosevel

Rossiter

,

least

short-term triumph

a

a

ti an

ends.

Overall, like

Neustadt would see Reagan's victory on contra funding as at
of

the governmental bargaining process led by

powerful president, although since the ultimate outcome of the U.S.-

sponsored fight against the Sandinistas is in doubt, the "viability"

administration policy cannot be determined.

of

12

Restrictivists might consider the contra aid bill as an example
balanced executive-legislative interaction.
the measure.

of

Reagan did get his way on

He did act powerfully to protect his version of the

nation's national security interests.

But the bottom line for the

restrictivists would be that the president worked his will
with the coordinate branch of government.

in

concert

Like the expansivists,

restrictivists would have to concede that the process was sound.
Certainly some degree of caution would creep

in

to their analysis.

Schlesinger and Lowi both might be concerned that President Reagan's
method is highly personal, tending toward plebiscitary in style.

Lowi

especially would be likely to voice concern that Reagan had too much
power to set the entire agenda for contra aid, linking approval or
denial of aid to approval or denial of his administration's overall

goals and, indeed,

linking approval or denial to congressmen's sense of

patriotism (an aspect of what Lowi calls the "oversell syndrome").
an

As

issue of the balance of power between Congress and the White House,

the
though, restrictivists -- regardless of their personal view of

balanced.
contras -- would have to agree that the process was reasonably
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Congressional opponents had ample opportunity to voice their vociferous
opposition to the program.

And supporters succeeded in making the case

that contra aid would help preserve democracy in "our own backyard."

A

bipartisan commitment was affirmed.
Given the factors orthodox theories might explore, how would
truly structural view of the presidency handle this case?

structural inquiry would put the issue
of

the history of U.S.

a

First of all,

contra aid in the perspective

of

relations with Nicaragua, noting repeated U.S.

interventions there to assert our will in the name
concept of "democracy" and "freedom."

preservation against the kind

of

of

preserving our

would assess those claims of

It

political, economic and social life

Nicaraguans have had since our involvement there, noting the generally
abysmal level of political freedom and material sustenance gained under
the regimes supported by the U.S.

Next,

a

structural view would examine

the economic context of our historic interaction with Nicaragua, to

locate our relationship with this third world nation within the overall
U.S.

strategy toward the world economy.

A

structural orientation also

would assess the nature and uses of anticommunist appeals to engender

domestic climate receptive to the goals

of

U.S.

a

policy, appeals invoked

repeatedly and long before the Sandinistas achieved their victory over
Somoza's forces in 1979.

Relatedly, the geopolitical assumptions

corresponding to such appeals would receive attention, especially the
premise of

a

zero-sum superpower struggle which fuels assertions

Soviet threat in Central America.

of

the

Finally, touching all these concerns

but in a sense rising above them, a structural

analysis would open to

question the whole notion of "national security" as used to defend the
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conduct

U.S.

of

policy in relation to the contras.

13

This is the policy

foundation of President Reagan's approach to the issue and, as such,
merits closest scrutiny.
A

a

full

accounting of the structural view would,

of

course, involve

lengthy development of all these points, contrasted with the mode

analysis expected in the expansi vist-restrictivist debate.

I

of

am not

pretending to undertake such an endeaver here; the second part

of

this

chapter goes into the structural interpretation in much more detail and

chapters three and four are case studies intended to apply it.

What

I

would suggest, though, is that having combined these lines of inquiry,

a

structural position would conclude that what is remarkable about

President Reagan's handling
mastery

of

of

the contra aid bill

is not

so much his

Congress, or his continued success at drawing from the well
The remarkable aspect is not that he could win approval

of

persuasion.

of

$100 million for rebel forces regarded as murderers, rapists and

thugs

—

"freedom fighters" in Reagan's parlance of persuasion

—

by

virtually every respected international human rights monitoring group
and
of

a

sizable number of U.S. allies.

What

i_s_

remarkable is the degree

continuity between the policies pursued by the Reagan administration

and those pursued by every administration since the mid-nineteenth

century.

Presidential consistency of purpose and strategy in regard to

Nicaragua would be the structural insight.

And as for the orthodox

concern for the balance of power between the president and Congress, the
crucial point here is how Congress has accepted the values and

assumptions that all president's have had toward Nicaragua, regardless
of

whether any given president was more or less plebiscitary in
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character.

In

the case of contra aid, of particular note is the extent

to which even the most forceful

president

5

and articulate opponents of the

position -- Senator John Kerry,

(D.- MA)

is the best example

-- accepted his basic premises regarding
the nature of the Sandinista

regime, their "betrayal" of the revolution and the geopolitical

implications of further Sandinista leadership.

14

in

sum,

while

a

structural reading of contra aid would not dismiss the contributions of

expansivist and restrictivist theories
primacy to other factors and ask

a

of

the presidency, it would give

host of different questions.

From the preceding discussion we can distill the elements of

a

broader critique of conventional approaches.

Specifically, there are

three interrelated deficiencies in the expansi

vi

st-restr i cti

vi st

debate.

The first shortcoming of mainstream theories is hyperinstitutional

i

sm.

The two variants seek to explain government institutions largely by

studying their internal composition, their political-constitutional
dynamic, and the balance of power between them.

Often this leads to

analyses that are mainly descriptive in nature, with too little regard
for

the importance of what

conventional accounts

of

the exclusion of, ends.
on how to make it

I

am calling

structural dynamics. 13

Second,

the presidency stress means over, and almost to

They view the office

i

nstr umental 1 y

,

focusing

"work better," instead of investigating the

fundamental reasons why it works the way it does, and subjecting the
goals of the presidency to rigorous inquiry.

implicitly assume the goals

of

Such approaches at least

presidential leadership to be, ipso

facto, beyond question and reconsideration, thus ruling out the

structural possibility that the pursuit of those very ends may produce,
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or

contribute to, the profound troubles all analysts see plaguing the

office.

Ira Katznelson and Mark Kesselman's comment -- aimed

specifically at Neustadt's thesis on presidential power as the unifying
ingredient of executive authority -- thus seems generally applicable to
the entire debate between expansivist and

r

estr i cti vi st positions:

In our view, Neustadt is correct in stressing the
need to understand the overall coherence of presidential
activity.
Yet he does not specify what ends are served
by the successful exercise of preidential power.
Unless
one can supply an answer, the exercise of presidential
power appears meaningless, like a dog chasing its tail 16
.

Third, the expansivist-restrictivist spectrum offers an exceedingly

narrow range of debate.

president is located, analytically and

A

normatively, somewhere between the poles
relative restraint.

Such

a

of

relative activity and

cramped intellectual space provides little

room for perspectives that question the assumptions upon which previous

theories have rested.

Some scholars have noted that the difference

between the two schools is more apparent than real,
rather than substance.

They are,

in

a

shift in emphasis

fact, two sides of the same coin.

As Bruce Miraff has argued concerning what some call

"revisionist"

theories of the presidency, "This supposedly 'revisionist' literature is
soft at the core;

despite their disillusionment, most presidential

scholars cannot conceal the fact that they are still in love with the

Presidency ."

17

He adds that since such theories are rooted in an

uncritical analysis of the office, and cling to the illusion

president as an historic agent
no longer than the arrival

of

of

of

the

progressive change, they "will survive

the next liberal

in

the White House

." 10
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Genuinely structural analysis avoids such pitfalls by broadening
the
scope of debate currently confining the conventional approaches.

Structure, the State and the Presidency;

The Missing Links

Mainstream political science has been reluctant to acknowledge the

challenge posed to its theoretical enterprise by alternative views
the presidency.

approach.

Theorists on occasion will briefly mention

Sometimes such an approach receives

a

modicum

of

a

of

structural

respect,

albeit while being woefully underdeveloped and inadequately contrasted
with the preponderant mainstream theories.

times

At

contribution is noted, but subsequently ignored
most salient capacity as
and,

further,

a

in

a

solid structural

what should be its

basic challenge to the reigning orthodoxy

jettisoned as an avenue warranting future exploration.

But more common is intellectual

invisibility.

For instance,

1V

in his

recent work Lowi -- while perhaps the widest ranging theorist still

operating within the parameters

of

the debate between the two hegemonic

schools of thought -- employs what he terms an "institutionalist

approach" to the presidency.

This approach is in accord with the

conventional structure-as-institutions position within the discipline.
He makes his case for proceeding along institutionalist lines by

asserting its superiority to the other available model, the

"psychology/character approach." 20

The impression he leaves is that

these two approaches exhaust the realm of the possible as far as

studying the office is concerned.

Elsewhere

psychological approach, which gained

a

I

have argued that the

wide following among presidency

scholars in the early 1970's, fits easily within the expansivist-

110

restrictivist range
Lowi

of

debate 21

The point here, though,

.

is simply that

seems to bar the emergence of truly structural perspectives.
An

ironic opening can be found, though,

stated institutionalist framework.

if

one looks beyond Lowi's

For while on the one hand,

confirms the widespread, historic invisibility

his work

critical orientations

of

within the presidency literature, it also supplies some of the matter
out of which

a

structuralist approach could materialize.

In

making his

argument that the presidency has grown too personalized, untied from its

traditional institutional moorings, Lowi contends that the American
people have come to hold gargantuan expectations

the office.

of

These

expectations place enormous pressure on the president to solve the
nations's problems.

Recognizing this burden, modern presidents quite

logically have sought to claim power commensurate with such awesome

responsibility and in the process have assumed -- regardless

of

their

political party -- that the office is "tantamount to the state ." 22
view of the president as "state personified" raises

questions.

What is the state?

number of vital

What is the nature of the relationship

between the state and the president?

presidency?

a

This

How does the state constrain the

Can the president influence and shape the state as well?

One could come up with other queries.

pursues none of them.

Interestingly enough, Lowi

The equation of state and presidential power

evidently raises no important issues beyond those

of

the institutional
The nexus between

balance of power between the president and Congress.
state power, private power and the president remains

a

dark area.

A

structural theory of the presidency throws open this dark area to the
light of critical

inquiry.

It

accepts Lowi's position on the state-

Ill

presidency connection and draws the inference that

if

the president is

the state personified, then it must embody the goals of
the state.

The

presidency must marshal its power to pursue ends consonant
with state
power.

Therefore, theories

of

theories of the presidency.
herein lies

the state must be brought to bear on

An encounter needs to take place.

problem for conventional theories

a

of

Traditional theories of the presidency share
(whether acknowledged or not)

in

the presidency.
a

common foundation

the pluralist theory of democracy 23
.

Pluralism holds that the social order is best understood as
of

multiple, voluntary interest groups competing over

policy areas.

But

a

a

collection

variety of

Through these groups, or acting as individuals through

the use of other democratic freedoms such as elections, representative

institutions, civil liberties and the like, citizens can become involved
in political

life.

The role of the state is to serve as an umpire,

a

neutral referee that sets the ground rules for group conflict and for
the continued vitality of political

rights.

Beyond the maintenance of

a

relatively stable setting for bargaining and compromise, the state has
no specific purpose,

no intersts of

its own.

Democratic government, by

definition, serves the interests of the people.
thus viewed as

a

reasonable approximation

of

The policy process is

the "public interest";

power is diffuse so that no one group has an undue influence on the
then,

government.

For pluralists,

the focus of

sustained analysis.

an

the nature of the state has not been
To find such attention to the state as

object of inquiry, one must move beyond scholarship wedded to the

concerns

of

liberal democracy and into the orbit of the Marxist and non

Marxist left 24
.
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It

is here that

larger social order.

we find the state situated

in

The state is not viewed as

a

the framework of the

neutral

judge

presiding over the relatively fair, and immanently open democratic game
of

group competition.

Rather, the state is intimately involved in

making and protecting what Cronin referred to above (though vaguely,

without any accompanying analysis) as the "rules of the game."

These

rules are analogous to understanding the operation of the political
economy, understanding, in short, the articulation of democracy and

capitalism.

To have such an understanding,

explaining the social order, is to bring
bear on whatever is being studied.

being explored.

But with

a

In

a

and to give it primacy in

structural perspective to

this case, the presidency is

structural analysis, the presidency can only

be explained within the broader,

more enduring interaction of the

democratic state and the capitalist economy.
Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, for example, provide an excellent
account of structural analysis in their book On Democracy 23
.

For them,

the workings of American politics cannot be seen as just the outcome of
the exercise of constitutionally-granted political rights, whether by

individuals or groups.

Those rights and civil liberties, absolutely

essential to any kind of genuine democracy, are severely limited by the

capitalist context of our "capitalist democracy."
point out,

"the political

As Cohen and Rogers

rights granted to all citizens, workers among

others, are formal or procedural, and not substantive.

That is, they do

the inequalities
not take into account in their own form and application
in

capitalism, which
the distribution of resources, characteristic of

and importantly limit
decisively affect the exercise of political rights
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their power of expression.

owners

of

"

2*

Such "resource constraints" give the

capital enormous structural advantages in the gathering of

information about, and the coordination of, their shared interests,

contributing to substantive political and economic ineguality despite
formal political equality of rights.

Moreover, the structure of capitalist democracy encourages people
to seek fulfillment through the satisfaction of

gain.

short-term material

Such "demand constraints" powerfully encourage calculations of

economic rationality as the normal way of thinking,

a

logic that

privileges, by necessity, the interests of capital before the interests
of

all

other groups in society.

the control of

Because of the inherent link between

investment decisions, production and employment, the

accumulation of private profits must be the condition upon which the
interests of all members of society rest.

capital's power over state policy --

a

It

is likewise the basis of

kind of veto power over public

policy that has come to be known as "capital strike ." 27
conclude, "Under capitalism, therefore, the welfare

structurally secondary to the welfare
of

of

of

The authors

workers remains

capitalists, and the well-being

workers depends directly on the decisions

of

capitalists ." 20

And

this condition for national politics has ramifications for the world

arena as well, since the accumulation

of

capital requires the state to

pursue certain fundamental foreign policy goals.
then,

Within this milieu,

citizens' motivations, their horizons, are structurally

constrained to the pursuit

of

short-term material gain, rendering

irrational the demand for longer-term political and economic struggle

against capitalist democracy, or for

a

system based on other forms of
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human motivation.

pluralist notion

This is hardly
of

set of conditions conducive to the

a

democracy as the open competition between groups,

involving free and equal citizens.
This digression into the work of Cohen and Rogers is intended to

show how much deeper

a

notion of structure can be found in critical

accounts of the political economy.
only makes sense, on

environment

of

a

The institution of the presidency

truly structural reading,

located within the

if

capitalist democracy, an environment which the state

defends and extends through the exercise

of

public authority and power.

Theories of the state enrich our comprehension

this environment and,

of

hence, further our knowledge of the presidency.

Generally speaking

there are three approaches to theories of the state that have vied for

preeminence within left scholarship.
instrumentalist, str utur al
theories.

2<?

-f unct

i

These can be classified as

onal

i

st

,

and social

struggle

Despite their important differences, these approaches do

shade into one another at times.

What follows is

a

brief discussion of

these points of contact and diversion.

Instrumental theories of the state are most often associated with
William Domhoff, although both are

the work of Ralph Miliband and G.

heavily indebted to the path-breaking career
studies of the "power elite

." 30

a

C.

Wright Mills and his

The essence of the instrumentalist

perspective can be found in its its explosion
through

of

of

the pluralist paradigm

careful detailing of the influence of members of the corporate

capitalist class on the activities
case directly:

of

government.

Domhoff makes the
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Contrary to this pluralist view of power ... there is
social upper class in the United States that is a ruling
class by virtue of its dominant role in the economy and
government....
C T 3 h i s
ruling class is socially cohesive,
has its basis in the large corporations and banks, plays a
major role in shaping the social and political climate,
and dominates the federal government through a variety of
organizations and methods. 31
a

Instrumentalism holds that the capitalist class dominates state
policy in two ways.

On the one hand,

members of the ruling class have

inside influence by virtue of the direct participation of class members
in

the state apparatus.

Class participation hinges on

interlocking relationships between members
the banking sector and the government. 32
the instrument of corporate capital.

class has outside influence through

organizations that shape the range

a

complex set of

the corporate community,

The state is,

in

On the other hand,

this sense,

the dominant

network of policy planning

a

acceptable thought on the leading

of

This context of "reasonable" thought is reinforced

issues of the day.
by

of

a

secondary aspect of outside control, the conferal

of

large sums of

money to political candidates through the proliferation of business-

related political action committees. 33

In

this outside sense, capital

expresses its will through the state.

Instrumentalists do not argue, however, that elite domination
the state is total.
"the ability of

a

As Domhoff

of

explains, corporate domination means

class or group to set the terms under which other

classes or groups within

a

social

system must operate." 3 *

terms, some social mobility occurs.

Within these

Non-ruling class people do

occasionally work their way up through the class system, but at the
price of being assimilated into the norms and beliefs of the upper class
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along the way.

Domination also does not negate the importance

interclass and intraclass conflict over state policy.

of

But to the extent

such conflicts exist, they "do not involve challenges to the rules that

create privileges for the upper class and domination by its leadership
group

." 33

is,

It

consensus to

a

in

short, conflict within

a

shared consensus,

a

significant extent manufactured through class power.

Structural-functionalist theorists consciously defined themselves
in

opposition to instrumental theories.

Within Marxian thought,

a

classic debate occurred between Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas 36
.

Poulantzas contended that Miliband placed far too much emphasis on the
social backgound of state members and the direct links beteeen corporate
and state officials.

By contrast,

he argued,

the relationship of the

state to the capitalist class is an objective one.

The relation between the bourgeois class and the State
This means that if the
is an objective relation.
determinate social formaa
function of the State in
tion and the interests of the dominant class in this
formation coincide it is by reason of the system itself ." 37
,

He went on to assert that the state serves as a "factor
a

social

cohesion" in

formation, reproducing the conditions necessary for capital

accumulation.

This is the function of the state,

independent of whether members
or

of

of

a

function performed

corporate capital actually have direct

indirect influence in government.

And he argued further that

capitalist State best serves the interests

of

“the

the capitalist class only

when the members of this class do not participate directly in the State

apparatus, that is to say when the ruling class is not the politically

governing class

." 3B

The state, Poulantzas contended,

is

"relatively
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autonomous
of

from any class or class fraction.

performs its function

It

maintaining capitalism and its system of power because objective

structural constraints compel it.
Other stur ctur al -f uncti onal theorists have tried to specify how
and why these structural

constraints operate.

Fred Block cites two

prime "structural mechanisms" that limit the options of state managers.
Both constraints rely on pressures other than the individual or

collective designs
maintain

of

capitalists.

high level of

a

One constraint is the need to

"business confidence."

Governments must do

everything in their power to ensure that businessmen have confidence in
the stability of the country's "general pol itical /economic climate."

Investment decisions of firms, the level of employment and inflation,
tax rates and many other factors are linked to the overall health of the

economy.

And it

that health which is essential to the existence of

since economic decline could spark an accompanying decline

any regime,
in

is

business confidence and the withdrawal

of

productive investment.

Without such investment, no government can hope to function from

position of strength, or even remain in power, for long.
this threat of

"capital strike" does not assume

a

a

Notice that

class conscious elite.

"[T]he chain of events can unfold without any members

of

the ruling

class consciously deciding to act 'politically' against the regime in
power ...

si

nee decisions made by individual capitalists according to

their own narrow economic rationality are sufficient to paralyze the

regime.

"
.

.

3,?

.

Samuel

Bowles and Herbert Gintis concur with Block's position,

stating the case for capital's "veto power over public policy" this way:
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The power of capital -- its command over state
policy -- thus derives not so much from what it does
but from what it might not do.
As in many other
situations, power resides with the party that can
effectively (and without great cost) withdraw resources and thereby inflict large costs on an
opponent 40

The mobility of capital

is at the root

of

its power.

The "freedom to

move" wherever the business climate looks most promising gives capital

a

power which labor can approach only under extraordinary circumstances.

Concerning the different nature

of

capital and labor, and hence, their

different kinds of power, Bowles and Gintis add:

Capital is owned by people and alienable from them; it
can be invested or withdrawn or sent around the world
by nothing more than the touch of a computer keyboard.
Labor is embodied in people.
The withdrawal of labor
services from employer requires an alternative source
of income, which workers generally lack..
The withdrawal
of labor from an entire economy requires the costly and
often jarring and politically or culturally obstructed
physical movement of the workers themselves. 41
To return to the second,

and secondary,

structural constraint noted by

Block, class struggle also impinges on the options of state managers.

Concerted pressure from below can force state managers to expand the
state's role into areas that reduce the hardships of the economy for

various constituencies.

Such reforms are most likely to occur in

periods of economic crisis or postwar reconstruction.

But as crisis

conditions diminish, the impetus for further changes wanes and what
reforms have been enacted serve, ultimately, to rationalize the system.
This dimension of Block's structural-functionalist argument shows
an

affinity with the third approach to state theory, the social struggle

school.

Social struggle theories recognize the importance of the
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state's need to secure and maintain business confidence, often referred
to as the accumulation function

capital).

4 ^

(promoting the accumulation of

But they also see this functional

requirement conflicting

with the need for state policies to be legitimate in the eyes of the

public.

If

the state favors the interests of capital

to the extent that

people no longer can endorse the systemic bias toward business, causing

widespread disaffection

—

—

whether overtly-articulated or more implicit

from the established order, citizen allegiance to state institutions

and goals can weaken 43

The state therefore walks

.

a

fine line.

It

must

balance its capitalist accumulation function and democratic legitimation
function.
on

This opens up

a

space for social struggle to have an impact

the outcome of state decisions.

do things that

are dysfunctional

The state at times may be forced to

to the accumulation process,

a

point

Bowles and Gintis make to critique the structural -functional i st tendency
to assume the state always reproduces the conditions for capital

Bowles and Gintis contend that the relationship between

accumulation.

the capitalist economy and liberal

democratic state can best be

understood as "a contradictory rather than

a

functional totality ." 44

The contradictory nature of this articulation of state and economy

means that the state does more than just respond to crises generated by

capitalism, as str uc tur al

production of

a

-f unct

i

onal

i

st

assume.

It

"is integral

crisis as well as to its resolution."

Gintis cite the success

of

4®

to the

Bowles and

social struggle on many fronts in the postwar

period as forcing the state to make concessions to, among others, the
labor movement

—

costly concessions that seriously limited the

profitability of capital by increasing the "citizen wage"

(socialized
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consumption) and reducing the negative impact
on

wages.

of

the reserve army effect

this way the state helped create the crisis of capitalism

In

which was manifest in the early 1970's and whose effects are still with
us today.

Popular pressure thus must have

a

place alongside other

factors in explaining the operation of the state.
as well

as protect,

capitalism.
str

The state helps set,

the "rules of the game" governing liberal democratic

And Bowles and Gintis believe that both instrumental

uc t ur a 1 ~f un c t i on a 1

i

st

theories

of

and

the state do not appreciate the

fact that those rules can change.

There are important differences in emphasis and particulars

between instrumental, str uctur al -f unct i onal i st and social struggle

theories of the state, and

I

am in no way trying to resolve them here.

But despite these differences they share

a

common premise that the basic

structure of capitalism profoundly and inseparably influences democratic
political life.

All

the elements of these theories -- the class

background of state actors, the role of the policy planning network, the
functional imperative of accumulation, social struggle and the tension
between democracy and capitalism
calling structural analysis.

—

are vital to what

I

am broadly

While the literature on theories

of

the

state is large and growing, the number of analysts who have attempted to
use such theories, or elements thereof, to uncover the dynamics of the

presidency is modest by comparison. 46
as offering

a

Two efforts do stand out, though,

promising structural blend

of

these scholarly areas.

Both

Miroff and Alan Wolfe explicitly examine the specifics of presidential

policy-making to glean insight about the nature
what presidents have done and why.

of

the office.

They ask

And in seeking answers they explore
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the relationship between the goals of the presidency and
the goals of
the state.

Miroff's study of the Kennedy administration, Pragmatic Illusions
debunks the myth of JFK as
myth of the office as

century.

a

a

,

progressive chief executive and the larger

progressive institution in the twentieth

Focusing on foreign and domestic policies (the Berlin crisis,

the Cuban missile crisis,

the Alliance for Progress, Vietnam,

the New

Economics and civil rights), Miroff concludes that Kennedy's tenure was
essentially conservative in character and substance:

Kennedy's presidential record cannot ... sustai n his
reputation as a progressive.
Behind the image of the
popular hero lies the reality of service to established
power and established values. 47

Kennedy's leadership style was premised on the liberal belief in
pragmatic, hard-headed adherence to objective facts, free from the taint
of

ideology.

This illusion of pragmatism, of being above the fray --

reinforced by the veneer
the

of

empirical social science so fashionable in

1950's and 1960's, and highly touted by the corporate executives

Kennedy brought into top administration positions -- concealed the

thoroughly conventional intent

of

Kennedy's policy objectives.

These

objectives, according to Miroff, in no way departed from the basic, and

politically-laden, goals

of

liberal

ideology, goals all president's must

endorse in their role as the "central figures in the maintenance

established socioeconomic ar r angements

.

of

40

Despite JFK's lofty rhetoric, then, Miroff maintains he held to
the earthly interests of the status quo.
by the economic and

Those interests were supported

ideological context of the American political
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economy.

Within that context, the principle domestic function of the

Kennedy presidency -- and, to extrapolate, all presidencies -- was the

"stabilization

of

corporate capitalism."

Miroff elaborates:

It has not mattered greatly that recent Chief Executives
have been relatively unlearned in economics; the imperatives
of giant corporations who dominate the American economy
impose themselves on the Presidency with a force that
cannot be misunderstood....
The complex partnership between
the White House and the corporate community thus transcends
personalities and party lines 419
.

Activity on the foreign policy front complements the stabilization

of

domestic corporate power by facilitating an accommodating climate for
international capital.

The expansion of U.S.

concomitant perpetuation

of

military power and the

Cold War assumptions about the threat of

communism are crucial features of this objective.

Toward this end,

Miroff contends that the president can be much more openly assertive in

style than in the sphere of domestic policy, even though the chief

executive is the most visible national voice on virtually all important
public questions.
What Miroff
or

any other)

in

the U.S.

leaves us with is

as the

a

picture

of

the president

(Kennedy,

"chief stabilizer" of political and economic order

He probes the structure of power

in

the U.S.

and finds two

major intertwined areas -- the domestic economy and its international,

defense-related equivalent
supporter
at

of

—

where the president serves as the dominant

systemic maintenance

.* 0

In

contrast to Miroff, Wolfe looks

successive administrations from FDR onward to discern the underlying

imperatives they faced.

His work is at once broader in the sense of

covering more presidents, and broader

in

the sense of containing

a

more
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highly developed account

the phenomena he finds.

of

But in his basic

assertion that "there are only two issues at work in American
politics
most of the time:

economic growth and military strength," he is in

substantial agreement with Miroff

.

31

Wolfe arrives at this conclusion by tracing the development of

American democracy and the relationship

of

the presidency to it.

Late

eighteenth and early nineteenth century debates about the nature

democracy -- crystalized in the competing visions

of

America held by

of

Jefferson, who favored republican government, and Hamilton, who was an

—

early advocate of modernist expansion and commerce
the turn of the twentieth century.

Searching for

a

were settled at

means to rationalize

the unsteady growth of capitalism, Progressive Era presidents solidified

the Hamiltonian conception.

The impetus for the victory of nationalist

economic expansion was the need to tame the unsteady rhythm
industrial economy.

The chief tool

for the job was

a

of

the

strengthened

presidency at the helm

of

unprecedented degree.

Wolfe posits the presidency as "the major

instrument by means

which modernizing elites have sought to overcome

or

state with its reach broadened to an

remove obstacles to the expansion and revitalization of American

capitalism ." 32
of

of

a

People increasingly put their faith in the institution

the presidency as the surest available solution to the maladies

facing them.
By the time of

FDR and the exigencies of depression,

a

political

bargain of sorts had been struck between the electorate and the chief
executive.

The people got reforms and

a

measure of security from

uncertainty, while the president got political support for the increased
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purview

of

the state.

"Implicit in the bargain that made the

Rooseveltian formula possible were two conditions," according to Wolfe,
"continuous economic growth at home and persistent U.S. hegemony
abroad ."* 3

The conditions fed into each other.

Our national

security

and economic security were indissolubly united -- hence the welfare-

warfare state.
Wolfe devotes an entire book to exploring the effect of these twin

postwar imperatives on American political life.
of

what he terms the "growth coalition,"

He develops the history

collection

a

of

centrist

liberals (pragmatic to the core) spanning the Truman years through the
end of the Johnson administration.

These recycled elites, and the

policy planning organizations with which they were affiliated, fashioned
a

strategy whereby hard political choices could be avoided by spreading

the benefits of solid economic performance.

Political challenges from

social democrats seeking to expand the welfare state, and free market

conservatives trying to contract or eliminate it, could be circumvented.
For as Wolfe asserts,

"instead of making

opted for an economic surrogate ."* 4
for the pursuit of

of

political choice, America

Wolfe exaggerates his case here,

corporate expansion under the umbrella

military presence certainly

priorities

a

is_ a

choice.

It

of

a

worldwide

is a choice to endorse the

business, which in turn had reached an accommodation with

the realities of state intervention into the economy.

But his major

point, that growth and empire constituted the primary policy objectives
for postwar presidents seems useful.

And it is clear that such goals

appeared to them as largely technical issues, revolving around questions
of

means, not ends.
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The price paid for this "Faustian pact" with growth
politics was

high.

And in Wolfe's account of how differnt administrations
dealt with

various policy areas we get

a

sense of how the fixation on growth as the

basic end of politics subverted anything truly resembling the public

interest.

Whether in the case of public housing that essentially tore

down buildings for urban renewal, or health care policy that built

hospitals without improving health care delivery, or foreign aid for
"development" which sacrificed humanitarian concerns for the sake

of

economic indicators, growth politics often undermined the very ends it
was purported to achieve.

And herein lies Wolfe's larger lesson.

The

fact that real domestic economic growth did occur in the postwar period

served to obscure the fact that purported reforms, especially those of
liberal presidents, were conceived in

a

way that was bound to expose

them as woefully inadequate once growth abated.
Such
All

a

scenario did transpire, beginning with Nixon's presidency.

the circumstances which contributed to the growth of American power

were subject to eventual diminishing returns.
long wave of economic expansion underlying U.S.
an

end in the late I960'

pressure.

and early

a

particular, as the

postwar hegemony came to

1970's, the presidency faced mounting

Presidents accustomed to being

growth" domestically, and

In

a

"cheerleader for economic

"cheerleader for American Power"

internationally suddenly had very little to cheer about.
writes:

As Wolfe

"The American presidency requires economic growth to work;

when

ss
economic growth cannot be generated, the presidency cannot work."

State crisis and the crisis of the presidency are bound together.
their collective fortunes are tied to the health of the political

And
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economy, whose basic needs shape the needs of government.

Difficulties

with the generation of growth, and challenges to hegemony, put the

office, and the state, in
an

" i

mpasse

a

bind,

leaving the nation at what Wolfe calls

11

.

Presidents Carter and Reagan both assumed an office under seige
from the conditions sketched above.

I

now turn my attention to their

presidencies, with the hope that an analytic approach informed by the
work of Miroff, Wolfe and the theorists of the state can offer

a

richer

account of the institution than that available within conventional

frameworks.

What follows are two case studies that probe the structural

dynamics of the central imperatives of economic growth and national
security, as reflected in the presidents' policy toward occupational
safety and health, and the MX missile.

Both issues are important in

their own right, potentially affecting the quality of everyone's lives.
But my foremost concern here is to see what these issue areas can teach
us about the nature of

To borrow from the

the chief executive.

language of empiricism, my case studies thus will serve as something
Insight into the presidency, and the

like “independent variables."

forces that constrain it, is what

I

am after.

Hopefully this

examination will extend, deepen and refine the tools
inquiry so as to provide

presidency.
at

a

of

structural

fuller explanation of the American

And in so doing

I

will

take seriously what Woodrow Wilson,

-- namely,
the outset of the chapter, called attention to

structure and operation of society itself,
the instrument.

of

"the very

which government is only
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the authors have omitted the final sentence of this
passage from their
recently released (1987) 3rd edition, p. 111.
For his part, Neustadt
maintains that he simply was concerned with the “problem of statecraft"
in his book, and that his many critics ignore this
problem in their
analyses.
And ironically, he points out that many analysts have
criticized his work as being too prescriptive in nature, out of step
with "science."
See "What Did 1 Think 1 Was Doinq?" Presidency
Research Vol. VII, No. 2 (Spring, 1985).
.

Miro * f
Pragmatic Illusions p. xiii.
See also John Hart,
"Presidential Power Revisited," Political Studies Vol. XXV, No. 1
(1977).
I
have taken issue with the term "revisionist" as used to
describe this school of thought on the presidency; see note 11 in
chapter 1.
i

,

.

10

Ibid.

,

p.

xv.

1<?

For an example of the former, see Paletz, "Perspectives On The
Presidency"; for an example of the latter, Thomas, "Studying The
Presidency:
Where And How Do We Go From Here?"
20 Theodore J. Lowi
The Personal
Press, 1985), pp. 134-137.
,

President

(Ithaca:

Cornell University

21

See note 18, chapter 1, dealing with the expansivist inclinations of
the two leading proponents of the psychological approach to the
presidency, James David Barber and Erwin Hargrove.
22 Lowi, The Personal President
Lowi's view of the president
p. 174.
,
as the personification of the state is woven into the fabric of the
In an interesting
book, but appears explicitly on pp. 96, 174, and 180.
related argument, W. Wayne Shannon refers to presidents as the
Quoted in Harold M. Barger, The
"reification of the nation's meaning."
Impossible Presidency (Glenview, II.:
Scott, Foresman, 1984), p. 16.
23 The literature on pluralist democracy is enormous.
Three seminal
works in this vast body are Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic
University of Chicago Press, 1956); Dahl, Who Governs?
Theory (Chicago:
Yale University Press, 1961); and David B. Truman, The
(New Haven:
Knopf, 1971, originally 1951).
Governmental Process 2nd Ed. (New York:
.

24 The classic critique of the democratic pluralist conception of the
state is offered in Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New

York:

Basic Books,

1969).

23 Joshua Cohen and Joel

Penguin,
Rogers, On Democracy (New York:
to their
indebted
particularly
is
here
discussion
brief
The
1983).
short
best
the
simply
This
is
"Structure."
entitled
third chapter
-term
they
what
democracy
American
of
account of the structure
that I know of.
"capitalist democracy"

—

130

26 Ibid.

p.

,

50.

27 The capital

strike argument will receive more attention when I
discuss structural-functional theories of the state.
For a clear
explanation of capital strike, see Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis,
Democracy and Capitalism (New York:
Basic Books, 1986), pp. 87-90.
2e Cohen and Rogers,

On

Democracy

p.

,

53.

29 There are a number

of good overviews of the literature on theories of
the state, among them Martin Carnoy, The State and Political Theory
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); David A. Gold, Clarence
Y.H. Lo, and Erik. Olin Wright, "Recent Developments in Marxist Theories
of the Capitalist State," Monthly Review
Vol. 27, Nos. 5 and 6
(October, November, 1975); and Bob Jessop, "Recent Theories of the
Capitalist State," Cambridge Journal of Economics Vol. 1, No. 4
(December
1977)
.

.

,

.

30 Miliband,

The State in Capitalist Society; G. William Domhoff, Who
Prentice-Hall, 1983); and
Rules America Now? (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Wright
Mills,
C.
The Power Elite (New York:
Oxford University Press,
1956).
For an interesting critique of instrumentalism, as well as the
"Political Response
other approaches to state theory, see Theda Skocpol
of
the
Theories
State
and the Case of
Neo-Marxist
Crisis:
to Capitalist
No.
(1980).
Vol. 10,
2
the New Deal," Politics and Society
,

.

31

Domhoff, Who Rules America Now?

p.

,

1.

32 These relationships are explored by Domhoff in his many works,
especially Who Rules America Now? and by Thomas R. Dye, Who's Running
America? The Conservative Years 4th Ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
,

.

Prentice-Hall, 1986).
33 For

insightful discussion of the growing part played by business
PAC's and business policy planning organizations in the rightward drift
of American politics, see Thomas Edsall, The New Politics of Ineguality
Norton, 1984).
(New York:
34

33

an

Domhoff, Who Rules America Now?

,

p.

150.

Ibid.

first published in New Left Review can be found in Robin
Vintage, 1973),
in Social Science (New York:
Ideology
Blackburn,
State," and
Capitalist
of
the
Problem
"The
piece
Poulantzas's
including
Laclau,
Miliband's "Reply to Nicos Poulantzas." See also Ernest
New Left Books, 1977)
Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London:
for a critique
especially chapter 2, "The Specificity of the Political,"

3A The debate,

,

of

the Miliband-Poulantzas debate.

37

Poulantzas, "The Problem

of

the Capitalist State,"

p.

245.

131

30

Ibid.

,

p.

246.

Fred Block, "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule," in Thomas
Ferguson and
Joel Rogers, eds. The Political Economy;
Readings in the Politics and
Economics of American Public Policy (Armonk, N.Y.:
M.E. Sharoe. 1984)
n

Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Democracy and Capitalism
(New York:
Basic Books, 1986), p. 88.
Ibid.

,

88-89.

—

See, for example, James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the Sta te
"
York:
St. Martin's, 1973).

(New

Two of the most probing texts on the issue of legitimacy are Jurgen
Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston:
Beacon, 1973), and William
Connolly, ed., Legitimacy and the State (New York:
New York University
Press, 1984).
44

Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, "The Crisis of Liberal Democratic
Capitalism:
The Case of the United States," Politics and Society
Vol.
Bowles and Gintis suggest that the
11, No. 1 (1982), p. 52.
contradictory nature of this relationship is perhaps most evident when
popular struggles strive to extend into the sphere of capitalist
production (where property rights reign) the rights vested in persons bv
democracy.
.

43

Ibid.,

p

.

60.

4<b

Two insightful and creative attempts to bring instrumental analysis
to bear on the institution are found in Kim McQuaid, Big Business and
Presidential Power;
From FDR to Reagan (New York:
William Morrow,
1982); and Laurence H. Shoup, The Carter Presidency and Beyond (Palo
Alto, Ca.:
Ramparts, 1980).
The former examines the influence of the
Business Council (and its sister organization the Business Roundtable)
on presidential policy-making since the New Deal, while the latter
traces the formidable connections between the "Eastern Establishment"
(especially through the Trilateral Commission) and a single president,

Carter.
Of the handful of critical introductory American government
textbooks, the most illuminating structural analysis of the presidency
is presented in Katznelson and Kesselman, The Politics of Power
2nd
Ed., chapter 9.
David Paletz does deserve mention for including the
"Power Elite" category of analysis (with Mills, Domhoff and Chomsky as
its representatives) as an "emerging perspective" among the six key
See his brief survey of the literature,
perspectives on the office.
"Perspectives On The Presidency." The problem, of course, is that this
"emerging perspective" has not emerged very far since he wrote in 1970.
.

47

Miroff, Pragmatic Illusions

,

p.

272.

132

Ibid.

,

p.

xv.

49

Ibid., p. 279.
Miroff also claims that the president must stabilize
the nation on the social front too, as evident in Kennedy's handling of
the disorder stemming from the civil rights upheaval.
But he maintains
that the stabilization of the economy is the president's "paramount
domestic duty."
There is no discussion of legitimacy, per se, in the
book.
For another, briefer analysis of the president that complements
Miroff's thesis, see Katznelson and Kesselman, The Pol i ti cs of Power
2nd Ed., chapter 9.
They argue that the president has three main
functions:
to assist corporate production domestically, to defend
corporate capitalism abroad and to maintain social control.
The authors
link each sphere with particular constitutional grants of authority and
particular agencies within the Executive Office of the President.
.

30 For an assessment of the importance of, and differences between, the
foreign and domestic aspects of the presidency by a leading conventional
presidency scholar, see Aaron Wildavsky, "The Two Presidencies," in
Wildavsky, ed. Perspectives on the Presidency
Wildavsky does not,
however, acknowledge the cricial connection between these two spheres,
instead seeing only the more minor point that the president has more
power in the sphere of foreign affairs.
.

31

Alan Wolfe, America's Impasse:
The Rise and Fall of the Politics
Pantheon, 1981), p. 237.
Srowth (New York:

of

32 Alan Wolfe, "Presidential Power and the Crisis of Modernization,"
This discussion also
democracy Vol. 1, No. 2 (April, 1981), p. 22.
draws on Wolfe's essay "Perverse Politics and the Cold War," in E.P.
Verso, 1982).
Thompson, ed., Exterminism and Cold War (London:
.

33 Wolfe,

"Presidential Power and the Crisis

of

Modernization," pp. 27-

28.

34

Wolfe, America's Impasse

S3 Wolfe,

,

p.

10.

"Presidential Power and the Crisis of Modernization,"

p.

31.

CHAPTER THREE
THE PRESIDENCY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:
THE CASE OF OSHA UNDER THE CARTER AND REAGAN ADMINISTRATIONS

think OSHA can be a great program.
The concept
I
intend to enforce the law rigidly,
but I also hope that we can have an acceptance of
the OSHA program by the business community.
But
there would be no backing down on the concept or
the purpose of the law concerning OSHA.
I
just
want to make sure that it is administered with a
maximum amount of support from labor and of industry.
I

is good.

-- Jimmy Carter

1

an OSHA would be if government set up
agency that would do research and study how
things could be improved, and industry could go to
it and say, 'We have a problem here and we seem to
lose more people by accident in this particular
Would you come and look at our plant
function.
and then come back and give us a survey of what
should be done?'

My idea of
an

-- Ronald Reagan 2

On April

(OSHA)
of

for

1,

1986 the Occupational Safety and Health Administration

proposed the stiffest penalty in its 16-year history.

The fine

nearly $1.4 million was assessed against Union Carbide Corporation
"willful disregard for health and safety" at its Institute, West

Virginia plant.

3

The Labor Department accused the corporation of

widespread "constant, willful, overt violations"

of

safety and health

laws at the facility which manufactures highly toxic phosgene gas

violations including the customary practice
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of

asking employees to
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detect the presence of the potentially deadly gas by sniffing the air
after alarms indicate
At

a

first glance,

leak.
it

might appear that the imposition of such

a

large penalty indicates vigilant enforcement of the nation's safety and

health statute.

However, such an appearance would be deceiving.

In

reality, under the Reagan administration QSHA has become an anemic

regulatory agency, its feebleness perhaps surpassed only by the soap-

operatically embattled Environmental Protection Agency.
In

the case of the fine levied against Union Carbide, for example,

the entire proceeding was handled not by the QSHA director

(officially

called an Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and

Health), but by Labor Secretary Bill Brock, along with an interim head
the agency.

of

administrator

The reason:
of

at the time,

QSHA, and there had been none for almost

was awaiting Senate confirmation of

John

A.

there was no official

Pendergrass

of

a

year.

OSHA

its third director in six years,

the 3M company.

4

His two predecessors had

succeeded in substantially reducing the scope

of

the agency's standard-

setting and enforcement functions, immersing the already beleaguered
agency into even deeper controversy.
From the very beginning of his presidency, Ronald Reagan made OSHA
a

primary recipient of administrative animus and ridicule.

had as one of

its central

tenets an assault on social regulations as an

impediment to economic growth.

And of

and the business community -- despised,

intrusive, the worst of the worst.
it.

His agenda

all

the social regulations he

OSHA was singled out as the most

As the editors of

Business Week put

arm
OSHA "touches more individual companies than does any other

of
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government except the Internal Revenue Service." 3
of

Business resentment

that alleged intrusiveness helped elevate "regulatory reform" and

deregulation

to a privileged position within the economic policy

debates of the late 1970's and 1980's generally, and to the status

of

an

eternal verity within the Reagan camp.

Widespread counterattacks against the OSH Act and other social

regulations did not simply commence with the advent
however.

There were many precursors.

of

the Reagan years,

The story of the rise of

regulatory retrenchment and the overall rightward shift in economic
policy thus must include an account

of

the relative positions of

business and labor during the economic tumult of the mid-1970's.
Moreover, and of paramount importance for this project, the Carter

administration's attempt to fight inflation and promote economic growth
in

a

period of deepening economic crisis must be understood.

How these

goals influenced the Carter administration's policy toward occupational

safety and health, the extent to which Carter's tenure laid the

groundwork for the Reagan years, what all of this says about the office
of

the presidency -- such issues are the concern of this chapter.
The picture that emerges is one of

constrained by the imperative
imperatives of the office.
pursuit
will

of

a

vital

of

a

contingent presidency

economic growth, one

of

the twin

The dynamic interplay of state power and the

economy, as viewed through the lens of OSHA policy,

provide the substance out of which

I

will

build my case for

a

structural approach to the study of the presidency, as discussed in the

preceding chapter.

It

is my contention that

orientations to the presidency

—

neither of the conventional

the expansivist and restricti vi st
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perspectives -- offer as rich or as revealing an account
as does structural

inquiry.

of

the office

Bearing in mind, then, that the structural

approach operates at the intersection of the instrumental, structuralfunctional and social struggle components

of

now will

structural approach to the

focus on the query:

how would

presidency look at the imperative

a

theories of the state,

I

economic growth as it affects the

of

Carter and Reagan administrations?

A

Brief History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act^
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of

political and social struggle.

1970 was the child of

Born amid the domestic turmoil over the

Vietnam War, the "War on Poverty," and the nascent environmental
movement, the OSH Act is most profitably viewed as an outgrowth of
general climate of enhanced receptivity to governmental reform.

climate produced not only OSHA, but

a

host of

a

This

"new regulatory agencies,"

such as the EPA, the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the National

Highway Transportation Safety Board.
stands as

a

testament to the power

of

The mere existence of the law thus

structural imperatives to affect

the actions of state actors, particularly the president.

The policy

agenda of that era was shaped, in great measure, by the confluence
social

of

forces advocating an aggressive federal role in the area of

workplace safety and health.

Chief among this coalition of forces were

labor unions, rank-and-file agitation, the environmental movement, and

public interest pressure (especially the work of Ralph Nader).

Together they kept awareness

of

a

7

workplace safety and health crisis

coupled
soaring injury and death statistics from the mid-1960's onward,
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with rising sensitivity to the incidence of health-related problems

associated with the use of toxic substances -- prominantly in the public
eye

The role of workers merits special note, for it was within

a

tradition of struggle that they, sometimes with union support and often
without it, pressed for passage
workers'

of

the OSH Act from 1968-1770.

The mine

effort bears greatest notice because it was their determination

to enact basic health

and safety reforms that helped galvanize the

national health and safety movement.
the West Virginia coal

Their three-week wildcat strike in

mines in February,

1969,

including

a

march on the

state capital, following as it did the tragic Farmington, West Virginia
mine explosion which killed 78 miners, provided the impetus for not only
the 1969 Coal

Mine Health and Safety Act, but for the OSH Act as well.

Most active among organized labor were the United Steelworkers of

America, the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Worker's Union and the United Mine
Workers.

The ensuing union lobbying and public information effort on

behalf of the OSH Act was without precedent in U.S. history.
Within this milieu of ferment,

a

conservative president such as

Richard Nixon could only hope to channel existing energies in

a

direction that might prove beneficial to his political fortunes.

Preventing the passage

of

a

health and safety law was simply out
Such

question when he assumed office in 1969.
on

remembered, was the first new president

in

over

without his party controlling at least one house

the

law was, by then, high

a

And Nixon,

the list of Congressional priorities.

of

a

it

should be

century to win office
of

Congress.

His

that he
interest in maintaining his political legitimacy, then, dictated
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not oppose the inevitable.

Moreover, Nixon was ambivalent about the

legacy of New Deal and Great Sociey programs.

While certainly

conservative on many issues, he harbored animosity toward much

of

big

business and what he considered the "Eastern establishment," and he also
longed to be thought of as

Charles Noble has argued,

a

"modern man

." 0

As political

scientist

"Although President Nixon appeared to be an

opponent of the welfare state at the time tof debate over the OSH Act],
his administration oversaw what can only be perceived,

in

retrospect, as

the second phase of the Great Society.

Nixon's options were further limited by the general lack of

coherent business strategy to deal with the prospect
Rather than taking

a

leading role in crafting

suit their needs, businesses of all

a

of

OSH Act

an

a

.

10

piece of legislation to

sizes generally opposed the statute

as unfairly weighted toward supplementing the power of

organized labor.

With capital unwilling to accept an expansive role for the Department of

Labor in the health and safety area, they forfeited their chance to

guide the outcome of legislative negotiations.

In

addition, there was

reform from

no leading business organization to champion the cause of

the perspective of

"enlightened" capitalists, as the corporate liberal

variant of instrumental theories of the state would posit

11
.

Thus, the

task of articulating the prime capitalist response to the law was left
to the U.S.

Chamber of Commerce, whose shrill, reactionary laissez-faire

rhetoric was out of step with the prevailing ethos
policy.

of

responsible public

Business disorganization left Nixon with no credible group

industry allies upon which to rest
the issue.

a

of

case for an alternative approach to
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For his part, President Nixon did propose three different versions
of

the bill which would have been much more favorable to the interests

of

employers than the version which ultimately passed.

White House

efforts centered on the strategy of dividing the authority over health
and safety matters so that the Labor Department would not be unduly

strengthened, and keeping provisions of workers' rights to
In

a

minimum.

this sense, the Nixon administration tried to mobilize the state to

perform

a

coordinative function that business could not pull off

collectively.

But his attempts did not bear fruit.

A

strong version of

the OSH Act finally passed, with the Labor Department obtaining the

standard-setting and enforcement powers most conservatives had feared.
Responding to what his Secretary of Labor termed

"a new

national

passion, passion for environmental improvement," Nixon signed the

landmark bill on December 29,

American system at its best."
The bill
to deal

12

with workplace safety and health.

its enforcement

and healthful

"the

itself stands as the first comprehensive federal effort

potentially radical
of

1970, hailing it as an example of

It

is

far-reaching, even

— depending on how it is interpreted and the vigor
— in its provision of a universal right to a safe

workplace. 13

Intended to "assure safe and healthful

working conditions for working men and women," the act makes it the
"general duty" of every employer to "furnish to each of his employees

employment and

a

place of employment which are free from recognized

hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious
physical harm to his employees."
area,

14

In

the bitterly contested health

the law goes as far as saying that in setting health standards
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dealing with toxic materials or other harmful agents, QSHA "shall
set
the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent
feasible, on
the basis of

material

the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer

impairment of health or functional capacity even

if

such

employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard
for the period of

his working life." 13

The law establishes
its goals.

QSHA,

a

tripartite institutional apparatus to meet

located in the Labor Department, promulgates rules,

sets safety and health standards, and oversees enforcement.

It

is the

organization that has the most power and has drawn the most criticism.
Its research arm is the National

Health

(NIQSH)

Welfare

,

Institute for Occupational Safety and

located in the Department of Health, Education, and

(now called Health and Human Services).

The third body,

the

independent Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC),

adjudicates all disputed enforcement actions.
a

in

vast expansion of employee rights,

The law also provides for

including the right to participate

workplace inspections and standard setting, and the right to have

access to information about potential safety and health dangers.
Writing more than

a

dozen years removed from the heady days of

regulatory explosion, Herbert Stein, chairman

of

Economic Advisers from 1972-74, views the passage

example of governmental excess.

"a

of

of

the act as an

He attributes the administration's

inability to moderate the scope and expense
to the momentum of

Nixon's Council

of

such social regulations

tide of Congressional demagoguery and

sentimentality plus bureaucratic zeal," contending that "the juggernaut
of

environmental regulation proved not to be controllable by the Nixon
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administration.

11

16

His words implicitly attest to the power of social

movements to pressure the state for concessions on important issues.
Nixon surely was constrained in many ways.

But he also used passage of

the act to help his chances of siphoning off the support of labor unions
and workers from its traditional

home in the Democratic party.

This

blue-collar affiliation with the Democrats was viewed by some analysts
at

the time as soft,

and Nixon quite consciously set out to include

workers, considered to be conservative on may social issues, within his
"silent majority."
for

the president;

Therefore, the OSH Act had
it

was not simply

a

a

positive political side

grudging concession to popular

pressure.
Moreover, no one,

least of all

crisis of 1973-75 on the horizon.

In

Richard Nixon, foresaw the economic
1970,

concern for the overall

health of the U.S. economy was not nearly as salient as other social and

foreign policy issues.

The public and politicians generally assumed the

economy could support additional regulatory measures.
social regulation constitutes

growth did not serve as
of

a

a

substantial impediment to economic

major organizing tool of QSHA opponents.

1974-75, and the onset of the previously

unheard of phenomenon of stagflation.

oil

All

this changed, of course, as the economy experienced sustained

downturn, the recession of

of

The argument that

postwar expansion came to

a

17

As the unprecedented

long wave

rather abrupt halt -- dramatized by the

price shock, but manifested in numerous other developments of lesser

visibility -- government and corporate leaders began to rethink the
issue of social regulation.

The perspective that emerged reflected the

roughly mid-decade shift to the right in the balance of political
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forces.

1

"

Corporate capital and policy planning organizations initiated

campaign to fight excessive social regulation as

a

irrational way to achieve public policy goals.
have proliferated during the last decade.

a

costly, burdensome,

Calls for "deregulation"

Economic decline thus

afforded big business the opportunity to mount the kind of coherent
attack on social regulation that it lacked from 1968-70.
Here

a

digression is needed to note the important distinction

between two kinds of activities that are often placed together in the

category "government regulation:"

economic and social regulations.

1

'

7

Economic regulation involves an attempt by the state to stabilize market

conditions within

a

given industry.

Most such efforts to rationalize

market behavior -- through regulation of prices, rationalization of

competiton between firms, reduction

of

risk and the creation of

predictable market environment -- occured before the 1970's.
interstate Commerce Commission of

1887,

a

more

The

the first such agency, was

regulatory program aimed at the railroad industry.

a

The Civil

Aeronautics Board, the Federal Communications Commission and regulation
of

the airline and banking industries are all examples of economic

regulation.

Often such market-smoothing measures were welcomed by,

not substantially written by,

businessmen.

In

if

the context of economic

regulation, then, the call for deregulation means either partial
reduction, complete withdrawal, or rewriting of government regulatory
activity. 20

Often the "regulated" industry will oppose deregulation

becasue it will hurt the market position
increasing competition.

of

its leading firms by
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Social regulation, by comparison, seeks to alter the non-market

behavior of corporations, notably to correct for market failures or

externalities"

of

working conditions.

production, such as air or water pollution, or unsafe
Unlike economic regulations, social regulations cut

across industry lines, restricting the freedom of large numbers of

different businesses to injure third parties (workers and consumers, for
example).

They grew out of

social objectives.

a

sense of fairness and justice, to achieve

Here government is involved in the production

process itself, affecting

a

firm's production and investment decisions.

Such regulations invade the terrain of the capitalist firm and are

widely seen by companies as an unwarranted invasion

of

privacy.

In

the

context of social regulation, although the call for "deregualtion" is
heard, the more commom charge is regulatory excess or overr equl ati on

Virtually no one would publically advocate the elimination
OSHA.

of

.

EPA or

But the claim that government has overr egul ated in these areas is

common, to both political parties and to both liberals or conservatives.
And strategies for reducing the alleged inflationary impact of social

—

regulations

which could be termed "social deregulation" or, more

humorously "de-overregulation -- are now routinely received with favor
21
by businessmen and politicians .

Within the overr egul ati on thesis, the cost of social regulations
has become

performance

a

convenient scapegoat for the overall decline in the
of

the economy.

to economic growth

is,

The cost of regulation as

at best,

a

a

major obstacle

spurious claim, which will be examined

more likely cause of the intense hostility

in

greater detail later.

of

business toward social regulations -- and especially toward OSHA

A
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lies in their nature as intrusions into property rights, their violation
of

the inner sanctum of business. 22

Economic crisis provided the

condition for corporate capital to make OSHA

opposition to the whole array

a

lightning rod for

social regulations enacted in the early

of

OSHA unified corporate thinking on this issue, helping to

1970's.

undermine, within changed economic circumstances, the basis
support from the state.

in

its

And because so much else had changed by mid-

decade -- organized labor, for example, has not won

legislative victory

of

the

significant

since the OSH Act -- OSHA policy

U. S.

retrenchment became the order

a

of

the day.

The constraints on the state

had shifted aver time from being primarily generated by the need to

respond to social struggle, to being preoccupied with the functional

provision

economic growth.

of

Into this radically altered climate of

economic uncertainty, corporate mobilization and labor defensiveness
stepped Jimmy Carter.

The Carter Presidency:

The Internal

Tension

From the beginning of his presidency, Carter was of two minds on
the issue of occupational

safety and health regulations.

hand, he carried with him

a

On the one

desire to retain some degree of the

traditional Democratic attachment to the concerns of organized labor.

commitment to enforcing the QSHA statute.

As he

This included

a

remarked to

gathering of Labor Department employees in the first weeks

of

a

his administration:

think that of all the beneficial legislation that
has been passed by the Congress in recent years, the one
I
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that has the best prospect of Improving the
lives of
American workers and the one that had the most adverse
acceptance has been the OSHA program. 23
He went on to praise OSHA as "a great program."

the other hand, having inherited an economy in trouble
from

On

a

long-term growth standpoint, he wanted to please the business
community
and,

in

particular, allay their fears about the threat of inflation.

In

the early months of his term, Carter's remarks also reveal his

ambivalence toward OSHA.

"We need to have,

approach at the delivery end

of

though, some sensitive

the OSHA program," he continued in his

talk cited above, stressing the need for "a minimum number of

regulations" and

"maximum amount of common sense." 24

a

A

few months

later he decried as "unnecessary and burdensome" OSHA safety regulations

implemented over the preceding seven years, saying that the agency would
now "develop and enforce effective standards for occupational health

without repeating the excesses of the past." 23

regulatory excesses surfaced again as

a

Controlling OSHA's

theme in July of 1977 at

a

public meeting in Yazoo City, Mississippi, where he assured small

businessmen that while the OSH Act is "a good piece
enforcement has at times gotten too fiesty.

of

employees," he

"but the OSHA program is going to extremes." 26

the extremes with
for

legislation,"

"It's important that in the

working places we protect the health and safety
asserted,

of

a

He illustrated

story about overly detailed OSHA safety regulations

ladders and stools, concluding that the federal government ought to

withdraw from such details and focus on the provision
health.

of

occupational

The president's early ambivalence toward OSHA would only

increase as his presidency encountered mounting economic pressures.
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his attempt to reconcile these competing concerns
Carter

In

pursued

strategy of centralizing the regulatory process within the

a

executive branch, where his economic advisers heavily influenced the

regulatory process.

This approach led to the formation of two distinct

camps within the White House on questions of QSHA regulations.

And

these camps periodically warred over occupational safety and health

policy decisions. 27

The internal administrative tension was played out

between what

I

supporters

Briefly put, the economic technocrats included members

.

will

call

the economic technocrats and the OSHA

such groups as the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA)

Wage and Price Stability
(0MB),

(CWPS)

,

the goal

of

(RARG).

the Council on

and the Office of Management and Budget

along with their informal working group known

Analysis Review Group

,

of

a

the Regulatory

Greater regulatory cost-effectiveness was

these agencies charged with assisting in the White House

review process of regulatory oversight.
and safety regulations,

In

order to rationalize health

emphasis was placed on economic incentives for

safety regulations, and increasing use of cost-benefit analysis as

a

general guide for health standard-setting.
OSHA supporters within the administration, on the other hand,

included the Secretary of Labor and Carter's OSHA director, Eula
Bingham.

This alliance contended that the OSH Act does not call for

cost-benefit analysis

of

any type and resolutely defended OSHA

regulations, existing and proposed, against its use.

Bingham, in

particular, pushed for stronger standards, especially for occupational
health, her field of expertise.

As for

safety, OSHA supported vigorous

enforcement practices through such measures as more accident inspections
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of

workplaces (both initial as well as follow-up inspections),
greater

fines for violations, and the like.

However, in

a

concession to the

economic technocrats, and to common sense, OSHA did eliminate
about

a

thousand of the nitpicking safety standards for which it had been
chided
by business groups since its inception.

The internal

spring of

discord between these two camps commenced in the

1977 and continued throughout Carter's term.

Before examining

this tension in detail, though, some background on the debate over OSHA

safety standards will help put the issue in perspective.
the debate over occupational safety issues is

a

The crux of

disagreement between

those who favor the enforcement of safety standards and those stressing
the use of an injury tax approach to economic rationality.

disagreement turns on the question

of

whether safety regulations or the

unfettered market is best able to prevent disabling
In

This

or

deadly accidents.

1971 OSHA adopted en masse some 4,400 existing "national

consensus standards" set by the American National Standards Institute.

Previously viewed as merely
as

a

nuisance,

incorporation into the OSH Act

"the word" on safety gave the ANSI standards enhanced visibility and

importance.

QSHA's critics did not hesitate to make an issue

frivolous nature of some of these safety rules. 20

It

is,

of

the

after all,

tempting to ridicule the 140-odd regulations pertaining to wood step
ladders or specifications for the shape

government nitpicking.

In

of

toilet seats as needless

defense of OSHA it can be said that the ANSI

standards appeared to be an efficient, quick way for the agency to make
its mark.

Unnecessary standards could be weeded out later and more

relevant safety rules could be promulgated as needed.

Perhaps more
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important, though, was the political mileage QSHA derived
from meeting

organized labor

s

desire to actively involve safety inspectors to get

tough with companies that fail to comply with baseline
regulations.
The problem with the enforcement of safety standards has
been that

this approach has failed to significantly affect the industrial
injury
and death rate.

Indeed,

in OSHA's

first few years of operation, the

national job injury and death statistics actually rose, and it is

difficult to find

a

correlation between OSHA's enforcement activities

and changes in the injury statistics.

2,y

Labor's evaluation

of

0SHA“s

impact centered on the agency's lack of adequate numbers of inspectors
and the low level

of

fines levied.

This interpretation has some

plausibility given that through 1975 QSHA had so few inspectors that the
average employer could expect to see one every 66 years, and the average
fine was only $25 per violation. 30

The deterrent effect of such meager

efforts would appear minimal, and both the probability
size of fines has not risen appreciably.

of

inspection and

Recognizing such limits on

OSHA's resources, supporters of safety standards have either pushed for
higher budgets to finance more inspectors issuing stiffer penalties or,
more commonly, advocated that the agency target its efforts on accident

inspections and on "general schedule"
injury rate workplaces.
for

it

still

(ie.

routine)

inspections in high

This strategy is not without problems, however,

must ensure that fines are high enough to deter dangerous

workplace organization and practices.

Likewise, provision must be made

to prevent employers from understating their

injury statistics when OSHA

devises its targeting scheme, since employer self-reporting is the basis
for

injury data.
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Opponents of safety standards have noted the failure
death trends to decline with
They propose instead

a

predictable

"I

injury and

told you so" attitude.

system of injury taxes to provide incentives for

firms to bear all the costs

process.

a

of

of

accidents resulting from the production

This is the familar cry of the market approach to economic

management -- "internalize the externalities" -- raising the marginal
benefits

injury prevention by raising the costs

of

American Enterprise Institute (AEI

)

of

accidents

economist Robert Smith,

critic of OSHA, advocates such an approach, viewing it as

a

a

.

31

leading

way to

achieve economic rationality, especially efficient resource allocation,
while minimizing

not obviating altogether)

(if

the weight of moral

issues, trade-offs among policy objectives and distributional

questions 32
.

Yet,

however "natural" the injury tax appears (natural, in the

sense of being more market-like)

it has several

political drawbacks

which underscore the tension between economic rationality and political

feasibility.

Organized labor has vehemently opposed injury taxes for

fear that they would not supply enough incentive to prevent injuries,

hence by implication some injuries will be allowed to occur.

leaders characterize such taxes as "a license to maim."
might also replace

a

Labor

Injury taxes

union's power to call in safety inspectors, and

in

nonunion plants they might lead employers to replace workers with bad

accident records.

In

addition, unions see any weakening

of

mandatory

standards and enforcement procedures as an encouragement to favor risktaking workers over risk-averse workers, an ethically questionable
practice.

Ironically, many businessmen also are wary of injury taxes,
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noting that once established tax rates could be subject to politically-

motivated fluctuation, perhaps becoming
rather than

a

a

source of general revenue

method of internalizing social costs.

One final argument

against tax plans highlights the potential they have for engendering

a

layer of government bureaucracy to monitor corporate compliance with

injury reporting requirements.
for

While such monitoring would be necessary

any serious tax plan -- given the motivation to fudge occupational

accident reporting, inherent in the microeconomic "free-rider" problem

—

it

also defeats one of the purposes of such market measures, namely

getting the government "off the backs" of business. 33
The stakes involved in the dispute within the Carter White House

over these kinds of occupational safety issues were evident in the first

internal flare-up, which occurred as

a

result of

memorandum to the president on OSHA reform.

a

May 27,

1977

Signed by Charles Schultze,

chairman of the CEA, Stuart Eizenstat, director

of

Carter's Domestic

Policy Staff, and 0MB director Bert Lance, the memo calls for "major

changes" in OSHA, arguing that "serious consideration should be given to

totally eliminating most safety regulations and replacing them with some
form of economic incentives." 3 *

elimination

of

While the ostensible reason for the

safety standards was to free OSHA resources for use in

tackling health problems, an QMB issue paper attached to the memo made
it

clear that the economic advisers were calling for retrenchment in

that area as well, of which more below.
The memo, which Carter accepted in its entirety, provides clearer

reasons why the technocrats saw OSHA reform as
new administration,

a

top priority for the

the primary one being the link between OSHA reform
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and the broader effort to apply economic incentives
to all

regulatory agencies.

social

This link meant that QSHA reform would not be

confined to the purview of the Labor Department.

"Social regulations

have pervasive impact on the economy," the memo continues,

concerned with economic policy and your anti
involved.

3S

-i nf

1

"and those

ati on program should be

Noting that QSHA supporters would be concerned,

outraged, by the proposed "reform" measure -- which included

if

not

a

recommendation to establish an interagency taskforce on QSHA reform -Schultze and the others stressed the importance

of

keeping foremost in

mind the growing perception of the agency as an economic burden.

QSHA is, as you know, the leading national symbol of
overregulation; not to act decisively would be
perceived outside the labor movement as a retreat
from your commitment to major regulatory reform. 3,b

Ironically, for the economic technocrats the perception
crucial as the agency's actual impact on the economy.
of

Carter's reform program as

economic growth was at stake.
value.

It

was

a

a

of

OSHA was as

The credibility

major component of his strategy for

QSHA had, in short, enormous symbolic

symbol aimed at securing business confidence --

a

symbol of the administration's determination to fight inflation and

create prosperity.
This frontal challenge to one of QSHA's principle areas of

interest was not presented as an attack on the agency.

Rather it was

couched in terms of making the agency more cost efficient.
it

Nonetheless,

generated immense internal conflict, which eventually became public

when someone in the Labor Department leaked the memo to the press.

The

administration devoted considerable time and energy to damage control

in
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the ensuing months. 37

The primary objection to the “reform" campaign
of

the economic technocrats was its suggestion that QSHA
rely in large part
on

stiffening payment of compensation to injured workers as

motivating employers to provide safe workplaces.
place the active prevention of injuries in

a

a

means of

Such incentive plans

secondary position, and

have all the aforementioned problems associated with injury taxes as
well.
was,

It

of

course, coincidental that while the Carter

administration was taking its lumps (mainly in July) over the QSHA
reform strategy, the AEI was busy preparing the premier issue (JulyAugust,

1977)

its bimonthly journal Regulation

of

would provide

a

controversial.

,

a

forum for the very ideas that Carter was finding so
The AEI was

leading conservative policy planning

a

organization in the coordination
helping to create

a

of

the business case against OSHA,

climate receptive to the corporate perspective on

the relationship between government and economy. 30
of

publication which

Regulation was one

AEI's carefully conceived tools for use in this ideological offensive

against social regulations, an offensive fought within industry,

government, academia and the mass media in the name

of

liberating market

Given its ideology, the journal might more appropriately

capitalism.

have been titled Deregulation

.

As we will

see, President Reagan

selected many of his top economic advisers from the ranks

Regulation
It

'

is

s

of

the AEI and

staff.
-revealing to point out that Carter's economic technocrats

above all Schultze -- bought into much of AEI's overregulation argument.
The organization even excerpted in Regulation Schultze's paean to the
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free market, his Brookings Institution study The Public
Use of Private

Interest

,

in

which he opines that "Market-like arrangements not only

minimise the need for coercion as

a

means of organizing societyj they

also reduce the need for compassion, patriotism, brotherly love, and

cultural solidarity as motivating forces behind social improvement." 3

'

9

This happy thought accords well with the economic ethics of the Reagan

administration, whose views the Carter economic advisers foreshadowed.
While there were important differences between the two administrations,

there were substantial and fundamental areas of agreement.

difference was the existence

of

genuine supporters

of

The major

QSHA within the

Carter White House to counterbalance the views of the technocrats.

Reaction to the May 27 memo eventually subsided and few concrete
results ever came from it.

The Interagency Task Force on Workplace

Safety and Health that it recommended

—

approved by Carter and co-

chaired by Labor Secretary Ray Marshall and 0MB director James

McIntyre

—

produced recommendations (released

that had little real

impact on 0SHA. 40

in

RAR6 criticism of it came in 197S.
thus could stand before

understand this is where
confidence."

41

the summer of

1978)

For the remainder of the year,

relative calm prevailed on the OSHA front.

comprehensive carcinogens policy

in

T.

The agency did propose its

the fall, but the major CWPS and
By the end of

1977

a

relaxed Carter

meeting of the Business Council and joke:

a

I

"I

was supposed to come to restore business

Peppered with deferential, almost fawning, remarks to

the leaders of corporate America, Carter's address focused on conveying
his personal

sense of confidence in the course of the nation, and

especially the economy.

He stressed the

"remarkable harmony

within the

154

various departments

of

Schultze by name as

a

if

the government,

even singling out Charles

trusted private voice on economic affairs.

to underscore the theme of

And as

harmony and confidence, the president

brought along Eula Bingham to make the point that his administration was

reducing "unnecessary paperwork and regulations and intrusion into the
business lives by Bovernment.

"

The president added that "Dr.

Bingham

has brought forward revisions in those administrative procedures that

have helped to remove this burden on your shoulders." 42

QSHA and other

regulations were being pared back, the administration was

harmony on

the economy was experiencing "no serious or major

its basic goals,

imbalances or distortions" -- all in all
picture for the president's first year
If

in

in

it

was, officially,

rosy

a

office.

the president seemed to forget the contentious internal debate

over OSHA reform,

he would not be afforded that luxury in

1978.

In

March of that year he signed Executive Order 12044, codifying the shift

toward emphasizing increased use of cost-benefit analysis as
guide for regulatory standard-setting
study,

in

—

a

general

most importantly, for this

the area of occupational health. 43

Entitled "Improving

Government Regulations," the order required an assessment

of

the

economic impact of regulations because, as Carter put it, "we want to be
sure that they don't contribute to inflationary costs."
E.O.

Specifically,

12044 mandated that all new "significant regulations" be proposed

only after assurance could be given to White House reviewers that

alternative approaches had been carefully considered and the "least
burdensome"

of

the acceptable alternatives had been selected.

Moreover,
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regulatory analysis was required for all regulations
projected to have
"an

annual effect on the economy of $100 million or
more."
The intent of this regulatory centralization was
to ensure that

new regulations be cost-effective.

The administration did not

explicitly call for cost-benefit tests as the method

of

regulatory

analysis until one year later in proposing its Regulation Reform Act
1979. 44

of

But cost-benefit criteria were used as standard operating

procedure.

As Kitty Bernick,

Assistant Director

of

the Domestic Policy

Staff, described the use of such analysis:

The idea is that the agency C OSH A ] should be informed of
the costs and benefits of its actions but not that the
substantive statute should be overruled by such analysis.
Our point is that cost-benefit analysis is a useful tool,
but it is not the only factor the decisionmaker can consider. 43
The 0MB was nominally in charge of overseeing the White House review

process, but in practice the agency delegated responsibility for the

program to

a

rather loose coalition of CWPS, RARG and the CEA, with 0MB

providing input on occasion.

This group,

veto power over proposed regulations.

it

should be noted, had no

But the implementation of its

oversight activity did spur the internal administration battle once
again, this time extending the debate over economic incentives and the

appropriateness

of

cost-benefit techniques to the health area,

more heated arena of conflict than that of job safety.

a

much

While this

conflict arose over health standards for benzene, arsenic, DBCP,

acrylonitrile and lead,

it

was the controversy surrounding the proposed

revision of the cotton dust standard that received the most attention.
The dispute over cotton dust generally was indicative of the
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others, except tor the intensity of hard feelings
it invoked.

inclusion here draws attention to the level

in-fighting and

of

bureaucratic maneuvering within the institutional confines
executive branch
up

to President

Its

of

the

involving conflict which eventually worked its way
Carter himself.

Conventional accounts of the presidency

would be likely to focus exclusively on this intra-institutional

discord, drawing lessons about the personal and political impediments to
the smooth implementation of

a

president's program.

management of the policy process is the kind

of

to be derived from such a mainstream inquiry.

The need for better

insight we could expect

While there may be some

value in such institutional, process-oriented insights from the cotton
dust story, conventional accounts omit the more important structural

point that, as we will see, the imperative of economic growth eventually

consumes other domestic policy agenda items,

this case QSHA policy,

in

relegating the administrative give-and-take to

a

secondary (though not

unimportant) status.
The cotton dust case revolved around DSHA's plan to release its

final

causes

standard on permissible levels
a

of

exposure to cotton dust, which

respiratory disease known as byssinosis or "brown lung."

proposed in 1976, QSHA's standard was subject to

a

First

lengthy period of

public comment and written opinions on how best to achieve reductions
cotton dust concentration in workplaces in all segments
-- ginning,

of

of

the industry

milling, yarn and fabric manufacturing, and waste

processing. **

QSHA's final standard was to be

original standard.

In

a

a

revised version of this

late May memorandum to the president, Eizenstat

rather
and his Domestic Policy Staff aide Simon Lazarus warned him
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starkly
If

a

of

the consequences of endorsing

a

revised cotton dust standard.

version suitable to the economists was endorsed,
organized labor

and other OSHA advocates "will explode."

Mentioning Labor Department

rumors of Bingham's "vague resignation threats," Eizenstat and
Lazarus

asserted that in the event
option,

of

the promulgation of

a

more cost-effective

"the resulting propaganda -- alleging that you care more about

cotton industry profits than workers' health -- could be ugly." 47
the alternative,

from the economic technocrats' perspective, was worse:

"On the other hand,

credibility

of

yet

permitting OSHA to promulgate could damage the

your anti -i nf 1 ati on commitment and of Charlie's

[Schultzel Review Group process." 40

This type of linkage would surface

repeatedly on this issue.
By June of

1978 the disagreement between the OSHA supporters and

the economic technocrats had narrowed to one over the cost of reducing

cotton dust concentration in the ambient air of workplaces in just the
yarn producing segment of the industry.

In

brief, Labor Secretary

Marshall and Bingham favored mandating plant-wide engineering controls
(such as ventilation equipment), while Schultze and Eizenstat argued for

performance standards that set target goals for dust reduction to be met
in

any way the industry saw fit.

In

practice, Schultze admitted,

performance standards would allow heavy reliance on personal protective
equipment, namely respirators worn by employees.

respirators is their low cost.

The lone virtue of

Indeed, virtually everyone agrees that

they are the most cost-effective way to reduce exposure to airborne

pollutants.

enormous body

The problem is, as Marshall
of

and Bingham contended,

evidence exists to show that, for

a

an

variety of reasons,
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respirators are demonstrably ineffective
out of workers'

lungs.-

"that can be worked out."

in

keeping harmful substances

The technocrats' response was

a

very vague

For them the bottom line was that the

proposed standard's reliance on engineering controls confronted
industry
with excessive costs, placing

industry."

a

"major burden of uncertainty on the

And perhaps most important for Schultze,

CEA and RARG,

both the

"the credibility of our anti -i nf 1 ati on and regulatory

reform effort requires some modification -- even
in

as head of

if

only

a

modest one --

the draft OSHA Ccotton dust] regulations." 30

Once again sensing the symbolic value of OSHA regulations to

Carter's larger economic program, Schultze decided to challenge the
agency's new cotton dust standard.

preserving the mettle

of

It

was,

to him,

a

matter of

the administration's anti -i nf 1 ati on commitment.

Unable to convince Marshall to modify the OSHA regulation in

favorable to the position

of

a

Carter.

In

direction

those engaged in the regulatory review

meeting was called for June

process,

a

7

to take the issue directly to

attendance were the president, Vice President Mondale,

Schultze, Eizenstat, Bingham and Marshall.
An exhaustive accounting of

necessary.

this important meeting is not

The upshot is that after hearing Bingham deliver what

Eizenstat describes as an "impassioned discussion"
standards, President Carter "much to our surprise.

of

..

engineering

seemed to embrace

31
this alternative and to push Charlie [Schultze] to accept it.

The

exact degree of warmth of Carter's embrace immediately became an issue,

however.

Participants seem to agree that the president suggested

compromise plan that would have phased in

a

a

new cotton dust standard in
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two stages over

a

four year period.

misunderstanding abounded.
resulting in

a

But after that, disagreement and

Schultze interpreted the meeting as

compromise regulation which, while requiring engineering

controls to be installed on an industry-wide basis at the end

of

the

four year period, would have allowed firms to receive an extension

beyond four years for economic reasons.

More importantly, he thought

there had been consensus on allowing firms to develop performance

standards using alternate means
if

of

protecting workers (eg. respirators)

they could demonstrate their plan was at least as effective as more

costly engineering controls.

This would, of course, be

a

vindication

of

Schultze's orientation toward health regulations.
Bingham and Marshall, by contrast, interpreted the meeting as

vindication for their position.
proposals as

—

a

They judged Carter's reaction to their

"reversal" of his earlier stand and

and said so publically at

a

newspapers played the story as

a

"victory" for them

post-meeting press briefing.
a

The

major Labor Department victory and

a

"turnabout" on the president's part, with him "apparently reversing an
earlier decision."
Times

,

One account of the affair, appearing in the New York

carried this passage that particularly upset the White House

staff

the inflationary impact of regulations, Dr.
Bingham commented that "my ignorance of economics is
comparable to the ignorance of the Council of(sic) Wage
and Price Stability and the Council of Economic Advisers
She added that the
of industrial safety and health."
Occupational Health and Safety Law mandated the pro82
tection of workers and said nothing about inflation
As for

.
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Acting on her understanding of the June
later signed

a

meeting, Bingham two days

7

new cotton dust regulation which Schultze and
Eizenstat

viewed as in "flat contradiction" of the principles agreed
to.

They

were angry at provisions for OSHA to cite firms for noncompliance
before
the four years had expired, the difficulty of firms obtaining

under the rules, and the lack of
an

a

a

waiver

provision for firms to show they have

equally effective alternative to engineering standards.

informed the president that they "consider this

a

They

flagrant and

deliberate attempt by OSHA to frustrate an express agreement reached
directly with you." 33
From the perspective of the White House review team, the cotton
dust decison was an absolute disaster.

As Eizenstat expressed it to

Carter's chief administrative assistant Hamilton Jordan:

The way in which this has now come out makes it
look like the Administration is not serious about
fighting inflationary regulatons.
Barry Bosworth
tCWPS director] is depressed about what this means for
the regulatory process
as is Charlie.
It will make
everyone less likely to tackle these tough regulatory
issues in light of the results of this debacle. SA
.

.

.

—

Surveying the damage done, Lazarus wrote to Eizenstat

of

the importance

of

"modifying the perception that the President reversed himself," and

of

"re-establishing CEA's and the White House's authorization to review

this and other regulations."
of

Clearly for these advisers, the legitimacy

the White House review effort was on the line.

And the first step

toward regaining that legitimacy was to dispell "the notion of discord
33
within the administration that OSHA has generated."

proved difficult to dispell.

This notion
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In

fact,

in

December of 1978, Bingham was still something of

a

loose cannon on the Carter ship, this time in regard to
OSHA's lead

standard.

Speaking before

a

United Steelworkers' conference on lead

regulations, the OSHA director reemphasized her personal commitment
to

stringent workplace health rules.

Executive branch insiders were upset

about her remark that "Marshall and
once to see him [Carter

ready to do it again.

"

]

a*

about

a

I

have been through the palace guard

standard [for cotton dust! and we are

She was especially critical of economists --

the strong implication is administration economists

health and safety regulations are inflationary.

—

who argue that

Suggesting that the

lead standard was being delayed within the administration, she

commented, "These economists never look at the working men and women
look at."

"I

I

prize men and women more highly than the GNP," she added,

charging that many industrial leaders and economists "are complacent
about cancer in the workplace."

Bingham concluded by urging the

unionists to lobby Washington and the administration to "free the lead
standard."

Roughly one year after Carter spoke to the Business Council

about the harmony within his staff, discord reigned over the

relationship between OSHA regulations and economic vitality.
Despite Bingham's convictions, the end

of

domestic policy shift for Carter's presidency.

1978 marked

a

As structural

major

analysis

highlights, his presidency henceforth was held hostage to the

unsuccessful quest to promote economic vitality and restore business
confidence.

Therefore, while OSHA did successfully fend off the

economic technocrats' challenge to the cotton dust standard, the agency

actually issued no new health standards after January

of

1978 and
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existing proposals continued to be subject to the scrutiny

cast-effectiveness tests, often with more success than
dust case.
a

In

in

of

economic

the cotton

effect, Bingham and OSHA won the battle but lost the war,

war whose importance eclipses the specifics of administrative
turf

battles.
0MB and CEA tightened up regulatory review considerably after
1978,

seriously blunting OSHA's earlier activism.

As political

scientist and OSHA specialist Charles Noble has pointed out:

Particularly after 1978, OSHA found it difficult to set
new health rules or intensify enforcement.
But the
shift in agency strategy is clear in standard setting
and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in enforcement. 37
The shift toward greater use of White House review of regulations and

overall retrenchment in OSHA activity was not prompted so much by the
power of the technocrats' arguments, as by rising fear over economic

downturn.

Specifically, by 1979 Carter's concern over economic growth,

especially as threatened by rising inflation, became

a

major domestic

policy preoccupation, lasting the duration of the second half of his
Noble points out that there is

term.

a

strong correlation between

changes in the business cycle and changes in White House regulatory
policy.

justify.

As the economy worsens, regulatory initiatives become harder to

This relationship is confirmed by the Carter experience.

Restoring economic growth and fighting inflation are ubiquitous

objectives in administration documents and public pronouncements
period.
in

The level

of

of

administration anxiety over the economy is clear

the words of Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal, who wrote to

president in late May

the

of

1979 that attention needed to be focused on

t.ie
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how best to sell publicly

a

policy of long-term economic austerity. SB

He attached to his presidential

memorandum another memo he wrote tor the

Economic Policy Group Steering Group, in which he outlined his
thoughts
on

how to accomplish this task.

Basically, Blumenthal saw Carter's

entire presidency, and his re-election chances, hinging on convincing
the public to accept

continuation

of

tough and austere macroeconomic

policies, requiring sacrifices by many."

American's would swallow the bitter pill

He strongly believed that

deterring liberal spending

of

programs, deferring expensive environmental and health and safety

regulations, and other

decisions

if

a

(nine in all)

painful executive economic

program of economic austerity was infused with

a

spirit

and an exciting theme "that engages the imagination and deep convictions
of

the people."

And he offered the theme of America's economic

preeminance in the world as such
again, he reasoned, if

crafted,

a

a

theme.

America could be number one

"frank appeal to national pride" was carefully

"creating genuine excitement and commitment for economic

policies that would other wise cause him [Carter] great political
problems."

He elaborated:

This new approach attempts to lend shape, color, and
by associating
excitement to the general interest
it with widespread anxieties about our economic
position in the world and about our productivity and
A "strong economy" has,
economic discipline at home.
believe, the same political potential as a "strong
I
defense.

—

Blumenthal was dismissed as Treasury Secretary only

a

few months

after writing these words -- in the wake of Carter's July retreat to
Camp David and subsequent fabled "crisis of confidence" television
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address. 60

But his thoughts on the psychology of damage
control

getting the body politic enthused about austerity

—

--

perfectly captures

the domestic dilemmas confronting Carter as the economy
headed into

tailspin.

Public confidence, as well as business confidence, was

waning.

Eizenstat echoed Blumenthal

theme in

a

at

a

a

s

strong economy /strong defense

confidential memorandum to President Carter in March

time when, coi nci dentl

y

,

of

1980,

the Labor Department and organized labor

were reduced to trying to defend OSHA against

a

series of bills in

Congress that would have made the most dramatic cuts ever

in the

agency's jurisdiction.
In

his memo, Eizenstat warns that "we truly are on the verge of an

economic crisis which is as severe for the country as the foreign policy
crises you have been dealing with over the last several months." 61
Citing

a

"growing national sense that things are out

control," he

of

urges Carter to "get out and let people know you are the general in

personal charge of this war"
and general

economic malaise.

—

the war being the war against inflation

Like Blumenthal, Eizenstat believed the

psychological dimension to economic decline was crucial.

people

If

expected routine rises in the inflation rate, they would get them.
Carter,

it

seems, needed to break the psychic grip of hard times through

judicious exercise of presidential leadership.
of

the 1980 election,

in

the results

part, attest to his failure on this score.

But more important for this study,

that OSHA initiatives of all

kinds,

within this context it is no wonder
for the most part,

were overwhelmed by the force of the structural

growth

As we know,

languished.

imperative

of

They

economic
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The Reagan Administration:

Unity in Opposition

President Carter established the centralization
policy as the administrative norm.

there was

a

regulatory

of

This effort was not

a

smooth one;

certain contradictory nature to it as different wings

administration worked at cross-purposes.

the

of

Yet while not given the legal

authority to single-handedly squelch new regulations, the White House

reviewers were able to have
environment.

a

substantial impact on the regulatory

When coupled with the overriding problem of economic

crisis, the impact was nothing short of chilling.

It

should come as no

surprise, then, that things got tougher for OSHA after 1981, since
Ronald Reagan was welcomed to Washington by an economy in even worse
shape than the one Carter had inherited.

As a candidate for president,

Reagan had expressed his relaxed concept of OSHA -- quoted at the outset
of

the chapter but worth repeating -- in these terms:

an OSHA would be if government set up an
agency that would do research and study how things
could be improved, and industry could go to it and say,
'We have a problem here and we seem to lose more
Would
people by accident in this particular function.
you come and look at our plant and then come back and
4 2
give us a survey of what should be done?'

My idea of

*

Notice here the omission
labor actively using OSHA as

a

of

any notion of workers or organized

resource to protect their interests,

although the law expressly establishes workers' right to "safe and

healthful" workplaces.

Notice also the passive role for the nation's

primary guardian of workplace safety and health.

On this reading

of

the agency
OSHA's purpose, industry assumes the active role, going to
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when it suits the needs of business.

This is part of what came to be

known as Reagan's "voluntary" approach to OSHA.

There is

a

peculiarly

uneven quality to his notion of voluntarism, though,
as one safety

specialist has pointed out:

No one in the Reagan administration has ever proposed
a
"voluntary" approach when it comes to food stamp fraud or
illegal immigration.
"Law and order" in these areas is a

brisk, menacing enterprise that has thousands of federal
enforcers vigilantly patrolling their turf for violations
of the law. 63
To understand why the situation
to OSHA enforcement,

address to

a

components

of

radically different when

is so

we can begin by

it

comes

looking at Reagan's very first

joint session of Congress.

There he outlined the basic

his economic program that remain relatively unchanged

today
In

his February 18,

1981

speech outlining his economic recovery

program, President Reagan attempted to sum up the nation's dire economic

predicament.
of

High on his list of culprits was overregulation,

"a mass

regulations imposed on the shopkeper, the farmer, the craftsman,

professionals and major industry that is estimated to add $100 billion
to the price of

things we buy and it reduces our ability to produce.

H4,A

The result of this "virtual explosion in Government regulation during
the past decade," has been "higher prices, higher unemployment, and

lower productivity growth."
on to make

"a

It

was quite

far-reaching program

of

a

damning indictment.

He went

regulatory relief" one of the four

pillars of his recovery package.
Reagan's speech is instructive for at least two reasons.
he prominently cited the figure of

$100 billion for the costs of

First,
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regulations and has done so on numerous occasions.
sometimes increased to upwards
is

of

—

This figure

$115 billion, or even $126 billion --

the handiwork of Murray Weidenbaum,

leading AEI economist and the

first chairman of the CEA under Reagan, who calculated the number from
1976 study.

general
up

Weidenbaum's purpose was to charge that regulations

are too costly,

the lion

s

share

and that social

in

regulations in particular make

(roughly four-fifths)

of

the excessive cost.

Neither charge has stood the test of close scrutiny.

Many subsequent

analyses have exposed these calculations as devoid

any real

essentially mythical. 65

a

of

value,

And more telling, the figure is derived without

any regard for the benefits of social regulations, as even Business Week
-- a publication hardly unsympathetic to Weidenbaum's ideas -- had to

concede. 66

All

costs and no benefits -- that is the view

regulations espoused by Weidenbaum and President Reagan.

of

social

And that the

facts speak otherwise has not deterred them from continuing to use this

fabricated claim.

Given Weidenbaum's penchant for less than rigorous

economic analysis, perhaps this should be expected.

After all,

it

was

his "visceral computer" that concocted the mendacious "rosy scenario"

economic forecast in 1981, exposed as

a

fraud by one of its principle

perpetrators, former 0MB director David Stockman. 67
The second important element of Reagan's talk was its insistance
that rampant regulation was responsible for
ills.

a

host of macroeconomic

This claim is an outgrowth of the mid-decade mobilization of

business against social regulations.

It

reflects

the part of corporations and many think tanks,

a

strategy shift on

such as AEI.

As

mentioned earlier, the OSH Act and related statutes originally were
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justified by the microeconomic principle that the market failed
to hold
individual firms accountable for all the costs of production, such
as
the "external" costs pollution or hazardous work conditions.
was viewed as

Regulation

vehicle for inducing companies to bear all the costs

a

doing business, and disputes revolved around different methods

providing such inducement.

In

of

of

other wards, some regulation could help

make the market fairer.

Increasingly, however, OSHA opponents deployed the macroeconomic

argument that the law fueled

a

greater kind of market failure -- that it

inhibited the operation of the market system as

threatened the general interests
interests of

of

Thus, OSHA

society, not just the narrow

given firm, or industry 68

a

whole.

a

.

The Carter administration

made this kind of argument in its insistence on the connection between
OSHA regulations and rising inflation.

associated the law with
almost limitless.

a

But the Reagan economists

much wider variety of maladies, the list being

And it did so with dizzying frequency, with the

assertion of regulations as manifestations

of

the evils of

"Big

Government" appearing in seemingly every domestic speech the president
But as with Weidenbaum's cost figure, the connection between

delivers.

OSHA and broader economic decline is wildly overdrawn
is

6,9
.

This is why it

essential to point out the symbolic value of White House regulatory

reforms, as

I

over r egul at i on

did with the Carter administration.

,

OSHA's impact is enormous; as

a

As

a

symbol of

substantive,

quantifiable drain on economic growth, its impact is considerably more
modest.

Yet again,

this has not stopped OSHA's detractors from making
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their case against the agency.

Even some presidency scholars have

accepted the Reagan position uncritically. 70
With regard specifically to OSHA

,

President Reagan's attempt to

remedy the problem of overregulation with his "voluntary" approach
has
taken shape in the form of the pursuit of

strategy.

His first, and longest-standing

Thorne Auchter proclaimed the advent

of

"cooperative" regulatory

a

(of

the three), OSHA director

this new attitude to the New

York Chamber of Commerce and Industry in September of 1981:

OSHA has always been in an adversarial position.
This
adversarial spirit has hampered the effective functioning
of the agency long enough .... The OSHA of today is a
cooperative regulator. 71

Raymond Donovan, Reagan's first Secretary

ongoing change

of

of

Labor, underscored this

attitude at the agency in his submission

The

of

President's Report on Occupational Safety and Health for 1982

.

stating

that OSHA had "continued its campaign to change the focus of the Agency

from one of adversarial enforcement to one of cooperative assistance." 72
In

practice this orientation has been "cooperative"

OSHA has been cooperative internal

1

.

in

in

a

double sense:

its relations with the economic

technocrats of Reagan's regulatory review team, while at the same time
being cooperative externally with the business community it seeks to

unfetter from government instrusions.
of

Understanding the two dimemsions

OSHA's cooperativeness is the key to grasping the relationship

between Reagan and OSHA.
Reagan resolved the internal tension that plagued the Carter

administration by appointing
the program.

an

OSHA director who was openly hostile to

This point cannot be overemphasized.

As head of

the
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agency, Auchter

5

credentials as

a

small businessman, whose company

reportedly had many OSHA violations, were

a

Bingham, an eminent industrial toxicologist.

-far

cry from those of Eula

Whereas Bingham made clear

from the outset her desire to have OSHA and its research
arm at NIOSH

deeply probe the dangers of occupational health hazards, Auchter
began
his tenure at the agency by challenging its previous efforts
in this

regard.

Two of his initial acts upon assuming his post serve as stark

illustrations; both involve the health issue which proved so contentious
in

the Carter administration -- cotton dust.

First, he shocked organized labor by ordering the destruction of

100,000 booklets pertaining to cotton dust because he found the cover,

showing

a

gravely ill textile worker, "offensive" and "obviously

favorable" to labor. 73

He justified his act of censorship

(which later

included withholding distribution of several films and slide shows

pertaining to workers' health and safety rights) with reference to his
oft-stated desire to keep OSHA "neutral" with regard to business and
labor.

For him,

that meant espousing market-oriented, laissez-faire

ideology as the best way to provide protection for the nation's
workforce.

It

was the manifest failure of this type of approach, of

course, which led to the need for an OSH Act in the first place.

Nevertheless, such market "neutrality" meshed well with the aims

technocratic side

of

of

the

the administration at 0MB and the CEA, agencies who

now worked in relative harmony with their QSHA-Labor Department

counterparts to promote deregulation.
Auchter's second major act complemented this attempt to reverse
the "adversarial

spirit" at OSHA.

He threw the Supreme Court into
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disarray by issuing

a

"notice of proposed rulemaking" announcing that

OSHA was disavowing its position against cost-benefit anlaysis in
the

cotton dust case

administration

s

the textile industry's legal appeal of the Carter
1978 cotton dust standard.

In

a

highly unusual move,

the OSHA chief pulled the government's lawyers off the case as they had

argued it

(along with union lawyers)

two months earlier and instructed

them to re-examine the cotton dust standard to "evaluate the feasibility
and utility of relying on cost-benefit analysis in setting occupational

health standards.

1,74

Auchter, in effect, asked the High Court not to

decide the case and instead allow the Labor Department to reconsider it
in

light of President Reagan's new cost-benefit policy, thus switching

the government's stance on cotton dust rules in the middle of the

judicial proceeding.

textile

i

And while the court eventually ruled against the

ndustr y-Reagan administration position in June of 1981,

upholding the Carter administration's QSHA standard, this specific
decison has not prevented QSHA, QMB and other regulatory reviewers from

embracing cost-benefit criteria generally as

a

major component of their

campaign against over r egul ati on 73
The Reagan administration's endorsement of cost-benefit analysis
in

the cotton dust case is symptomatic of its larger purpose in

promoting economic analysis

of

regulations.

Reagan fostered internal

administrative cooperation most markedly by further centralizing
executive oversight of OSHA and other social regulations, putting 0MB
charge of White House review via Executive Order 12291
1981. 76

in

February of

This measure went far beyond Carter's centralization effort,

are being
giving the 0MB the power to rewrite or veto rules as they

in
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formulated.
that

E.O.

12291 has as

a

general requirement the stipulation

"regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential

benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to
society."

Only regulations "involving the least net cost to society"

can be promulgated.

The order also established

a

Task Force on

Regulatory Relief, headed by Vice President George Bush, to assist 0MB
in

weeding our "burdensome" regulations, monitor industry views on

regulatory matters, and urge executive agencies to cut back certain

regulations by requesting QMB to undertake regulatory reviews.

In

practice, though, 0MB wielded much more influence on OSHA matters, and
the Task Force has since been disbanded.

Above all, the major outcome of the executive order was to mandate

strict cost-benefit analysis as an explicit rule for regulatory
This represented an important shift in emphasis:

decisions.

while

President Carter's executive order encouraged cost-benefit criteria as
guide to analysis, President Reagan enshrined them as

operation. 77

a

rule of

CEA chairman Weidenbaum made the case for the widespread

use of cost-benefit analysis this way:

Benefit-cost analysis is inherently a neutral concept,
giving equal weight to a dollar of benefits as to a dollar
Those who quiver at the thought of subjecting
of costs.
their favorite program to such analysis may know more than
Do they inherently fear that the regulatory activity
we do.
70
would flunk the most elementary benefit-cost test?
For some,

Weidenbaum's words might have an air

first blush.

After all, who could oppose

a

of

reasonableness at

"neutral" concept.

one does oppose the technique, perhaps they are trying to hide

And if

a
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something.

closer inspection, however, his words can be seen as

On

transparent ideology, pure and simple.
There are

a

host of problems associated with cost-benefit analysis

generally, and most of them belie the claim that it is merely
technique.

OSHA,

neutral

One major area of uncertainty involves the problem of how to

quantify the benefits of alternative regulatory strategies.
of

a

this entails placing

a

the case

dollar value on human life or various

lifesaving programs, in order to determine of

acceptable risk."

In

level

a

of

"socially

Economists have devised analytic techniques for

determining levels of socially acceptable risk, all

of

which use cost-

benefit calculation to impute dollar values to non-marketed things such
Perhaps the most widely accepted of such measurements is

as human

life.

the "wi

ingness-to-pay" criterion, which seeks to gauge how much money

a

1 1

worker would be willing to pay for marginal decreases in his or her

exposure to
is

health hazard on the job.

However, this economic device

fraught with technical and ethical amb i gui ty
In

all

a

the first place,

7’
.

people typically are not fully informed about

the risks involved in such decisions.

Secondly, the workers in

question may not have alternative job prospects, throwing off any true

measurement of their willingness.

Third, wi

1 1 i

ngness-to-pay assumes

there is no difference between how people value certain things

in

private individual transactions and how they might value those same
things in decisions for the larger public.
that to put

a

Fourth, same people believe

value on something cheapens its worth, and thus might

claim that life has an intrinsic value that is priceless.
the extent that occupational health is viewed as

a

r

i

ght,

Finally, to
it

may not be
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deemed socially acceptable to put

outweigh the benefits.

price on it, even it the costs

a

This point was driven home succinctly by

a

steelworker who commented at an OSHA hearing that the Emancipation

Proclamation was not subjected to an inflationary impact statement. 00
For these reasons and others, the ambiguity surrounding efforts to

determine acceptable risk cannot be clarified simply by the use

of

economic calculations.
Indeed, the uncertainties in the area of benefit calculation are
so great that when the Congressional
(OTA)

studied various estimates for the implied value

found no fewer than
of

Office of Technology Assessment

a

dozen.

of

a

life,

And they varied so widely that the choice

one over the others would itself be

a

highly political act,

dramatically altering the outcome on the benefit side

of

the equation.

Estimates are based on no greater certainty on the cost side
equation either.

they

of

the

Industry estimates of the cost of compliance with OSHA

health regulations are notoriously exaggerated -- the classic case being
the chemical

manufacturers dire predictions

of

the imminent collapse of

the industry if OSHA's standard for vinyl chloride was implemented in

the early 1970's.

Ultimately the regulation was adopted and the

industry has since flourished, its predictions

of

technological infeasibility enormously overstated.
All

economic ruin and
01

this is to say that cost-benefit analysis, far from being

neutral tool, easily can serve as

a

a

weapon with which corporations

combat the often glaring need to clean up health hazards in the nation

workplaces.

s

The Reagan administration aides this effort internally with

alternative
its emphasis on the use of respirators as the cost-effective
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to plant-wide engineering controls.

The aforementioned inadequacies of

respirators notwithstanding, they remain the preferred
method

compliance with

HI

»

^-director

Regulation,

a

health standards for big business.

OSHft

James

of

Miller

C.

the AEI's Center for the Study of Government

of

member of Reagan's QMS and executive director of
the

administration's Task Force on Regulatory Relief, expressed his view
prevalent worker complaints about the inconvenience and discomfort

respirators (among the many drawbacks

of

them), this way:

of

of

"Perhaps we

should rename the agency the Occupational Safety, Health and Comfort

Administration." 32
concerns

of

Auchter responded with similar disregard for the

workers:

"Well, employers are asked to do things under the

government's safety and health act and under OSHA regulations that are
not always comfortable for them." 33
on
a

The equation of monetary discomfort

the part of business with the physical discomfort of workers displays

particularly callous attitude on the part

regulators.

of

Reagan technocrats and

This is especially true when, as was the case with the

cotton dust standard, the lives of an estimated 74,000 textile workers,
at

risk of contracting brown-lung disease, are at stake.
In

the final

analysis, then, the cost-benefit criteria so beloved

by both the OSHA-Labor Department side and the economic technocratic

side of the Reagan administration serve to augment their conservative

political agenda.

As an economic tool

of

the Reagan presidency, cost-

benefit analysis is used to conceal political ends behind reams

seemingly objective data.
And the illusion has

a

of

But the objective appearance is an illusion.

cynical hue when we consider that the Reagan

technocrats at 0MB have seen to

it

that the budget for NIOSH -- as

176

QSHA's research arm, the one government agency capable

of

generating

reliable, non-corporate data for cost-benefit studies -has been

dramatically reduced between 1981 and 1985. 8 «

This forces OSHA to rely

even more heavily on industry-dominated economic analysis at
precisely
the time when

a

premium is being placed on cost-benefit analysis.

conclusion reached by the OTA after an exhaustive review
literature on cost-benefit criteria and economic analysis

of

The

the

in

regard to

OSHA policy decisions thus seems especially salient here:

CWlhere moral, political, and cultural values -- not simply
economic ones -- are at stake, we need to make moral,
political, and aesthetic judgments.
Cost-benefit analysis
does not replace these "subjective" judgments with "objective" or "neutral" ones.
Rather, it distorts or ignores the noneconomic values it cannot handle. 83
Or

as Mark. Green bluntly put

more appropriate today,

it

during the Carter years, in words even

"Given the current state of economic art,

mathematical cost-benefit analyses are about as neutral as voter
literacy tests in the Old South." 8 *
By

increasing the use of cost-benefit analysis while tightening

the centralization of OSHA policy in the executive branch, the president

further insulated the policy process from outside pressures.

analyst -- who served as both Deputy Director
as a consultant

of

As one

CWPS under Carter, and

to OSHA for Reagan -- has favorably commented,

"By

reviewing regulations before they are formally proposed, [Reagan
can limit the role of external political

added,

actors."

si

0MB

Along these lines he

"the criteria being applied to new regulations will be less

transparent and the possibilities
limited." 87

of

informed public participation more

-- "negotiations
This essentially anti -democratic impulse
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between the White House and the [regulatory] agencies have gone

—

underground"

jibes well with the president's larger strategy of

isolating organized labor as

a

political force.

Labor obviously has far

less access to personnel and processes in 0MB than it does in the Labor

Department.

Moreover, by subjecting OSHA regulations to greater

economic rationality, the hope is that the introduction

of

new

regulations will be inhibited.
The inhibition of new regulations is but one part of President

Reagan's strategy for promoting external cooperation on the OSHA front,
the second dimension of his cooperative approach.

During his

presidency, OSHA has dramatically reduced its ability to do the job it
was empowered to do,

leaving business feeling good about cooperation,

while labor feels concern for workers has been drastically slighted.
a

As

leading agency on Reagan's oft-noted regulatory "hit list," OSHA has

cut back, in

a

variety of ways on the number of general schedule health

and safety inspections,

the number of follow-up inspections, the

frequency and amount

fines levied for violations, and workers' right-

of

to-know about information on occupational hazards. aB
For instance,

under Auchter the agency began exempting companies

from inspections on the basis of their lost workday injury rate (called
on LWDI

-- basically the injuries that result in days away from work

and/or days of restricted work activity).

If

a

company's LWDI falls

below the national average for manufacturing industries, they are
effect guaranteed inspectors will not set foot inside.

justified as

a

in

This is

targeting program that rewards "safe" workplaces, even

that an
though "OSHA has never published any statistical study showing
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adequate relationship exists between lost workday injury
rates and the

hazardous conditions at
they are called

a

workplace."-

Such "paper inspections," as

(they rely on examination of company injury logs),
are

fraught with pitfalls, not the least of which is their
reliance on

businesses to faithfully and truthfully record injury data.

The

incentive (and means) to fudge on these numbers has been noted earlier.
But with

a

cooperative approach, such problems are not seriously

considered
Auchter also has championed the use of "informal conferences"

during which OSHA area directors can reduce the severity of fines and

citations and receive extensions on hazard abatement deadlines.

While

both inspection targeting and informal conferences were used with

greater caution in Bingham's OSHA, under Reagan they have become

mechanisms for avoiding the teeth

of

the agency.

Reagan's OSHA to claim credit for the decline

in

And attempts by

injury statistics

during the first few years of the administration are overdrawn,

cynical, given that slowdowns in economic growth are
causal
a

a

if

not

well-established

factor in injury rate declines, and the U.5. economy exeperienced

sustained drop in the business cycle from 1979 through 1983. 90
Of

a

perhaps more serious nature in the area

of

external

cooperation with the business community, OSHA has cut back on the
pr omul agati on

of

new health standards.

Only two new major OSHA rules

—

-- were issued
covering ethylene oxide and farmworker field sanitation
in

Reagan first term, and bath of them occurred only after intense

wrangling and court pressure.
a

OSHA likes to boast that it will propose

host of health regulations within its own regulatory timetable.

But
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to date,

virtually all proposed standards would weaken existing

regulations, not develop tough new standards.
issuing regulations has been
on

a

function of the agency's own insistance

the use of regulatory review and cost-beneft analysis -- an approach

promoting "paralysis by analysis."
at

Often the delay in

a

glacial

pace.

OSHA now pursues health regulations

While there are less than two dozen OSHA exposure

limits for hazardous and toxic substances, there remain more than 2,000
known and suspected carcinogens used in the workplace.

If

President

Reagan's ideological orientation toward social regulation endures, the
outlook for the welfare of the nation's workforce, on this score, is not
bright.
We now can better

the chapter,

the Reagan administration could reach

1986 it could issue
yet still

understand how, as discussed at the outset of

a

a

juncture whereby in

record penalty against Union Carbide Corporation,

not have such an action be indicative of the vigor of

healthy agency.

Auchter gave OSHA

a

direction, albeit

a

Since his departure in 1984, the agency has been adrift.

a

negative one.
Even if

Pendergrass, Reagan's latest (and third) OSHA director, is "rekindling
OSHA" as one publication speculated,

activity under Bingham.

91

it

will not return to the level of

And the agency certainly will

current configuration, escape the fluctuation
and contraction of

its activity,

executive branch's assessment

of

a

of

not,

in

its

presidential expansion

fluctuation most dependent on the

the prevailing economic climate and,

especially, the prospects for economic growth.
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Conclusion;

The Triumph of Structure

Aftor examining the policies of Carter and Reagan, the picture we
are left with is one of both divergence and continuity between their

strategies toward OSHA.

The divergence lies in the genuine commitment

to workplace safety and health on the part of Carter's OSHA apparatus.

The agency certainly was relatively more active, and in some respects

arguably more effective, during his term.

But it also was in deep

conflict with another part of the administration, and eventually the

concerns

of

that economic-technocratic side took precedence over the

concerns of the other side.

Indeed after

1978,

the Carter approach

begins to look like it is paving the way for Reaganism, as worried

attention to the generation of economic growth virtually overwhelms all
other domestic priorities.

Alan Wolfe's structural insight into

Carter's macroeconomic policy is applicable here to his OSHA policy as
well;
of

"In pursuing

a

centrist strategy, Carter learned that in an age

austerity the center shifts to the right.

"‘*

2

The solidification of centralized and insulated OSHA policy stands
as a chief

continuity between the two presidencies.

In

a

sense,

President Reagan simply sustained and deepened this weakening
with his vocal advocacy of deregulating the workplace.

presidency the structural imperative
only issue on the domestic agenda.
to OSHA,

of

of

OSHA

During his

economic growth is nearly the

With his business-dominated approach

the concerns of workers are minimalized and, at times,

trivialized,

OSHA has not disappeared, although that might be

the President's heart of hearts.

More effective is

a

a

goal

strategy that

impotent.
keeps the agency on the books, but renders it essentially

in
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This allows QSHA to be figuratively invisible, while not having

literally vanished.
The desire to promote economic growth and satisfy the business

community thus has effectively torpedoed the pursuit
and health enforcement for the foreseeable future.
in

a

of

vigorous safety

OSHA appears caught

cycle of liberal presidents -- who want to retain some health and

safety regulatory programs, but who also need economic growth for
political survival

—

and conservative presidents, who focus almost

exclusively on the growth side

of

the equation.

Such

a

cycle will

always tend to subordinate the need for safe and healthful workplaces to
the needs of the economy, ensuring that commitment to OSHA will only be
as strong

as the priorities of

business will allow.

For as Noble has

correctly observed:

CT]he relationship between the development of the White
House review program and changes in the economy suggests
a clear relationship between presidential concern for
business confidence and the subordination of social regulation to White House review.’ 3

Having been burned in the early 1970's, corporate capital is not likely
again to fall
As for

into

a

state of disorganization over social regulations.

the presidency as an institution, the fundamental point

seems to be the contingent nature of the office, dependent as it is on
the dynamic interaction of state power and economic vitality.

The

extent of the dependency becomes clearer when the structural constraints
on the
of

state shift from accomodating social struggle to the generation

economic growth, as they had by the time Carter assumed office.

roughly mid-term rightward shift attests to this fact.

His

President Reagan
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happily moved with the tide, all the while helping
to quicken and

intensity its speed.
of

This, then,

the Carter and Reagan years --

is the overriding
a

domestic continuity

continuity which reminds us that the

liberal democratic state is in the bind of being publicly
accountable
for the performance of

a

private economy over which it has only

limited set of tools for achieving public purposes. **

in

a

very

the case of

QSHA policy, if those purposes hang in the balance, the lives of
workers
quite literally may as well.

presidency.

This is the structural bind of the

Political science -- above all, presidency scholars --

would do well to devote greater attention to the exploration of this
bind as it envelops the chief executive.
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CHAPTER FOUR
NATIONAL SECURITY /NATIONAL INSECURITY:
THE MX MISSILE CONFRONTS TWO PRESIDENCIES

I
discussed my disappointment with the weekly memorandum on MX mobile basing.
It was a nauseating prospect
to confront, with the gross waste of money going into
nuclear weapons of all kinds.

—

Jimmy Carter

1

I
do know that the debates that are going on about the
MX, I think they're a lot of wasted rhetoric and we
ought to get on with it....
We need it.

-- Ronald Reagan 2

The attitudes of Presidents Carter and Reagan seemingly move in

opposite directions.

Jimmy Carter longs to be thought of as

peace and global cooperation.

A

a

man of

cursory glance at the record of the

first two years of his presidency lends credence to such

a

judgment.

Among the achievements of his administration during that period were the

signing of the Panama Canal treaties, the Camp David summit on Middle
East peace which culminated in the Camp David accords, and the

announcement of normalization
China.

of

relations with the People's Republic

And specifically concerning the nuclear threat, he can claim

credit for halting production of the B-l bomber, deferring production
the neutron bomb, and reaching an agreement on
II

of

Treaty.

a

framework for the SALT

Particularly in this latter area of nuclear weaponry,

President Carter prided himself on thinking the sobering thoughts and
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feeling the human fear

of

the nuclear threat.

earth,

in

his memoirs

a= he calls

it

The "shadow over the

"That horror was constantly on

my mind." 3

Historian Gaddis Smith thus is generally on the mark with his

assertion that "President Carter and some

of

his advisers were readier

than any of their predecessors to stare directly at the reality of

nuclear weapons," to "think deeply" about the implications

security in the nuclear age.

4

national

of

reasonable case can be made that on

A

some level President Carter was considerably more thoughtful about and

knowledgeable of nuclear weapons issues than his successor as well.

As

the quotes which frame this chapter suggest, Carter did give sustained

consideration to the moral and human dimensions

the multifaceted

of

nuclear dilemma, even staffing his administration at the highest levels
with advisers whose own views on the issue varied substantially.

Moreover he refrained from engaging
yet revealing,
(for

a

Union.

For his part,

minutes."

5

Ronald Reagan has shown much less care than Carter,

often adopting his familiar bul

1

-i

n-a-Chi na-shop attitude toward this

He staffed his various national

issue.

security-related

agencies uniformly with well-travelled Cold Warriors.

barometer

of

callous,

"I've signed legislation which outlaws the Soviet

The bombing starts in

most vital

the kind of mindless,

Cold War fantasies evident in President Reagan's famous

quip:

day)

in

And as

a

the depth of his own ignorance of the technical side of

more
strategic weaponry, he admitted having occupied the presidency for

than two-and-a-hal
of

f

years before realizing that roughly three quarters

the Soviet's entire strategic nuclear arsenal

is

concentrated

in
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land based missiles -- an elemental

-fact

whose importance cannot be

overemphasized when analyzing national security policy and arms
control
in

general, and the MX missile in particular

3
.

The difference between the two presidents, then, can be
construed
as

marked on such basic issues as nuclear weaponry and national

security.

President Carter began his tenure with an inagural address

pledging "perserverance and wisdom in our efforts to limit the world's

armaments to those necessary for each nation's own domestic safety," and
movement "this year
of

all

a

step toward our ultimate goal -- the elimination

nuclear weapons from this Earth

." 6

He also early on urged

a

commitment to "replace bal ance-of -power with world order politics," and
advocated the need to jettison our "inordinate fear
thinking about foreign policy

portrayed as

a

7
.

of

Communism" in

For such views he often is popularly

relatively dovish chief executive, compassionate, morally

committed, and yet ultimately weak.

By contrast,

Reagan is viewed as an

exemplar of the tough, power-conscious, defense-minded president,
in

hawk's clothes.

His firm,

a

hawk

denunciatory approach to the Soviet Union,

which colors all of his administration's national security policies, was

articulated in his first presidential press conference:

Now, as long as they do that [promote world revolution] and as long as they at the same time have openly and
publicly declared that the only morality they recognize
is what will further their cause, meaning they reserve
unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to
cheat, in order to attain that, and that is moral, not
immoral, and we operate on a different set of standards, I
think when you do business with them, even as a detente,
you keep that in mind 8
.
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Only now,

in

the wake of the revelations of the Iran-contra scandal,
are

the American people coming to see how well

characterization

of

auch facile

much of Reagan's glib

Soviet conduct describes U.5. behavior in the
world.
weak

v.

strong" comparisons of the two presidents

gloss over or ignore outright the absurd quality of ideas of "weakness"
and

"strength" when applied to presidents who have at their finger tips

the capability to destroy life as we know it on this planet in
of

hours,

if

that long.

As Alan Wolfe has written,

the U.S.

is a

superpower, having literally accumulated super amounts of power.
the nuclear age, no president is militarily "weak."
for

matter

a

’

in

More importantly

this chapter, though, charges of relative weakness or strength

obscure the most fundamental point that President Carter underwent

a

pronounced shift to the right on national security issues as his tenure
wore on.

Roughly comparable to his growing conservatism in domestic

policy, as evidenced in his OSHA policies, his increasingly militarized

foreign policy agenda was even more dramatic, since the foundation

of

whatever liberal reformist ideas he harbored was most securely rooted in
this arena.

As

in

the domestic sphere,

the basis for the international

the Democratic president laid

dimension

of

Reaganism which followed.

Particularly from mid-1979 onward, Carter repudiated anything
resembling his earlier embrace

of

policies espoused by his brethern

the cooperative, world management
of

10
the Trilateral Commission.

perspective, which had supplied the elite establishment

s

This

analytic

rationale for his initial moralistc orientation to world issues, was
distinct casuality

of

Carter's hardened stance.

As Smith points out,

"The character of the Carter Administration's foreign policy changed

a
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radically during 1979, continuing and completing
in

1978.

ll

Indeed it had.

For when all

a

shift which had begun

was said and done, his

professed nausea over nuclear weaponry notwithstanding, the erstwhile

detente-minded Carter had -- in the name

of

preserving "national

security" -- presided over the greatest buildup

weaponry in the nation's history,

of

of

offensive nuclear

which the MX stands as

a

prime

example.

Carter's Cold War transformation attests to the enduring vigor -and danger -- of

conventional notions of national security.

presidency is both prisoner

of

The

and benefactor of these accepted ways of

thinking, rallying the public behind him when perceived threats to
national security arise, yet unable to actually provide anything like
real

security in the nuclear age.

Simultaneously trapped by and

sustained by such notions -- it is this dual bind that the structural
view of the presidency wants to explore and challenge.
is to undertake this

My intent here

kind of analysis by examining the policies of

Presidents Carter and Reagan toward the MX missile,

a

weapons system

that perfectly captures the dilemmas faced by presidents in their

pursuit of national security.

The Secluded History of the MX Missile

The genesis of the MX missile
in

(for

"Missile-Experimental") stands

sharp contrast to the origins of OSHA discussed in the previous

chapter.

Whereas OSHA emerged from the sometimes acrimonious interplay

organized
among public officials, private industry and citizens, both
and unorganized,

the MX missile system was conceived in relative
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obscurity.

Like all major weapons systems, the MX was insulated
from

public scrutiny until its development and deployment
effectively were

foregone conclusion.
the vital

As one group of

a

analysts has observed concerning

issue of the function fulfilled by the nation's strategic

nuclear forces, such as the MX:

a question of such fundamental importance to the
security of the United States and the world, one might
expect to find either general agreement among scientists
and policy makers, based on a coherent body of doctrine
and analysis, or alternatively an informed, sustained
public debate.
Unfortunately, this is not so 12

On

.

What is true in this case for overall U.S. nuclear policy, also is true
in

the particular instance of the MX program.

Certainly the need for some amount
military planners not
of

i

ndi scr i mi nantl

proposed weapons systems.

y

of

secrecy dictates that

broadcast every technical feature

Yet one result of the nearly total

insulation and lack of broad debate is that both strategic theories and
actual

weapons systems growing out them -- which obviously carry with

them important implications for the security of all of us -- can become

virtually unalterable facts

of

life in the military world before being

subject to legitimate outside critique.
a

strategic triad

,

a

A

good example is the notion of

cornerstone of nuclear policy.

The triad concept simply means that U.S.

distributed over three modes
land-based.

of

delivery:

(and Soviet)

weapons are

air-based, sea-based and

Presidents and their military planners routinely treat the

triad as sacrosanct.

This results in the apparently ironclad need to

always have ongoing modernization plans for each leg

of

the triad,

guaranteeing the quantitative and qualitative proliferation

of

nuclear
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hardware.

Yet such

t

eti 5hi zati on of

the triad is completely

unwarranted
Far from being primarily the outgrowth of

conscious, well-

a

conceived plan, the triad actually resulted from bitter interservice
rivalry and the peculiarities
Congress.

13

of

the defense budgeting process in

The only logical necessity for strategic planners is the

requirement that the nation's forces be diverse enough to ensure

reliability and sur vi vabl

i i

ty

.

This might be achieved by strengthing

only one type of delivery system, say our invulnerable submarine fleet.
In

theory, there is no reason why

meet U.S.

defense needs as

destabilizing than

a

a

a

monad or

a

dyad could not adequately

deterrent, and be both less costly and less

system that includes relatively vulnerable land-

based intercontinental ballistic missiles

(ICBMs).

As Herbert Scoville,

former Deputy Director of the CIA and Past-President of the Arms Control

Association, has concluded, "there is nothing sacred about our triad
The important factor is to have

strategic weapons....
of

strategic forces."

14

Air Force,

a

of

diversification

Army and Navy turf battles, more

than the requirements of military ones, have created the triad.

The

concept does not deserve the respect it is given.
The triad stands as an example of how little serious thinking at

times goes into the determination of the nation
will

s

"strategic thought.

subsequently contend, the MX missile system itself, especially

As

I

in

its current scaled down deployment mode, cannot withstand serious,

thoughtful scrutiny.

Another seemingly intractable feature

of

the way

the MX,
nuclear weapons are developed, very important for understanding
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is

the tremendous lead time they require.

Of

his experience with this

phenomenon, Carter has noted:

New weapon systems are always being conceived; they
pass through research, design, and testing, and then
perhaps go on to deployment.
This process can take
as long as ten years, and once it gains momentum, it
is almost impossible to stop. 1 *

Having said this, he does not use this insight to draw much
of

in

the way

conclusions about U.S. weapons systems, their impact on the nuclear

arms race and related perceptions of Soviet nuclear capabilities and

intentions, or the ability of

president to interrupt or resist this

This is unfortunate, since he opted to confront the momentum

momentum.
of

a

two such nuclear weapons projects in decisions on the B-l bomber and

the neutron bomb 16

.

Yet perhaps it is an understandable omission,

given

that the reasons for these decisions would seem to preclude any insights
that fundamentally question the standard weapons development process.
In

the case of the B-l, cancellation was ordered because newer, deadlier

technologies (cruise missiles and the stealth bomber) had obviated the
need for this new bomber

(and still,

Reagan revived it).

neutron bomb, deferral was ordered because

of

And with the

insufficient public

support from our European allies, on whose soil the weapon would have
been based.
In

any event,

fait accompli.

the inertia of the process usually is taken as

a

Weapons are dreamed up by researchers and then some

threat is concocted to rationalize the development and deployement
the now-"vital" weapon.

of

Research money has been procurred; to waste

it
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would be almost unthinkable.

This is the pattern followed by the

erratic trajectory of the MX missile "debate."

Planning for an MX-style mobile ICBM began in the late 1950's.
At

the time,

the Air Force was searching for possible ways to address

the alleged possibility of U.S.

attack.
of

17

vulnerability to

a

Soviet missile

Fueled by the hysteria over the infamous "missile gap" -- one

the most spectacular lies ever perpetrated in the cause of whipping

up support

defense -- the Air Force searched in vain for

for national

secure basing scheme for

new mobile missile.

a

a

Before discussing this

search, however, it is absolutely crucial to underscore the MX's origins
in

this period of military mendacity.

separate the missile from
and outright falsehood,

designs.

a

For

it

has never been possible to

continual stream of official exaggeration

up to and

including President Reagan's latest MX

Indeed, the history of the MX is inextricably interwoven with

the history of

a

major development in U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine --

the advent and refinement of counterforce policy -- the reality of which

has been obscured, when not completely hidden, from the public.
The public face of nuclear doctrine, like the public face of the
MX,

ususally has been presented as

deterrence. 10

To digress briefly,

that the policy of the U.S.

a

product of the need to maintain

the doctrine of deterrence maintains

is to amass nuclear

purposes, to respond to Soviet attack.

weapons for defensive

Deterrence results in the

nuclear stalemate often popularly know as MAD (for mutual assured

destruction):

neither the U.S. nor the Soviets would launch its weapons

massive
first because each could be certain the other would respond with

retaliation against

a

host of targets,

including cities and industrial
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centers, bringing widespread ruin

not complete societal

if

devastation.

Under the scenario of deterrence, nuclear weapons are intended
for

second strike only, that is, in response to the first strike of
an
opponent.

is not

It

primarily

The MX, by contrast,

war-fighting doctrine.

a

is an example of

a

weapon designed with

another doctrine in mind, that of counter for ce.
has definite offensive implications.
(such as missile silos)

A

counterforce policy

targets an opponents weapons

It

and military command, control

and communications

structures, with the idea that they could be destroyed before they are
used, thus providing the aggressor with

Such

a

a

decisive military advantage.

counterforce capability potentially provides the nation that

initiates

nuclear attack the ability to achieve

a

sense of the term,

literal

in

a

is

said to have undertaken

a

a

a

first strike

.

While

nation that launches its weapons first

"first strike," the more precise and

germane sense of the word entails

strategic first strike --

a

a

sudden,

preemptive, disarming first strike rendering an opponent unable to
respond.

19

Counterforce policy thus has war-fighting connotations.

requires weapons with particular characteristics, foremost

variance of

a

But to hit

a

silo or

a

bomber base, accuracy is essential.

nuclear war is something more than

civilization as we know
a

it.

a

is that

MAD option promising to obliterate

This option, while horrifying, is so to

degree that nuclear confrontation may appear

possibility.

a

few hundred feet would not affect the outcome of the

Counterforce doctrine is unsettling because its premise

such

which is

Destroying cities calls for no special precision, since

accuracy.

mission.

of

It

a

relatively remote

Yet by counterforce logic, nuclear war is something
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fightable and winnable, much like war with conventional technologies.
Given that countertorce makes nuclear war theoretically "limited"
in

scope

(limited to military/political targets), and hence more likely

is understandable why U.S.

virtues to the public. 20

,

i

military planners did not rush to extol its
In

-fact,

successive administrations developed

strategic policies along two tracks, one essentially tor public

consumption and one tor private military calculations.

Publically,

national security posture has held that our nuclear torces aim to deter
war and are strictly tor

"national detense."

however, countertorce has been at the center
since the 195Q's. 21

the truth be known,

It

ot

U.S.

strategic policy

The top secret Pentagon document that assigns

specitic target tor each ot the nation's nuclear warheads
the

S

1

0P

,

tor Single

Integrated Operational Plan

completion in 1960, accorded countertorce policy
U.S.

—
a

has,

—

a

known as

since its

predominant place in

strategy.
The disjuncture between the national

security establishment's

public and private plans rests on the psychological ettects the

countertorce, tirst strike policy might have on the

steadtast pursuit

at

American people.

As Paul

Nitze -- decades-long Detense Department

-adviser and currently Reagan's chiet arms control negotiator

explained in 1956, there are two separate though related meanings to the
word "policy":

it reters to the general
In one sense, the action sense
guidelines which we believe should and will in fact govern
In the other sense,
our actions in various contingencies.
it refers to policy statements which
the declaratory sense
and psychological effect (my
political
aim
their
have as
22
emphasis)
,

,
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Presumably, it would be difficult to sell publicly the
benevolent belief
that our nation's nuclear forces are for "national defense"
above all
else,

if

at

the same time the maturation of counterforce doctrine
was

the common public rationale for the evolution and expansion
of our

strategic forces.

Defense is more palatable than offensive capability.

The existence of this longstanding public/private split in nuclear

doctrine does not, however

,

mean that counterforce options literally

have never been mentioned outside the back rooms of Foggy Bottom.

Robert McNamara, President Kennedy's Secretary
the development of

a

Defense, alluded to

counterforce posture in both 1962 and 1967.

McNamara conceived of counterforce as

a

method of "damage limitation,"

annhilation of cities by striking at the enemies

to deter the potential

forces.

of

Presented this way, counterforce strategy sounds more humane;

people allegedly are not held hostage to nuclear terror.
gap existed,

A

substantial

though, between the theory and practice of counterforce

war-planning.

It

was

a

hardware gap

of

sorts.

And this gap was an

authentic one.
When President Nixon’s Defense Secretary James Schlesinger again

made public overtures toward counterforce policy in 1974, he also did so
in

the name of offering

devastation.

a

more humane alternative to full scale nuclear

Nixon had stated publicly how troubled he was that his

hands were tied by nuclear weapons, since the only response he had to

a

nuclear attack was the massive retaliation against enemy cities.
"Should the President in the event of nuclear attack be left with the

single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians in the
slaughter of
face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass
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Americans?" he opined philosophically. 23

formulating

a

Nixon, of course, was

straw problem; the Pentagon's SI0P had always included

major component of non-city-busting counterforce options. 24
and Schl esinger together were playing

need for

a

moral trump card,

a

But Nixon

asserting the

"flexible nuclear options" to obtain the necessary hardware to

close the gap between counterforce theory and practice.

This ploy was

buttressed by the oft-used mythical scenario projecting that the Soviet
Union would soon have the ability to threaten
set at about 90 percent)

of

our Minuteman

I

a

large portion

CBM force.

(usually

Schlesinger

removed the velvet gloves in 1975, though, asserting publically for the
first time the U.S.

need for the ability to launch

against the Soviets

if

the contingency arose.

2*

a

first strike

He hoped for

a

"super

missile," specifically designed to achieve preemptive hard silo kill
The MX missile, placed into advanced development in 1974,

capability.
was to be

a

vital

part of this overall plan.

The development of MX technology traverses this history of

doctrinal refinement. 26

In

response to the Navy's highly touted

"virtually invulnerable" Polaris submarine, the Air Force

in

1960 had

been working feverishly on its Project Big Star, which resulted in the

first major proposal for
a

a

new mobile ICBM.

The Air Force came up with

rail-based system consisting of 60 missile trains, each with five

missiles, rolling randomly on the nation's commercial rail network.
Phase one of this project was approved by the outgoing Secratary
Defense.

But the new Defense Secretary, McNamara,

entire railway plan, and put the project on hold.
was

a

of

was dubious of the

Among his objections

he meant that
"public interface" problem, by which we can assume
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train passangers might feel somewhat squeamish about
riding the rails

along with weapons that could destroy the world as we know
it.
kinds of problems (often funny as black humor)

with the basing of the

missile would plague the MX concept throughout its years. 27
see,

These

As we will

they remain as formidable as ever today.
Many other mobile ICBM schemes have been considered by the Air

Force since 1960, along with proposals for sophisticated missile

characteri

si tcs.

In

1967 it announced another land-based proposal.

This ws the first of many "shell game" configurations, which attemped to

achieve invulnerability and deception by shifting the misisles among

multiple silos (many more silos than missiles) hardened to withstand the
impact of nuclear explosions.

A

year earlier, McNamara had ordered the

Pentagon's Institute for Defense Analyses to undertake

study of

a

follow-on generations of strategic weapons from all the armed services.
Known as the Strat-X Study
shot down the Air Forces'

(for

Strategic Exercise Study), this analysis

elaborate shell game system.

Strat-X had

concluded that the Soviets eventually would be able to detect the silos
actually housing the missiles.

The study was enthusiastic about the

Navy's proposed underwater long-range missile system (ULMS)

,

though, and

advocated further development of this project, which eventually became
the Trident submarine system being deployed today.

Licking its wounds from Strat-X, but still undaunted, the Air
Force commenced with research on

a

number of basing modes for its ICBM,

which by 1969 included missiles that could be silo-based, rail-based,
truck. - based,

and deeply underwater-based

(in

version of an air-mobile ICBM, launched from

silos).
a

In

1970 it added

Lockheed C-jA transport

a
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plane.

The point here is that the Air Force was searching
tor some way

to credibly base its new

I

CBM

ditterent basing options.

eventually considering more than 40

,

The motivation tor this investigation came

as much trom interservice rivalry as it did trom any outside
threat to

Minuteman missiles.

According to Aviation Meek

nascent Trident program "poses

a

2V

July 1970, the Navy's

potential threat to the Air Force's

present monopoly on the ICBM arsenal,
aware.

nf

a

tact ot which USAF is well

Thus, as one study recalls:

In the early sevent i es
Mi nuteman vulnerability was
regarded as a relatively long-term threat.
A more
immediate threat to the land-based ICBM came not trom the
Russians but trom the grand designs ot the U.S. Navy. 30
.

.

.

still

In

1975,

with the MX otticially in advanced development stage

(development, that is, ot missile design, independent

ot

its basing),

Detense Secretary Schlesinger rejected the Air Force's air-mobile
concept in tavor ot further research into land-based modes.
how to base the MX,

in other

Decisons on

words, were still very much up in the air.

What was certain by the end of the Ford administration, however, was

that despite conflicts over MX basing plans, the missile would be

brought to fruition.
of

Moreover, of special importance for the remainder

this analysis, the MX would proceed regardless of the veracity of

claims that the system was needed to counter
our Minuteman missiles.

a

Soviet nuclear threat to

Soviet strategic capabilities were not the

primary driving force behind the MX.
toward

a

Changes in U.S. nuclear doctrine

counterforce posture played the leading role.

As is so often

the case with new weapons systems, though, the public face of the MX
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decision would most often be painted in Soviet red.

The situation by

1976 thus could be summarized as follows:

Publicly, the decision to proceed with the MX was tied
to Soviet restraint in building up its new ICBM
forces.
Within the Pentagon, however, the MX missile was nonnegoti abl e. 31
By

1977,

then, President Carter was inheriting

program in desperate search

of

a

a

land-based deployment mode.

preferred Air Force basing mode at the time was

a

missile without

a

But Carter

home.

shifting domestic climate on issues of national security,
flux partly due to

a

wel

1

The

buried trench verison

a

although, as always, others were under consideration.

inherited something else besides

full-fledged MX

He faced a
a

-orchestrated rightwing offensive.

climate in
This

ideological offensive provided the foreign policy analog to the AEI-type

campaign against OSHA and other regulatory programs

in

the domestic

sphere.

Leading the cause of resurgent militarism in the U.S. was the

Committee on the Present Danger
(Nitze and Eugene Rostow)

(CPD)

,

an organization of

and relatively new

both old

(Jeane Kirkpatrick)

conservatives who sought to help the nation regain its position
unchallenged world leadership and military superiority lost
of

defeat in Vietnam. 32

containment

of

The CPD counseled

a

in

of

the wake

revival of Cold War

alleged Soviet global expansion to overcome the "Vietnam

syndrome" and reassert U.S. military strength.

Apart from Vietnam, the

CPD was reacting to the multicausal erosion of clear, unbridled U.S.

military superiority by the Soviets over the previous two decades.
Although

a

U.S.

margin of supremacy in overall conventional and nuclear
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power actually still existed,

"the very tact of Soviet approximation has

detonated the alarmist response in the USA...."”

relentlessly package the
of

The CPD goal

was to

Soviet threat" as virtually the singular cause

the country's ills, and by so doing pave the way for increased

expenditures in all areas

of

the defense budget.

More generally, the

CPD functioned to move the terms of political debate rightward on
of

a

host

national security issues.
Among the many issues on which the CPD wielded considerable

influence during the Carter years were opposition to the Panama Canal
Treaties, opposition to the nomination of Paul Warnke as head
the the Arms Control

of

both

and Disarmament Agency and the SALT negotiations,

fierce opposition in the ratification debate on the SALT

support for the MX missile decison.

On the MX

II

treaty, and

issue, the CPD

essentially invented the most widely-cited rationale for deployment
the MX, the chimerical
later.

In

of

"window of vulnerability," about which more

terms of setting the context for the newly-elected President

Carter, though, no issue was more telling than CPD dominance

infamous Team

B

of

the

report. 34

Under mounting pressure from hard-liners during the 1976 campaign,

President Ford authorized Central Intelligence Agency Director George
Bush to reassess intelligence estimates of Soviet military capabilities
and doctrine.
all,

The seven-member group of outsiders, unflinching hawks

included four CPD members, with one of them, Richard Pipes, serving

as chair.

While the Team

B

analysis was never made fully public, its

assessment
dire view of Soviet military power, notably its very dubious
of

to the
burgeoning Soviet military spending, was deliberately leaked
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press at the end of December.

And although many prominant national

security establishment figures openly took issue
with the Team

findings -- particularly the alarmist and easi
1 y-ref utab
the Soviets definitely had achieved overall

CPD agenda had been furthered.

position

a

It

1

e

8

claim that

strategic superiority

the

had made its stridently anti-detente

force to be reckoned with.

Its views had been prominent

the press as the Carter administration prepared to take power.
in

—

It

in

had,

short, presaged the Cold War revival to come.

President Carter:

Like

In

A

Lamb. Out Like

A

Lion

The metaphor of March actually overstates President Carter's shift
on

matters

of

national security.

team in 1977 was not

1007.

The incoming Carter foreign policy

pure lamb to begin with.

its core some tense internal

it

had at

divisions, which reflected the deep

fissures within the national security establishment.
members when choosing his top advisers.
the ranks of the rival

fact,

In

Carter ignored CPD

But he did draw heavily from

Trilateral Commisison, the group responsible for

opening his eyes to the larger world of national and international

politics beyond the Atlanta corporate elite
some 25 Tr i 1 ateral

i

in

sts to serve in high level

1973.

Carter selected

foreign policy posts,

among them Cyrus Vance, Harold Brown, Paul War nke

,

Andrew Young and the

commission's co-founder Zbigniew Brzezinski.
Even within this group, however, competing policy tendencies

existed.
of

Most notable was the policy split between Vance, as Secrtary

State, and Brzezinski as National Security Adviser.

as a strong supporter

of

Vance was seen

arms control with the Soviet Union, searching
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for ways to forge cooperation between the
superpowers.

Trilateral world

order politics fit well with his overall geopolitical
outlook.

fiercely anti -communi st Polish emigre, Brzezinski took
toward the Soviet Union, linking
being

a

major example)

a

host of issues

to their behavior

in

a

As a

tougher stance

(SALT negotiations

certain areas of the world.

He was inclined to view world events through the lens of
east-west

rivalry, and would support arms control measures only
U.S.

advantages, as did SALT

II

if

they codified

with its allowance for the expansion of

our counterforce capabilities which he so cherished.

decidedly more militarist than Vance's on issues
U.S. -Soviet relations in general,

of

His attitude was
the arms race and

although he shared Vance's Trilateral

perspective on other important issues, such as the pressing need for
greater collaboration among the major capitalist powers.
For perspective,

it

is useful

to bear

in

mind that whatever the

policy differences between these two tendencies, they represented

conflict within

a

shared consensus on the basic need for U.S. military

prowess and the general benevolence
But the cleavage was real,

of

multinational corporate capital.

resulting in some heated internal debates

over the specifics of policy, even if the ends were agreed upon.

And it

helped define the character of the Carter administration as it struggled
to balance the disequilibrium.

order

v.

Smith describes the fundamental world

militarism split embodied in Vance and Brzezinski as

that "ran like

a

a

division

fault line through the Carter Administration and all

3S
discussion of the wisdom or folly of its particular decisions.

He

added that the tension contributed to Carter's downfall, commenting that
"He knew they represented different viewpoints but did not appreciate
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how deep the

cognizance

i

ncompati bi i ty lay."®*

Carter's memoirs confirm his

this difference between Vance, who would become his close

of

personal friend, and Brzezinski:

Zbigniew Brzezinski was perhaps the most controversial member of my team.
...Dr. Brzezinski might not be adequately deferential
to a secretary of state.

There were some inherent differences in the character of
the White House National Security Council staff and the
State Department.
I
attempted to tap the strongest elements in each as changing circumstances demanded 37
.

Apparently the president thought he could handle whatever policy

contradictions arose by selecting ideas from one

or

the other adviser

when it suited his needs, perhaps because he ultimately believed Vance
and Brzezinski 's accorded each other mutual

respect.

remembers:

find it interesting that

"(In looking at my old notes,

I

As Carter

Vance recommended Brzezinski for this job, and Zbig recommended Cy for

Secretary

of

State.

Both were good suggestions.)" 3 ®

Yet Vance claims

that despite agreements to the contrary, and despite repeated directions

from Carter, Brzezinski would not abandon his attempt to assume the role
of

chief foreign policy spokesman.

In

his memoirs, Vance writes of his

growing rift with Brzezinski:

Eventually, as divergences grew wider between my public
statements and his policy utterances, Brzezinski's
practice became a serious impediment to the conduct of
It also became a political liability,
our foreign policy.
leaving the Congress and foreign governments with the impression that the administration did not know its own
mind 39
.
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What foreign policy analyst Fred Halliday refers to as the
"studied

ambivalence

the Carter administration's national security policies

of

(its mixture of

maintained. 40
of

conciliation and belligerency) simply could not be
In

1979 and

1980, the ambivalence was resolved in favor

Cold War belligerency, punctuated by the departures of Warnke, Young

eventually, Vance.

and,

By the end of

the Carter years, the lions

roamed freely.
In

the beginning, though,

that brought
of

a

squeaky clean view

Staff ,(JCS).

its stockpile of

was Jimmy Carter,

it

the world before the Joint Chiefs

of

There in January 1977 he proposed that the U.S. reduce
some 30,000 nuclear warheads down to 200,

adequate to deter any potential adversary.
If

lamb and moralist,

deterrence is the lone goal

U.S.

of

41

This was not

a

supply

a

crazy idea.

nuclear strategy, 200 warheads

are sufficient to destroy the Soviet Union as anything resembling

modern society.

a

Defense planners had know this at least since the mid-

196Q's, when McNamara's Pentagon "whiz kids" perfected their computer

projections on nuclear war-f i ght i ng

.

But what neophyte Carter learned

was the stark reality that deterrence was not the only objective of the

nation's nuclear forces.
was,

and is,

In

fact,

largely for public consumption, as I've argued.

JCS strategy was to "prevail" in

counterforce capabilities.
of

the rhetoric of deterring nuclear war

a

The real

nuclear war, and to prevail required

This made it much more difficult to conceive

the arms race having an end point.

Undeterred himself, Carter did make some overtures toward reducing
the threat of the arms race,

a

sincere desire on his part, including

some early talk of banning all mobile ICBMs, such as the MX.

Twice in
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1977 the new president substantially cut funding
requests for the MX.
In

January, faced with the outgoing Ford administration
request for $294

million for full-scale development

of

the MX in fiscal

postponed such development for at least
half* 42

And again in December,

a

year

1978,

he

year and cut the request in

Carter cut funds for full-scale MX

development in fiscal year 1979.

This time it was his own Defense

Secretary's approval of an Air Force $245 million plan that was denied,
largely because of uncertainty over how to base the missile, and because
it

was thought that approval

at

this time could adversely affect the

ongoing SALT negotiations.
More telling than Carter's initial stopgap funding cuts

specifically for MX development was his overall view

of

the way to

address development and deployment of nuclear weapons as an issue in
arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union.
SALT

II

As the administration's

strategy unfolded it became clear that

being forged,

a

linkage ensuring that

—

a

SALT-MX linkage was

lofty rhetoric about ending the

nuclear threat notwithstanding -- the MX was non-negotiable.
With the SALT

I

Carter wanted to reach
term.

Interim Agreement due to expire in October 1977,
a

new agreement with the Soviets early in his

Toward this end he sent Vance and Warnke off to Moscow in late

March to begin laying the groundwork for
put forward,
for

a

SALT

II

and the Soviets emphatically rejected,

"deep cuts"

in

a

There they

proposal calling

Vance actually went with two

nuclear weapons.

alternative bargaining proposals.

accord. 43

A

modest option simply built on the

agreement reached between President Ford and Soviet President Leonid

Brezhnev at Vladivostok in November 1974.

Vance and Warnke both favored
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this more cautious approach, figuring it offered the
quickest route to
SALT

II

a

agreement, with "deep cuts" negotiable in what they hoped
would

be future SALT

III

discussions.

But the decision was made to press

ahead with more substantial reductions.
It

is now widely acknowledged the Soviets had good reason to

vehemently denounce the "deep cuts" tactic.
of

Although there are

a

number

factors explaining why they did so with such fervor, the most

reasonable and obvious was that the proposed "deep cuts" would have to
come almost exclusively from the Soviet's heavy land-based ICBMs.

Since

roughly 75 percent of their strategic nuclear forces are land-based,
this plan was transparently one-sided.

Predictably, though, Soviet

rejection was seized by anti-SALT forces, especially the CPD, as

evidence of Soviet intransigence.
in

his memoirs that about

a

week,

With

homey flourish, Carter notes

before Vance went to Moscow, "Henry and

Nancy Kissinger came by for supper."

Kissinger

a

With Vance and Brzezinski present,

(presumably Henry) endorsed the "deep cuts" idea, Carter

recalls, saying it "had

a

good chance to be accepted by the Soviets

they are sincere and want to make progress on disarmament.

stage was set.

1,44

if

So the

The Soviets did indeed reject the biased offer, thus

they are insincere, do not want progress in arms talks, and, relatedly,
we therefore

(to protect ourselves from these calculating Russians)

should proceed at once with plans to add the MX, the Trident submarine,

cruise missiles, and
of

a

stealth bomber to our nuclear arsenal.

self-fulfilling prophecy -- used by some

in

This kind

the administration to

justify the need for the MX -- is the stuff of the arms race.

The

deep cuts" gambit also revealed that
President Carter

considered the issue of land-based ICBMs particularly
crucial to the
larger issue of nuclear arms.

Specifically, he bought into the key

argument that Soviet "superiority

Minuteman system at risk.
sloganized into

—

vulnerability"
will

see,

a

11

in

land-based missiles put our entire

This ICBM vulnerability argument -- later

prime ideological debating tool in Reagan's "window of
was

a

major rationale for deploying the MX.

Yet as we

given the speciousness of the vulnerability argument and the

vexing, if not insurmountable, dilemma of MX basing, the more basic

reason for the MX was its war-fighting capability, its first strike

accuracy.

For although there is

characteristics
the other,

between

a

it

of

a

a

relationship between the design and

missile, on the one hand, and its basing mode, on

should be kept in mind that there is no logical connection

missile's accuracy and its pre-launch vulnerability.

is

no less vulnerable

if

its accuracy is just that of existing Minuteman III missiles.

mobility is

a

a

target

if

it

is super

Only

administration officials admitted that the vulnerability

argument was much less than compelling.
words on this issue have been mercurial.
a

accurate, as planned, or

germane response to alleged vulnerability problems. 43

At times,

the idea of

The MX

Defense Secretary Brown's own
In

1978 he openly ridiculed

Soviet attack, against vulnerable U.S. missile silos in his

annual report for fiscal year 1979, saying the Soviets would not risk
such

a

"cosmic throw of the dice."

The U.S.

would have

a

wide range of

lethal options remaining if the Soviets took such an unlikely risk,

Brown contended, adding:
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In short, the [theoretical] vulnerability of
NUTEMAN is a problem, but even it we did nothing
about it, it would not be synonymous with the vulnerability of the United States, or even of the
strategic deterrent.
It would not mean that we could
not satisfy our strategic ob jecti ves.

M

I

Brown would change his tone, though, as the prospects for

SALT

a

II

treaty appeared to hinge on the U.S. going ahead with new weapons
systems, and as the I960 election approached.

In

1979 and

1980 he often

warned of "the growing vulnerability of our land-based missile force,
while adding the proviso that this threat not only was more imminent
than previously believed, but also could eventually imperil our entire

nuclear arsenal

0,7
.

Not surprisingly, Brzezinski
by the MX as

saw

U.S.

first strike threat posed

"extremely, extremely threatening" to the Soviet Union, but

ultimately necessary to maintain

a

superpowers, given his endorsement
achieved such

a

capability.

and expansion of U.S.

his worldview.

"strategic balance" between the
of

the view that the Soviets had

First strike ability, and the modernization

nuclear forces, were unwavering necessities within

For his part,

Carter generally was more cautious about

assertions of U.S. vulnerability to
about U.S.

a

first strike effort.

In

a

theoretical Soviet attack, and

his June 1978 Arms Control

Statement for fiscal year 1979, he voiced his understanding
a

potentially destabilizing factor

in

the arms race:

...With the MX deployed in substantial numbers, in
addition to Minuteman, the U.S. would have acquired a
capability to destroy most of the Soviet silo-based
ICBM force in a first strike....
...under extreme crisis conditions, Soviet leaders...
might perceive pressures to strike first themselves.
Such a situation, of course, would be unstable.

of

Impact
the MX as
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By

1977,

with his MX plan in place, he would abandon
altogether the

notion of it as

a

destabilizing influence, repeatedly calling

to the maintenance of
^ /

and

large,

vital

it

"essential equivalence" with the Soviets.

1978 brought with it mounting pressure for
President

Carter to appear tougher on the Soviets, particularly as
the superpowers

worked to pare down their differences in the ongoing SALT
One indicator of Carter

s

a

7.

The president devoted the major

harsh denunciation of the Soviet record on human

Contending that the Soviets are engaged

in

an

struggle" for political advantage and are guilty

of

a

rights.

meetings.

readiness to do so was his commencement

address at the Naval Academy on June
part of his speech to

II

"excessive far beyond any legitimate requi r ments

,

"

"aggressive
military buildup

he flatly asserted

that "the abuse of basic human rights in their own country -- has earned

them the condemnation of people everywhere who love freedom.

"

pieced together this important address out

conciliatory

one from Vance and

a

two drafts,

of

a

4’

more confrontational one from Brzezinski.

interpreted the final product as an expression
inability to shed its image

of

of

Carter

Vance

the administration's

inconsistency and uncertainty, but Carter

believed the main impression it left was clearly hard-line. 80

impression would grow in 1979, somewhat ironically, as the SALT

This
II

negotiations wound down.
Carter made the two major MX decisions
On

June 8,

to build

of

his presidency in 1979.

1979 the White House announced its long-awaited decision to

proceed with building

details

of

a

full-scale mobile MX missile.

81

While the

the basing plan were to be revealed later, Carter had decided

to largest version of

the MX permissable under the SALT II
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treaty being negotiated.

missile with

a

He authorized construction of

92 inch diameter,

instead of

a

a

ten-warhead

smaller 82 inch version.

This seemingly minor difference actually carried some import.

reflected at least two sets

of

pressures.

It

First, the smaller version

would have made the MX launchable from the new Trident class submarines,
as

as from a ground-based mobile launcher.

well

The "common missile"

option was scrapped, though, when it became clear that the Air Force and
the Navy could not come to grips with the idea of sharing any control

over these new technologies, and the Navy additionally feared

a

common

missile might decrease the need for its new deadly accurate Trident
missile.

II

Second, the larger missile was appealing to those, like

Brzezinski, who felt it was necessary to send the strongest possible
signal to the Soviets about American intentions to "get tough."

Warnke

explains that Brzezinski pressed Carter to go with the bigger missile,
summing up the NSC director's philosophy as, "The bigger, the uglier,

—

the nastier the weapon

"Shape up, buster.

to be:

The message to the Russians was

the better."

probably not going to do it

We've got the ability to do you in.

—

We're

but it's an act of grace on our part."* 2

Supposedly such breast-beating would scare them and, even better,
appease the growing number

of

critics of

a

SALT

II

agreement.

The timing of the MX announcement accentuated Carter's mixed

motives.
II

Coming only

a

week before he left for Vienna to sign the SALT

accords, the MX decision was schizophrenic.

The "man of peace"

authorizes the largest new nuclear weapons program since the hydrogen
bomb project,

and then toasts the goal

of

world peace and reconciliation
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with Brezhnev.

This contradictory juxtaposition fits well
with what

later would become President Reagan's "peace
through strength" credo.
Both Carter and Reagan have claimed on occasion
that the MX is not

"bargaining chip."

This is true,

in

a

sense.

MX was not,

a

and is not,

bargaining chip to be used at the table with the Soviets.

But it was

bargaininig chip to be used with the U.S. Congress, with the intent

a

a

of

buying Senate votes for ratification of the treaty, opposition to
which
had become

a

kind of cause celebre to conseratives of both parties

opposing detente.

The treaty simply could not have been ratified

without Carter agreeing to strongly endorse the MX, and to significantly

increase defense spending, both of which he did.
is

The irony, of course,

that for all his concessions to conservatives, the ratifying votes

were never cast.
In

reality, though, the SALT

II

accord signed by Carter and

Brezhnev would not have made much difference anyway, in terms
the arms race.

As the administration explained on several

the treaty allowed the U.S.

of

abating

occasions,

to move forward with plans to deploy not

only the MX, but the Trident submarine system;

air-,

sea-,

and ground-

launched cruise missiles; cruise missile carrier aircraft; cruise and

Pershing
all

II

missiles in Europe; and

counterf or ce-enhanci ng weapons

outbreak of peace.

a

—

new long-range bomber.

These are

hardly cause for celebrating an

Vance writes of the "deep sense

of

satisfaction"

felt by the Carter negotiating team as the president signed the SALT

Treaty on June 18.

The satisfaction is understandable, if codifying

enormous U.S. advantages over the Soviets was the goal.
agreement, Vance asserts:

Of

the final

II
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I
was confident that the treaty could stand up well
an objective debate.
It was a balanced, carefully
wrought set of agreements that left us with virtually full
freedom of action to modernize our strategic forces in
every area of interest, while requiring a significant reduction in Soviet strategic forces. 53

in

The treaty was so "balanced" and "carefully wrought" that Brzezinski

actually could support it.
After the Vienna summit, and as the administration was parading

witness after witness before the Senate Foreign Relations committee to

advocate the virtues

of

combining its military buildup with approval

of

the treaty, Carter announced the second half of his MX decision -- his

preferred basing mode.

(For

a

sense of the tenor of the times, recall

that this announcement came on the same day as the President went on

television to quell the uproar over the monumentally ridiculous,

Democratically-baited red herring

of

Soviet combat troops in Cuba.)

Justifying the move on the grounds that

it

would strengthen deterrence

and meet the threat of Minuteman vulnerability, the president sketched

basing plans for
will

a

mobile MX ICBM system on September

7.

"CTlhis system

enhance our Nation's security," he assured, saying it "is not

bargaining chip.
security.

It's

a

a

system that America needs and will have for its

1,34

The basic details of the plan have been well publicized and do not
55
need close scrutiny here.

Suffice to say, the plan employed multiple

protective shelters (MPS) configured in

a

"racetrack" pattern.

5*

Spread

plan entailed
out across the Great Basin desert in Nevada and Utah, the

200 missiles

(each with ten nuclear warheads)

to be shuttled among 4600

system per
missile shelters (23 per site) on oval roadways, one roadway
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missile.

The elaborate shell

game was thought necessary to achieve the

degree of deception and mobility requisite with
some notion

invulnerability.

It

carried

stated price tag of $33 billion in 1980

a

dollars, but virtually no one

of

took,

that figure seriously.

Pentagon cost

figures are legendary for being understated and unreliable.

Indeed,

more disinterested assessments placed the cost of the MX project
in the

range of $55 billion to well over $100 billion." 7

Brigadier General in charge

As the Air Force

selling the MX plan to residents of

of

Nevada conceded under questioning, "This is man's largest project. """
It

was common to hear that the scope of the project would dwarf the

pyramids of Egypt.
cost,

Yet even with such Rube Goldberg complexity, massive

and environmental

upheaval, the MPS scheme was no more certain to

ensure the deception necessary to achieve (in theory)

i

nvul ner ab

i 1

ty

than any of the other 40-odd basing plans the Air Force has come up with
over the years.

A

sense of the poverty of the system's logic can be

gotten by considering that in the absence of

a

agreement, plans existed for building thousands

shelters

seems, was

of

additional missile

the Soviets responded by expanding their number of warheads

if

to target

suitable arms control

all
a

the original

4600 shelters.®*

National security, it

spiraling, endless proposition.

President Carter provided

a

hint of the deeper logic of the MX,

an

interview with

a

group of editors after his September

announcement.

Responding to

a

question about the wisdom of the U.S.

though,

in

always maintaining its "defensive posture" in the face

of

"aggressiveness," Carter claimed the MX "gives our country
defense or attack capability." 60

7

Soviet
a

better

This attack capability is not often
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raised publicly, for reasons mentioned earlier.

Defense Information --

a

wel

1

-respected

But as the Center For

(becasue it is staffed by

retired admirals and generals) Washington-based organization opposed to

excessive military spending -- argues, disapprovingly:

Simple logic leads to the conclusion that the MX is a
first strike weapon.
There is no other logical mission
for a system which is designed with the power and accuracy
to destroy ICBM launchers. 61
The MX makes no sense as anything but an instrument of first strike.
Its pinpoint accuracy is not necessary except to preemptively attack

hardened missiles.
useless.

It

As a second

strike, retaliatory weapon, it is

would be aimed at empty missile silos, not exactly high

priority targets.

As the saying goes,

with counterforce missiles, you

either "use em, or lose em."
The fleeting candor of Carter's "attack" comment was offset by

countless standard invocations
deterrence.

of

the national security goal of goals:

However, administration documents illustrate how confused

attempts to justify this goal can become.

In

responding to congressional inquiry, William

a

J.

fall

1979 letter

Perry, Carter's Deputy

Assistant for National Security Affairs, made the following argument:

regard to the first strike capability of MX, I should
emphasize that we have not changed our basic strategy,
Deploying MX will not
which is and remains to deter war.
give us a disarming first-strike capability against the
Soviet Union, since the Soviets would still have large and
62
powerful strategic forces remaining after an MX strike.
In

Perry's case here is absolutely correct.

As we will

see later,

strike, though we pursue it, is probably unattainable.

But if

a

first

one

missile
reverses his logic, it also absolutely refutes the Minuteman
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vulnerability argument used by all administrations,
Republican and
Democratic, since the problem surfaced in the
1960's.
would have "large and powerful" forces left after

attempt, the U.S.

a

the Soviets

If

U.S.

first strike

also certainly would have such forces remaining

Soviets struck first.

In

fact,

larqer and more, powerful because

the U.S.
a

the

if

forces remaining would be

proportionally smaller numhpr

of

u.S.

missiles (roughly 25 percent, to the Soviets 75 percent) are land-based,
the most vulnerable leg of the triad.

Carter

s

MRS race track system generated rising public concern in

late-1979 and 1980.

While some groups opposed the system and its

justification outright -- reacting negatively to the idea
such
a

a

large chunk of the west into

of

turning

"warhead sponge," as the target

a

of

saturation attack -- the most frequent opposition centered on the

environmental

impact of the project, particularly its potentially

devastating effect on the region's water supply.

In

July 1979, polls

showed that 63 percent of the people in the Nevada-Utah area supported
the MRS system in their states;
to 39 percent.* 5

by February 1980,

support had plummeted

The governors of the two states opposed the basing

mode selected by the administration.

But as the public posture of Utah

Governor Scott Matheson indicates, much

of

the "opposition" to the MX

plan wholeheartedly supported the ICBM vulnerability argument and also

supported the need for an MX system.* 4

Often this resulted in alternate

proposals to involve other states in the project so as to minimize the
impact to any one region or state, or plans to base the MX in the air or
on the sea.

225

Reacting to these concerns, the Carter administration in May 1980

announced revisions of its MRS system.

Most importantly, the new

variation would array the missile's protective shelters in
fashion, abandoning the racetrack oval for

a

a

"drag strip."

linear

Defense

Secretary Brown contended that this modification would save considerable
amounts land and would be less costly.
of

the system remained unchanged

shelters), although

(eg.

The other basic characteristics
the number of missiles and

new shelter design was contemplated.

a

Technical aspects were not the most crucial development

system in 1980, however.

of

the MX

Changes in the nation's political climate were

paramount, although it is essential to keep in mind that the president's
two major

1979 MX decisons preceded these climatic alterations. 65

the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December

requested the SALT

II

In

1979, Carter

treaty be withdrawn from Senate consideration.

Although there was little or no chance

the agreement being ratified

of

under any circumstances, pre- or post-invasion, the Soviet incursion
Coupled with the seizing of

obviated the need for this eventuality.

American hostages in Iran, and the impending presidential election, U.S.
policy toward the Soviet Union turned increasingly hostile.
U.S.

Ambassador to Moscow and historian George Kennan reflected, with

proper establishment anxiety, in February:
has there been so far-reaching
in

As former

the capital." 66

A

a

"Never since World War

militarization

of

II

thought and discourse

heightened Cold War atmosphere pervaded as

Congress authorized the Pentagon to proceed with full-scale development
of

the final Carter MX plan on August

the security of the United States."

1,

calling the system "vital to

But the event most boldly
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confirming the central status

of

the revelation of Presidential

Directive 59

Leaked to the press only

Congress, and only

the MX in U.S.

a

strategic thinking was

(PD-59)

few days after the MX action in

few days before the Democratic convention, PD-59

a

provided the first public articulation

war-fighting strategy.

of

the administration's nuclear

The directive followed some earlier secret

directives (notably PD-18

of

mid-1977) that had called for thorough

review of strategic targeting options.

Brzezinski's aide Major General

William Odom drafted the plan, which called for preparation to fight
limited nuclear war, and to carry out decapitating strikes against

Soviet political and military command structures.

Counterforce

targeting options had emerged from the shadows once again.

A

spate of

articles and columns appeared decrying the fact that the U.S. was now
"thinking the unthinkable."

Of

course, such thoughts were far from

novel;

their emergence now simply confirmed

over

decade.

a

a

trend underway for well

This time, however, the maturation of the doctrine was

apparent, including military objectives easily interpreted as moving
beyond even "limited" nuclear conflict. 67

Moreover, the strategy meshed

with several new technologies coming on line to make

a

U.S.

first strike

technically feasible.
Such war-fighting plans verified the triumph of Brzezinski's view
of

east-west relations.

He had outlasted the primary detente-minded

adivsers in the administration.

With protracted nuclear conflict on the

agenda of options, Brzezinski had convinced Carter

intimidatory value

a

of

the potential

nation might accrue by virtue of commanding the

military resources and philosophy

of

counterforce.

The stance created
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by PD-59 fit the president's precarious political

struggled to project himself as
for reelection.

a

situation as he

tough, even nationalistic, candidate

What had eluded both McNamara, during the Kennedy-

Johnson years, and Schlesinger, during Nixon's second term, Carter
was
on

the brink of

achieving.

With PD-59, he forged the synthesis of

counterforce theory and practice.

President Reagan:

The Lion Reigns

Whereas President Carter's embrace

of

counterforce doctrine

signified the final leg of his relatively measured journey rightward in
foreign policy, punctuated as it was by exogenous factors, President
Reagan did not need to learn any stark lessons

naturally thrived in
issues of nuclear war

Strangelove

—

of

Realpolitik.

milieu of Cold War militarism.

a

kind of of f handedness

a

that was unsettling.

encourage and legitimize

a

A

—

He

Yet he brought to

something akin to Dr.

danger of PD-59 was that it would

sanguine attitude toward nuclear war on the

part of the national security bureaucracy and future presidents.

danger received confirmation within the Reagan White House,

a

This

fact to

which the casual story told by Ed Meese attests:

Cap Weinberger came in to see
"Mr. President, you know, the
hard time on the MX missile.
the Hallmark missile.. .1 hope
if we do, I want the Russians
68
to send the very best."

This kind of

a

the President, and he said,
press has been giving us a
suggest that we rename it
I
But
we never have to do it.
enough
to know that we cared

cavalier attitude toward such

a

cataclysmic possibility

has surfaced repeatedly during the Reagan years, though more frequently
in

his first term.

It

stems,

in

part,

from the prevalence within
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Reagan's national security apparatus

of

nuclear strategists openly

dedicated to the war-fighting proposition that nuclear conflict
is

in

some sense "winnable."

Colin Gray is an exemplar of this war-fighting school.

In

1980

Gray co-authored an article entitled "Victory Is Possible" in which he

argued that nuclear war not only is winnable, but the president needs
the strategic capability in initiate such action:

The West needs to devise ways in which it can employ
strategic nuclear forces coercively....
American
strategic forces do not exist soley for the purpose
of deterring a Soviet nuclear threat or attack against
the United States itself.
Instead, they are intended
to support U.S. foreign policy, as reflected, for example, in the commitment to preserve Western Europe
against aggression.
Such a function requires American
strategic forces that would enable a president to
initiate strategic nuclear use for coercive, though
politically defensive, purposes....
If American
nuclear power is to support U.S. foreign policy objectives, the United States must possess the ability
to wage nuclear war rationally. 69

Reagan appointed Gray,

a

staff member of the Hudson Institute, to the

advisory board of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and also named
him consultant to the State Department.
in

Arguing that "victory or defeat

nuclear is possible," Gray clearly endorses the first outcome

prevailing.

Elsewhere he has written favorably

of

of

the MX missile's war-

fighting potential to help the U.S. prevail, contending that "survivable
MX

I

CBM deployment is the key to victory-denial

for the Soviets

MX

cannot guarantee success to American arms, but it should ensure failure
for the Soviet Union." 70

Other Reagan defense advisers have made similarly provocative

pronouncements, some laced with biblical references to Armageddon
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ushered in by nuclear conflict.

And then there is T. K.

Jones, named

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering,

Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces.

A

staunch believer in the

survivability of nuclear war, with the proper civil defense
precautions,
Jones created
"Dig
of

a

a

stir by recommending that would-be nuclear war survivers

hole, cover it with

dirt on top....

going to make it.
that Jones'
team.
in

If

a

couple of doors and then throw three feet

there are enough shovels to go around, everybody's

It's the dirt that does it." 71

eccentricity is typical

My claim here is not

Reagan and his national security

of

But his ideas grew out of the widely-shared administration belief

the efficacy and necessity of civil

defense measures, and -- central

to Reagan's military policy -- the unanimous assertion of U.S.

ICBM

vulnerability to Soviet attack.
The unreal

nature of the military side

of

Reaganism can best be

capsulized in two fundamental myths, both directly connected to the

president's actions on behalf
the "window of vulnerability."

of

the MX:

the "decade of neglect," and

Reagan employs the "decade

thesis to justify his crusade to "rearm" America.

accusation

of

of

neglect"

According to the

neglect, the U.S. unilaterally disarmed during the 1970's,

leaving the new president no choice but to "repair" the country's
"broken" military machine.

The familiar Reagan charge goes like this:

When we took, office in 1981, the Soviet Union had
been engaged for 20 years in the most massive military
Clearly, their goal was not to catch
buildup in history.
Yet the United States remained a
us.
surpass
to
but
up
a decade of neglect
1 970
the
in
spectator
virtual
s
capabilities. 72
defense
on
our
toll
severe
that took a
'

,
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There is superficial plausibility to the charge:

following the

peak years of spending for the Vietnam War, U.S. military expenditures

were down throughout much of the decade, bottoming out in fiscal year
1975. 73

This decline was due primarily to U.S. disengagement from

Vietnam and the aftermath

of

the war, which included Congressional

reticence toward military spending and persistantly high rates
inflation.

Threat."

Notice that these factors are independent

of

any "Soviet

The concomitant Reagan charge -- borrowed from the CPD's

aforementioned Team

B

fiction

—

was that the Soviets had undertaken

massive increase in military spending during these years of
U.S.

of

a

relative

ebb in expenditures and, relatedly, had overtaken the U.S.

expenditures.

a

in

But both charges are false, except if grounded in the

discredited Team

B

accounting methods. 74

Soviet military outlays

actually were gradual but steady throughout the period in question,
rarely rising above

2

percent per year. 73

And if NATO and Warsaw Pact

figures are included in the overall spending balance, the scale is
tipped even more toward the west.
While bogus in general, the "decade

of

neglect" thesis becomes

utterly ludicrous when applied to the Carter years.

Actual defense

would
outlays rose more than 12 percent during Carter's four years, and

have been higher if not for inflation.

Increases in his last two

budgets were particularly precipitous.

While this does not measure up

during his first term
to Reagan's almost 30 percent increase in outlays

—

at

approximately $1.1 trillion, the largest sustained peacetime

-- it hardly constitutes "neglect."
military buildup in U.S. history
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Moreover, Carter was responsible for major additions
in the area

of

strategic nuclear forces, including the MX missile,
Trident submarine
(with the new Trident

II

missile), stealth bomber, and cruise missile

-

programs, as well as other military areas
in

a

point Brzezinski has made

defense of his former boss against charges that he was "soft"
on the

Soviet Union 7e
.

has observed,

As one careful

analyst of the Carter military program

"the Reagan rhetoric tof the 'decade of neglect'] tended

to obscure the fact tht Reagan's program was mostly an acceleration of

the buildup alredy begun under Carter." 7 ?

In

light of the real military

affinity between the two presidents, Carter understandably has been
upset by Reagan's repeated attempts to pin the "neglect" charge on him.
In

an

a

front page story on March

1986,

2,

the New York Times carried

interview (arranged at Carter's request) to respond to Reagan's

assertion the week before that he had not increased military spending

modernized strategic forces.

or

The former president was "irate," saying

Reagan "habitually" misrepresents the record of U.S. military programs
with contentions "he knows are not true and which he personally promised
me not

to repeat." 70

Carter pointed with pride to his contribution to

defense spending and strategic upgrading, saying that he and Presidents
strategic nuclear weapons

Ford and Nixon had initiated almost all

programs.

(Ignoring contrary evidence, Reagan has made demonstrably

misleading claims, such as his assertion, in the middle

of

Congressional

debate over MX funding, that after taking office "we began immediately
to make up for the irresponsibility of

the three legs of our nuclear triad.

the seventies and to revitalize

") 7,?

"This is the first time

I

have
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gone public," Carter lamented, "but some of his statements
are almost
more than

a

human being can bear." 80

Although as we will see, circumstances have rendered
President
Reagan unable to use the slogan "window of vulnerability" any
longer,
the principle thesis of this second myth still

administration,

of

is deployed.

course, also had subscribed to

a

The Carter

version of the idea

that Minuteman missiles were becoming vulnerable to attack from Soviet
But this threat remained more explicitly theoretical for most of

ICBMs.

Carter's term.

It

was only as the election approached within an

atmosphere of renewed Cold War politics that administration figures
claimed
to all

a

more immediate ICBM threat, and extended it include

U.S.

forces, not just missile silos.

For Reagan,

vulnerability always has been played as more imminent,

threat

however,

direct threat

The comparative level of alarmism trumpeting

ability to deter.

to our

a

a

the alleged danger is much higher.

Of

particular value during the 1980

presidential election, the frightening window metaphor conjures up
images of thousands of Soviet missiles flying into our national home,
while we sit idly by with no recourse.

Soviet capabilities, U.S.

Or,

knowing of these awesome

leaders soon would have no choice but to

succumb to nuclear blackmail, as candidate Reagan meant when he told an

interviewer that the window soon would be open so wide "the Russians
could just take us with

a

phone call." 81

The beauty of the "window of vulnerability" thesis for the Reagan

administration has been its amorphous nature.
scenario consistently has proclaimed
percent

of

our

a

Although the CPD-inspired

Soviet ability to knock out 90

-- early,
land-based missiles, the time frame has varied
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mid,
o-f

and

late 1980's projections have been common -- as has
speculation

just how far open the window is at any one time. 02

have ensued over how to best close the window.
the concept,

its potential

for ideological

And arguments

Given the fluidity of

manipulation, it is useful to

keep in mind what the Federation of American Scientists had to say in
1974 about the Nixon-Schlesinger version

counterforce attack scenario against U.S.
is bizarre -- enormous risk,

of

a

surprise Soviet

ICBMs:

"The entire scenario

for no point. ...One can only imagine that

the Joint Chiefs have been smoking pot." 03

Today such scenarios still

offer an impaired perspective.

"Window of vulnerability" claims are deficient in

respects, some of which have been touched upon earlier.
the argument about the vulnerability of

the U.S.

strategic triad.

number of

Briefly put,

land-based ICBMs requires one to

suddenly become blind to the retaliatory capacity
of

a

of

the other two legs

Fifty percent of all U.S.

strategic

nuclear warheads are in submarines which are virtually invulnerable to
attack.

bombers.
still

And

a

Even

full
i_f_

25 percent of

our warheads are aboard long-range

the Soviets could take out 90 percent of our silos, we

would retain the vast majority of our strategic weapons.

It

is

implausible in the extreme to assume any adversary would harbor the
intention

of

a

first strike against such

a

force structure.

Moreover,

suicidal venture, the liklihood

in

the event the Soviets intended such

of

them being technically capable of doing it are equally fantastic,

a

given the enormous problems of accuracy and operational reliability

missiles under actual war conditions.

of
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The details at the massive uncertainties of
well

known.

0*

a

first strike are

Without delving too deeply here into this somewhat arcane

(but actually comprehensible)

world ot technical nuclear calculus, they

include problems of missile bias, the amount

a

missile drifts from its

flight path due to uncorrected gravitational field anomalies.
to overcome bias never

Testing

establishes anything approaching certainty,

or

even high probability, since neither country test fires its missiles
over the north pole,

exchange.

the path they actually would travel in

The general

accuracy

of

a

a

nuclear

missile is influenced by other

factors as well, such as fratricide, which is the lingering effect

of

debris, wind currents and shock waves from earlier warhead detonations
on

incoming warheads.

Warheads are extremely sensitive to such

environmental phenomena, and since pinpoint accuracy is necessary to
destroy

a

missile silo, even small decreses in precision can render

warhead useless for its intended job.

Reliability and readiness also

enter into calculations of vulnerability.
U.S.

a

Neither the Soviets nor the

can be sure what percentage of their total force would fail to

launch, or fail at other phases of its flight, although significant

failure is virtually certain.
the U.S.
of

is for

a

And in the area of general readiness,

number of reasons conceded to have

a

higher percentage

its nuclear forces at an advanced state of readiness necessary for

a

first strike.

Missile accuracy is measured by circular error probable (CEP),
defined as the radius

of

a

circle centered on

the warheads are expected to fall.

accuracy.

a

target within which half

The smaller the CEP, the greater the

it
The MX has an estimated CEP of 300 feet, meaning in theory
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should be able to deliver five of its 10 warheads
to within 300 feet of
their target.

With the deployment of the Navstar global
positioning

satellite system, midcourse corrections for ICBMs
(MX, Trident
and others)

could bring the CEP for the MX to less than 100
feet.

most accurate Soviet

evenhandedness

,

and knowledge of history,

technological edge over the Soviets.

The

accuracy, since in the absense

is transparently false.

of

Even

a

modicum

would grant the U.S.

wide

a

Vet proponents of the "window"

thesis exaggerate claims about the pace and quality
in

II,

ICBM has an estimated CEP in the neighborhood
of

600 feet, but they too are working to improve accuracy.
of

and

I

of

Soviet advances

such improvements the window thesis

As Federation of

American Scientists arms

control analyst Christopher Paine points out:

Crediting the Soviets now or in the future, with
"worst-case" capabilities which they might obtain 10
years hence ... is one of the defense establishment's
primary techniques for selling new weapons programs
to Congress and the public.
In the case of the ^BOSS "window of vulnerability," the available evidence
points to a distortion and exaggeration of Soviet
(his emphasis) 35
capabi 1 ities.
,

.

.

.

Although Paine's assertion is valid, what needs to be added is

acknowledgment that the Soviets are, by far, more vulnerable to

a

first

strike threat because of their previously-mentioned force structure

.

top-heavy as it is with relatively vulnerable land-based ICBMs.
Whatever the vulnerability of Minuteman missiles -- and the evidence
above suggests is is greatly overstated -- the Soviets are saddled with

three-quarters

of

their strategic forces on the ground.

they are, vulnerability scenarios must be seen as
-- hence,

a

danger -- to the Soviets than to the U.S.

Farfetched as

greater possibility
a4>
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Lest we be distracted by the details of the above
discussion of
the implausibi

1

ity of vulnerability to

a

first strike,

it

reiteration that the MX is irrelevant to such scenarios.
does not make American forces any less vulnerable.
to

vulnerability

the MX

is

s

bears
new missile

A

Equally irrelevant

characteristic degree of precision

.

New

missiles with sophisticated capabilities have no impact on Minuteman
vulnerability.
-- or

Only

a

different basing mode for older land-based forces

abandoning them altogether while enhancing our submarine force,

thus eliminating them as first strike targets -- genuinely would address

concerns about their vulnerability.

Nevertheless, armed with his two

myths, which together instilled in him the belief that the Soviets had

achieved

a

"margin of superiority" over the U.S. in strategic nuclear

weaponry, President Reagan joined the MX fight.

Needless to say, Reagan viewed the missile system as
variable in the quest to close the window

of

a

vulnerability.

that rationale was becoming increasingly untenable.

key

However,

The first

administration action on the MX came in March 1981, when Secretary
Defense Caspar Weinberger established
basing modes. 87

a

of

committee to explore alternative

Opposition to the system had been gaining strength

in

Nevada and Utah, and the administration had doubts about the complexity
and survivability of the Carter multiple shelter scheme.

The committee,

chaired by Nobel prize-winning physicist Charles Townes, was to report
July

1,

1981,

but in fact

until March 1982.

Townes'

a

summary of its findings was not made public
panel

found "no practical mode" of basing

ICBMs on land that would ensure survivability,
a

a

finding that jibed with

major basing study released by the Office of Technology Assessment in
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March 1981.

When two of Reagan's Senate allies, Jake Garn

close friend Paul Laxalt

(R.

Nevada)

(R.

Utah)

and

announced their opposition to the

Carter plan envisioned for their states, the president
the accumulated
weight of opinion left little choice but to search for
an alternative MX

route
On October

2,

1981

Reagan formally scrapped the multiple shelter

basing system and, hoping to make the MX more saleable, reduced the

requested number of missiles to 100.

With an obligatory reference to

the neeed to forestall the opening of

a

"window of vulnerability," he

said that up to 40 missiles would be housed temporarily in existing but

hardened Titan and Minuteman silos, the very silos under the gun from
the alleged Soviet threat.
for

In

the meantime, he outlined plans to search

alternative permanent basing schemes, including air mobility, deep

underground basing and silos protected by ballistic missile defense
systems.

All

of

these plans were mired in long-standing problems,

though, and testified to the fact the president was clutching at straw
in

an

effort to rationalize

a

fundamentally flawed missile.

Congress by and large supportive

ground-based leg

of

of

Even

a

the idea of strengthening the

the triad, and generally deferential to Pentagon

strategies of all types, was finding

it

hard to square the new plan

(and

early 1982 revisions) with its stated aim of promoting invulnerability.

Whatever misgivings Congress had, however, did not prevent legislators
from continuing to authorize money for MX development, although

deadlines were set for final administration selection
mode

of

a

secure basing
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The next major administration push
1982,

as

-for

the MX came November 22,

Congressional basing mode selection deadline neared.

a

That

evening the president went on national television to unveil
his latest
MX

plan.

Earlier in the day, in

a

move that would have made Orwell

blush with pride, he had announced that henceforth the MX,

fighter's weapon
"Peacekeeper."

if

a

war-

there ever was one, officially would be called

The president pulled out all the stops in his effort to

introduce the waiting public to the ways

of

address with multi-colored charts portraying
Soviet arms buildup, along side

a

peace, augmenting his
a

dynamic and relentless

pathetic, weak-kneed U.S. stasis.

You often hear that the United States and the Soviet
Union are in an arms race.
Well, the truth is that
while the Soviets Union has raced, we have not.
As
can see from this blue line... 00
Ah

yes, the blue line.

A

relationship

to exist between the magnitude of

embellish

it

of

of

direct proportionality seems

the deception and the need to

with the trappings of objectivity.

his listeners,
deal

of

red and

"I

a

The president assured

could show you chart after chart where there's
much lesser amount of U.S. blue."

Indeed.

a

great

The point

Reagan's theatrics was to support his contention that "the MX is the

right missile at the right time."
to be based

known as

a

in

the MX was

100 closely spaced superhar dened silos in Wyoming.

Also

"dense pack" mode, the plan hoped to maximize invulnerability

by using the effects of

True,

As for the big decision,

fratricide to throw off incoming Soviet ICBMs.

the Soviets would know exactly where all

100 missiles are,

they would be spaced in such close proximity that to destroy some

but
of

them would ensure that others survived because some attacking missiles
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would be thrown off course.
the president,

is that

One rather obvious problem, unaddressed by

the fratricide effect can be expectd to throw off

whatever surviving U.S. missiles were launched

in

retaliation.

Despite the charts with blue and red lines, "dense pack" did not
even make it through the Christmas holiday.
for Congress to swallow,

for roughly

1

1

The plan proved too hard

and in late December the president's request

billion for MX procurement was denied.

Congress did,

however, approve funds for research and development on the missile and
basing, asking the president once again to reexamine basing modes and

report back after March

1983.

1,

Reagan established on January

3

Ushering in the new year, President
his second MX commission, this time

headed by retired General Brent Scowcroft, former national security

adviser to President Ford.

Forces
final

The president's Commission on Strategic

(usually referred to as the Scowcroft Commission)

report in April. 09

The report made

the further development of U.S.

a

issued its

straightforward argument for

counterforce capability, saying that in

order to "frustrate Soviet efforts at [nuclear] blackmail," and the

accompanying advantages

of

political coercion, the U.S.

must be able to put at risk those types of Soviet
targets -- including hardened ones such as military
bunkers and facilities, missile silos, nuclear weapons
and other storage, and the rest -- which the Soviet
leaders have given every indication by their actions
they value most, and which constitute their tools of
We cannot afford the delusion
control and power.
that Soviet leaders -- human though they are and
are going
cautious though we hope they will be
to be deterred by exactly the same concerns that

would dissuade us. 90
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The commission found

a

place for the MX within this counterforce

strategy, namely providing military planners the "ability to destroy

Soviet military targets, hardened or otherwise."

recommended immediate deployment
older Minuteman and Titan
In

II

of

order to justify this basing method in vulnerable, unhardened

"window of vulnerability."

window never existed.
of

MX

100 MX missiles in existing silos of

missiles scheduled to be decommissioned.

silos, the commission had to drop
the

Accordingly, the panel

a

In

bomb of its own -- it slammed shut

essence, the commission said the

There was enormous irony in Reagan's own group

devotees putting the lie to his favorite slogan

magnitude

the deception proved too much.

of

of

fear, but the

With measured words, the

commission report insists that "the different components

of

our

strategic forces should be assessed collectively and not in isolation,"
for

whereas it is highly desirable that a component of the
strategic forces be survivable when it is viewed
separately, it makes a major contribution to deterrence
even if its survivability depends in substantial measure
on the existence of one of the other components of the
force. S 1
’

In

the language of establishment admonition, the commisison gently

chided those who "miscast" the issue

of

ICBM vulnerability by viewing

them in isolation, thus pushing for the quick deployment of an almost

totally survivable new ICBM.

vulnerability is unwarranted

This haste and sense of immediate
if

U.S.

strategic forces are viewed in

terms of their "mutual survivability."

Members

of

Congress were upset that MX survivability no longer

that ICBM
mattered very much, particularly when their memories told them
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vulnerability, in the words

of

Senator Gary Hart,

were talking about.

in

the view of the Scowcroft report,

But

programs sorely needed

a

"was precisely what we

weapons

"greater degree of national consensus," so

little historical rearranging seemed in order.

The commission offered

other recommendations as well, notably the development of

single-warhead ICBM (since dubbed "Mi dgetman"

)

a

a

small,

to augment the MX;

research aimed at resolving the uncertainties regarding silo hardness,
to

apply to the MX,

a

small

ICBM,

and other future ICBMS;

accelerated research, development and testing

of

an

and

antiballistic

missile system.
The Scowcroft Commission's findings effectively have framed the MX

debate over the last few years.

And despite the fact that it censured

the "window" thesis and its proponents, both the now-explicitly-

vulnerable MX, and President Reagan's credibility on military issues,
have not lost their appeal.

Yet the deterrence argument stands exposed.

The Scowcroft Commission said deterrence "requires us to determine, as
best we can, what would deter them [the Soviets] from considering

aggression, even in

a

The MX represents the most tempting

crisis...."

target in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal.

serves as the prime object of

a

In

Minuteman silos, it

preemptive Soviet attack.

Indeed, to

Soviet military planners, it must invite attack, since its principle

utility can only be to facilitate
In

U.S.

first strike.

the wake of Reagan's endorsement of the Scowcroft findings, the

MX was successfully test
of

a

the first 21 missiles.

flown, and Congress authorized the production

Since then, the most significant controversy

over the project occurred in the spring of

1985 when,

after considerable
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debate about the specific number, Congress placed

a

limit of 50 on the

number of missiles that can be housed in Minuteman silos.

accutely influenced by Reagan's skillful lobbying.

In

a

Debate was
radio address

on

March 15, he described the Minuteman missiles as "aging."

of

like

a

1963 jalopy with some new parts," he explained.’ 3

"It's sort
He failed

to mention that Minuteman missiles have been upgraded continually right

through the early 1980

s,

and that

"some new parts" on the Minuteman III

missiles include an improved guidance system giving them (theoretical)
accuracy in excess of the Soviet's most accurate ICBMs, and higher

explosive yield.

To the "jalopy"

arms negotiations gambit.

gambit he added manipulation

With U.S.

of

the

negotiators engaging the Soviets in

Geneva, he made the case that "the rug shouldn't be pulled out from
under them."

This is

MX was linked

to arms negotiations in the Carter

when the SALT

II

The spring

approval of
lifted.

a

a

variation on an old theme; as we have seen, the
administration as well,

Treaty was on the line.
1985 compromise stipulated that the president obtain

new,

more secure basing mode before this limit can be

Following the Reykjavik Summit in October 1986, his second with

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Reagan began the process
with this requirement.

In

of

complying

his address to the nation upon his return,

the president had stressed the importance for arms control of the

distinction between words and deeds:

—

again in Reykjavik as I had in
told Mr Gorbachev
-place far less weight upon the
Americans
we
Geneva
meetings as these, than upon
at
words that are spoken
the deeds that follow.
I
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Only two months later, the president unveiled
his latest deed on behalf
of

the MX.

option.
call

The new proposal resurrected the discredited
"rail garrison"

Although the details remain to be worked out,
initial plans

for 25 six-car

trains with each train carrying two MX missiles,

thus constituting the additional 50 missiles.* 3
at

air bases

(10 possibile sites already have been selected)

time of national
rail

lines.

The trains would remain

It

until

a

emergency, when they would be dispersed along domestic
is unreasonable,

course, to expect that the Pentagon

of

would yet come forward with its plans for resolving the tricky old

"public interface" problem, as well as the assorted dilemmas of

environmental

impact, vulnerability

attention), and the like.

(if

that still merits any official

Review of such matters will commence this

coming January, the same year the 50 original MX missiles in Minuteman
silos will become fully operational.
the time comes,

the effort will

The only certainty is that when

be made to railroad the new scheme as

essential to our "national security."
The future of national

security and arms control remains unclear.

The Reykjavik talks ran into the Star Wars juggernaut and Reagan's

unwillingness to consider serious restrictions on its development and
deployment.
a

The strategic defense initiative

protective shield that will

does

a

defense

of

(SDI)

is being marketed

"make nuclear weapons obsolete."

as

"How

the United States threaten the Soviet Union or anyone

else?" the president wondered aloud after the summit.

takes the idea of SDI as

a

In

fact,

leakproof astrodome very seriously.

the Scowcroft Commission confirms,

defense establishment that short

of

it

an

no one

But as

is commonly understood within the

impenetrable shield,

a

Star Wars

244

ballistic missile defense (BUD) system would have enormous
value in
offering "point defense" for U.S. strategic nuclear weapons.

These

intermediate utilities," as they are called, like point defense,
could
among other things provide cover for vulnerable weapons systems
like the

Thus they would enhance the security not of people, but of

MX.

counterforce weapons.
An

SD 1 -MX

link would underscore something that already is an

accomplished fact:

the complete disappearance of meaningful distinction

between "offense" and "defense" in nuclear warfare.

While counterforce

weapons continue to be researched, designed and built, we will be
subject to ever more presidential rhetoric about their contribution to
"national security" and "deterrence."

The public rationalizations for

weapons such as the MX will get increasingly thin, as the clamour for
them thickens.

In

1981

Defense Secretary Weinberger made the following

pitiful plea as he initiated the Townes Committee investigation into MX

basing modes:
5’

it."'

7

"We need the MX missile,

please tell us where to put

More than six years later, the Reagan administration still has

'

no publicly credible idea of

Conclusion:
It

The Structural

is almost

how to solve this dilemma.

Inertia of National Security

incredible, until you ponder the routineness

that 50 MX missiles will

be fully operational

Their deployment now cannot be stopped.

by the end of

of

next year.

And the others are on the way.

Their existence stands as testimony to the structural inertia of

a

weapons system flying under the the all-purpose, one-thr eat-f i ts-al
banner "national security."

it,

The title of this chapter reads,

in

1

part,
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"The MX Missile Confronts Two Presidencies."
as

Weapons like the MX appear

life, as if they live and breathe, requiring that we
do the only

thing humanely justifiable and find them
are rhetorical

a

comfortable home.

Presidents

gardeners whose job is to nurse these little sapplings to

health with stock phrases about "security" and "defense."

As one arms

analyst has written of Reagan's MX plan:

The MX, it appears, will be deployed in silos, for
no other reason than the sheer momentum of its production
process. The production and deployment of the weapon have
become ends in themselves, serving no larger plan or
purpose than the Administration's diffuse and inchoate
desire for "strength. va

The argument about momentum and structural

too far, however.

For there

is. a

to complement the ambitions of

inertia can be taken

larger purpose to the MX.

Its goal

counterforce doctrine, which seek to

privide the U.S. with the ability to fight limited nuclear wars,
launch
It

a

is

or

successful preemptive first strike against the Soviet Union.

is within this

(largely private) overall framework that programs like

the MX take on their

(largely public)

appearance of inevitability.

If

the MX confronted Presidents Carter and Reagan, and not the other way

around,
of

it

is because neither

one of them wanted to confront the logic

national security driving the missile toward deployment.

President Carter came to office intending, at least rhetorically,
to question this logic.

As

I

have indicated, he was mindful of the

"shadow over the earth," and saw as

a

contributory factor the weapons

procurement process, about which he observed that "once
momentum, it is almost impossible to stop."

it

gains

But as the political

climate of the country grew darker, particularly around the midpoint

of
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his term, he could do nothing to lighten things up.

Indeed, even as he

signed an arms control agreement, he was lengthening the
"shadow over
the earth."

The factors contributing to the shift toward militarism
had

little to do with the "Soviet threat," with the sole exception
of the

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, whose linkage to arms control
is of

dubious value and which, at any rate, postdated the rightward turn of
U.S.

foreign policy.
Without an alternative logic, without

challenge conventional notions

of

desire and

a

a

program to

national security -- steeped in

a

presumed connection between nuclear weapons and security, and fueled by
a

visceral hatred for something called "communism" and vigilance against

the "Soviet threat" -- Carter was swamped by

the end of his term it seemed as natural

a

tide of belligerence.

By

for him to be endorsing an MX

scheme as it always would seem for his successor.

offers this reflection on Soviet foreign policy:

In

his memoirs Carter

"CTlhe fact was that

when violence occurred in almost any place on earth, the Soviets or

their proxies were most likely to be at the center of it."^

Save for

intensity, this statement rivals any of Reagan's assertions that the

Soviets are "the focus of evil in the modern world."
for his part,

did not undergo

a

President Reagan,

shift on defense matters.

As with his

consistent belief that regulation inhibits the great talisman
economic growth, he had no intention

of

of

questioning any aspects

fundamental assumptions of "national security."

For him,

of

the

"national

security" needs are everywhere, always.

Congress also remained under the spell of "national security."
That body accepted wholeheartedly the definitions and goals of U.S.
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security needs underlying the various MX decisions.

Legislators found

themselves, along with the president, debating and ultimately ratifying
the details of what kind of MX system we would have.
the system.

As one MX-watcher notes,

But we would have

"Congress has consistently

authorized and appropriated funds requested for MX research and
development, and it has rejected amendments to delete funding ." 100

This

fact should give pause to political scientists wedded to conventional

theories of the presidency, and their overdrawn emphasis on the balance
of

power between the executive and legislative branches.

Concern for

this institutional balance assumes that one branch conceivably would do

something different than the other

if

the balance tipped in their

direction, something at odds with the beliefs and aims of the branch

disadvantaged by the imbalance.

But this is not

a

reasonable assumption

within the current configuration of the two institutions.
Finally, it must be said that the MX dilemma is much larger than
just the MX missile and the assorted national security rationalizations
for

its deployment discussed herein.

National security is big business.

The imperatives of corporate profitability bring

a

whole different but

related set of pressures to bear on these military-technical decisions.
With the Reagan administration, and particularly with its advocacy of

a

Star Wars program, the economics of defense are glaringly obvious.

The

torrent of defense contracts associated with Star Wars, the MX, and

a

host of other military projects shows no sign of abating.

entire edifice of the "Reagan recovery" is built upon

foundation.

a

Indeed, the

military

Perhaps the single most significant sectoral investment

military
trend in the economy over the last few years has been toward
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investment
seek,

,

as key industries such as manufacturing and transportation

to restore their

economic health under the influence of military

Keynesianism or, more appropriately, "deficitary militarism."
Thus we have come full circle.

101

Today more than ever, the

imperatives of the state -- economic growth and national security -- and
hence the imperatives of the presidency, are indissolubly intertwined.
And this bond makes the structural exigencies just that much more

dangerous for the presidency.

As presidents press ahead in their

pursuit of national security -- along with the attendant ambiguities

inherent in counterforce weaponry and the apparent bounties

of

military

spending -- the self-defeating logic of that pursuit will become clearer
and more acute.

The escalation and refinement of counterforce weapons,

and nuclear weapons generally,

accelerates the arms race and makes

The quest for national security, therefore,

nuclear war more likely.

increasingly undermines itself.
confines the thoughts and actions

This self-defeating logic tightly
of

the president.

Relaxing this logic

should be the most urgent political priority of the nuclear age.
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CHAPTER FIVE
TOWARD

A

CONCLUSION:
STRUCTURAL THEORY OF THE PRESIDENCY

There have been five considerable crises in American
history....
So far, it is clear, the hour has brought
forth the man.

—

Harold Laski

,

1

94

1

The threat is nearly invisible in ordinary ways.
a crisis of confidence.
It is a crisis that
strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of our
national will.
We can see this crisis in the growing
doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in the
loss of a unity of purpose for our Nation.
It

is

-- Jimmy Carter 2

As we came to the decade of the 80's, we faced the
worst crisis in our postwar history....
The heart of America is strong, good, and true.
The cynics were wrong -- America never was a sick
society.
We're seeing a rededication to bedrock values
of faith, family, work, neighborhood, peace, and freevalues that help bring us together as one people,
dom
the
youngest child to the most senior citizen.
from

—

—

Ronald Reagan 3

Once again, the American presidency is in crisis.

In

this year of

the carefully managed bicentennial celebration of the Constitution, the

presidency

of

Ronald Reagan is being held up to the light

not seen since the days of the Watergate hearings.

expect

a

of

scrutiny

Accordingly, we can

flurry of political scientists postulating about the office,

its strengths,

its weaknesses,

its future.
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One theorist already has seen his stock rise,
in

with

a

predictable

told you so."

"I

leading proponent of what

I

and he has weighed

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,

a

have called the restrictivist school of

thought, finds in the Iran-contra scandal confirmation of his thesis on
the "imperial

presidency."

Recall Schlesinger's argument that the

presidency becomes imperial when the constitutional balance between
presidential power and presidential accountability (especially vis-a-vis
Congress)

is upset

in

favor of an overzealous exercise of former.

Schlesinger sees the constitutional balance fluctuating
fashion throughout history.

in

a

cyclical

This danger of systemic imbalance -- "the

perennial threat to the constitutional balance"

—

resides largely in

the sphere of foreign affairs, where "the imperial temptation" is always
just one international crisis away.*

While Congress, the courts, the

press and the public strenuously exercise their role as countervailing

centers of power in the domestic sphere, they "generally lack confidence
in

their own information and judgment" when it comes to foreign policy.®

So the imperial

will

temptation lies

to challenge the chief

in

waiting, surfacing as the pol itical

executive ebbs.

President Reagan succumbed to the urge, engaging

Schlesinger characterizes as "foolish," such as the
flimflam."

On

" I

in
r

an-Ni car agua

this reading, then, the Iran-contra hearings represent

healthy reassertion

of

critics of the hearings who believe
of

a

Congress' rightful duty to check excesses of

power occurring within our system of separation of powers.

misdeeds

activities

a

tough congressional

the Reagan administration will

To those

inquiry into

cripple the office, resulting

"No one need fear
another "failed presidency," Schlesinger responds that
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that the recurrent uproar against the imperial presidency will
inflict

permanent damage on the office.

For the American presidency is

indestructable.
Every day of the congressional probe brings with it sickening new

evidence

of

the deficiency of Schl esi nger

Covered with an thick overlay

of

'

s

widely-acclaimed thesis.

apology for the existence of the

investigatory committee, deference to the witnesses, and hopelessly
misframed questions (eg.

"Richard Secord:

patriot or profiteer?") the

hearings verily shout out the daydream-like quality
Congress can be expected to restore balance to

apparatus tilted toward the president.
it

well

with his observation:

a

of

the argument that

foreign policy

Columnist Alexander Cockburn put

"True to gloomy predictions, Republicans,

with the slack-jawed acquiescence and even vociferous support of most

Democrats, have turned the joint congressional investigation into

a

pro-

contra rally ." 7
We should have expected this bipartisan cheerleading for the

Only days before the hearings

essence of Reagan's policy, of course.

commenced, Senate Intelligence Committee Chair David Boren

expressed what he considers to be the crux

of

(D.

Oklahoma)

the Iran-contra affair:

The American people should understand that the
worst thing that happened here, and the most dangerous thing that happened, is that the whole constituDid the president
tional process was perverted.
and spirit of the
letter
the
out
carry
faithfully
in fact, did he
and,
ignoring
it,
he
was
law. ..or
0
emphasis
subvert the process? (my
)

Important as laws such as the Boland amendments are, crucial though

cooperation and consultation between the executive and legislative
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branches surely is, the fact remains that Congress
as
for

a

body does not

second oppose the notion that the United States
has the right to

sit in judgment over the internal

backyard.

affairs of

a

sovereign nation "in our

The gist of Reagan's case against the "Communist
menace" in

our hemisphere,

cruel

a

the assertion that Nicaragua suffers under the heal
of

Sandinista dictatorship, goes unquestioned on Capitol Hill.

a

The

policymaking process is at issue before the joint committee, not the
policy itself.

Schl esi nger

'

s

contention that an invigorated Congress

offers the remedy for America's occasional lapse into global messianism
thus is wide of the

restored; only
indicate.

a

There is no substantive policy balance to be

mark,.

procedural

imbalance exists, as Boren's comments

The presidency may on occasion become more or less

procedural ly imperial, but the historic, defining character

substance

of

of

the

foreign policy always has been steeped in the imperial

U.S.

urge, and particularly so toward Central America.

**

One of the central purposes of my study has been to fundamentally

challenge the way political science examines and theorizes about the
presidency.
of

Schl esi nger

'

s

restrictivist perspective is but one example

the dominant theoretical orientation of the field of presidential

studies to which

I

take exception.

Chapter

1

surveys major works in the

discipline, breaking them down into two major schools

of

thought.

expansivist school argues for vigorous presidential leadership
political system.
in

of

The
the

With the image of Franklin Roosevelt's tenure firmly

mind, expansivists stake out

a

position which commends the active,

power-wielding, and programmatic chief executive,

a

perspective that

perhaps finds its ultimate expression Richard Neustadt's equation

of

the
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good of the country with the good of the presidency.

congratulatory glow

of

Although the

the expansivist sun is not as bright as it was

from the immediate postwar period through the mid-1960's,
such ideas are
still

with us.

The works of expansivist James MacGregor Burns,

for

one,

have received special attention of late in the formulation
of programs
to overcome the deadlock and

incoherence that can result from

political system of divided powers.

a

10

The danger inherent in the expansivist logic fueled the

alternative orientation, the restrictivist perspective, which adopted
much more cautious approach to presidential power.

To be sure,

a

there

were some political scientists who blamed the decline of the office on
the pathological personality of Richard Nixon and character flaws of

Lyndon Johnson.

These theorists longed for the day of

a

renewed

expansivist chief executive, albeit one with the "right" blend

personality traits, whatever that might be.

In

of

the wake of Vietnam and

the fallout from Watergate, though, political scientists more commonly

began to perceive the shortcomings of unchecked presidential initiative,

particularly the constitutional deformation rampant in the many facets
of

Schlesinger, among others,

Nixon's secretive presidential war.

reoriented the field toward the assertion that the scope
action at times must be restricted by
the chief executive.

And

a

a

of

executive

Congress willing to stand up to

corollary of this position has been the need

to hold down public expectations about what presidents in general

accompl i sh
When it considers the presidency, political science tends to

vacillate between versions

of

these two dominant perspectives.

In

can
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opposition to this orthodoxy,

alternative.
that

I

I

have proposed in chapter

To differentiate a structural

2

structural

a

theory in the deep sense

intend from what are often termed the "structural"
concerns of

the mainstream views,

I

explained that the two traditional theories

think of structure in

a

shallow way, exclusively in terms of

constitutional structure.**

Thus the political structure often is

explored, leaving us with discussions of the relative balance of power

between the president and Congress, but without an analysis

fundamental assumptions underlying government institutions.

understood in the deeper sense

of

the word, by comparison,

of

the

Structure
would focus

analysis on these core assumptions which usually are taken for granted,
notably the context of the political economy of liberal democratic
capital ism.
On a structural

reading of the presidency, the prevailing

approaches exhibit several interconnected deficiences.

Orthodox

theories take for granted the setting within which presidents operate,
seldom questioning the priorities of corporate capitalism or the foreign
policy which supports its worldwide operation.

Such theories cut

themselves off from the possibility that the "crisis"
which they all

in

of

the office

—

some sense acknowledge -- may in fact have much to do

with the continued pursuit of goals consonant with these priorities.

Thus the ends of presidential behavior seldom are scrutinized; they are

treated as off limits.

Only the means are addressed, rendering these

orientations highly instrumental
of

in

focus.

In

addition, the very nature

the two perspectives narrows the range of acceptable debate about the

office, confining it to questions revolving around the relative balance
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of

power between the White House and Congress, as it
tilting one way or

the other would throw the system in

beliefs

of

orthodox consensus.

descriptive.

a

direction at odds with the basic

Finally, such theories are overly

Since "what is" is assumed to be "what should be," studies

proceed to explore government processes and the internal workings

of

the

White House, personality clashes, bureaucratic infighting, and related
issues that keep the focus an Washington as the center of action.

A

structural view objects to this circumscribed vision, and proposes to,
in

the words of presidency theorist Bruce Miroff, move the inquiry

"beyond Washington

." 12

One way to do this is to build on the the oft-noted observation

that because of the expectations of and demands on the office, and the

seemingly intractable nature

of

the problems we now confront, the

president has become the embodiment

of

the state.

If,

as Theodore Lowi

contends, the president really is the state personified, it behooves us
13

to ask what

it

is the state does

imperatives

of

the state at the center of its analysis, seeing in those

.

A

structural theory places the

imperatives an underlying continuity among presidencies which transcends

differences of party, policy and personality usually accorded primacy by
conventional theories.
identified:
theories.

Three major strains of state theory are

instrumental, structural -functional

,

and social

struggle

While these theories have important differences, notably

disputes over what areas of political, economic and social life merit
primary attention, they share an appreciation
of

of

the capitalist nature of American democracy.

the analytic centrality

Structural analysis as
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construe

I

of

it

seeks to employ the common areas of these three
components

theories of the state.
Although few analysts have attempted to uncover the
dynamics of

the office by forcing an explicit encounter between state
theory and

theories of the presidency, when such efforts do occur, the most

convincing ones focus on two issue areas that dominate the president's
agenda as the leading state actor -- promoting economic growth and
national security.

As Alan Wolfe has claimed,

work in American politics most of the time:

military strength.

14

economic growth and

Wolfe's assessment of these imperatives may be

overdrawn, but not too far.

His work analyzes the political

implications for all administrations
hegemony.

"there only two isues at

of

the decline of postwar

Accompanying this decline was the intensification

of

II.

S.

the

dilemma of promoting economic growth and security, which in the absense
of

the unprecedented postwar economic expansion made it increasingly

difficult for presidents to meet the demands

of

varying constituencies.

The "impasse" between public expectations of economic prosperity and

military supremacy, and the waning ability

of

the state to furnish them,

has produced declining confidence in government generally, and in the

president as head
Chapter

3

of

government.

analyzes the imperative of economic growth as seen

through the efforts

of

Presidents Carter and Reagan to meet their

statutory obligation under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
1970.

Both presidents faced

a

of

political climate significantly altered

from the time of the law's enactment.

While OSHA and other social

regulatory programs flourished in the atmosphere

of

the late 1960 s,

by
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the mi d- 1 970

'

s

those enabling social struggles had largely run
their

course as pressures on the state.

In

their place came self-conscious

elite mobilization to restore the primacy of market forces
and trim or

dismantle government regulatory programs.

The activities of the

American Enterprise Institute to delegitimize market intervention were

especially conspicuous

this regard.

in

retain something more than

a

Caught in the bind of wanting to

nominal commitment to OSHA-type regulatory

laws, but feeling the pinch to stabililze an economy in precarious

shape, Carter resolved internal divisions in his administration by

emphasizing growth and business confidence over the needs

of

labor.

This tilt away from labor was particularly pronounced from 1979 onward,
but it did not generate economic recovery.

Reagan's ascendance accenuated the state's withdrawal from
meaningful interest in promoting safety and health at work, curtailing

(dramatically at times) the scope and intensity

of

QSHA's regulatory

effort while further centralizing and insulating that effort in the

Office of Management and Budget.
the yoke of

In

the name of freeing the market from

"big government," Reagan championed deregulation of the

workplace through stricter use
cost-benefit analysis.
begun in the latter part

of

White House regulatory review and

Reagan's strategy, then, continued the trend
of

the Carter years, and highlights the

continuity between the two administrations.
had to forego

a

Both presidents essentially

serious and sustained enforcement of the OSH Act in the

name of achieving the greater goal of economic growth.

The difference,

which structural analysis considers secondary, was that Carter did so
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with some reluctance, while Reagan had no
intention of fulfilling those

kinds of comitments in the first place.

President Carter
of

s

mid-term shift on the national security issue

the MX missile appeared more pronounced than his
domestic policy

shift.

He came to office with at least

a

rhetorical intention to move

the country away from the looming presence of nuclear weapons
and its

obsession with the Soviet threat.

There was no corresponding unique

feature to his domestic policy agenda, save for the vague promise
honesty.

As chapter

4

of

explains, his advisers were split on issues

the Soviet Union and the arms race.

As events unfolded within

a

of

foreign

policy climate turned rightward in part by elite policy planning groups
like the Committee on the Present Danger reacting to the alleged loss of

nerve in Vietnam and the lingering "Vietnam syndrome," Carter could do

little but shift with the tide, offering an increasingly militarized

foreign policy influenced by Zbigniew Brzezinski.

The effort to

rationalize the MX missile as vital to national security became

a

key

part of this shift, as the president tried, unsuccessfully, to sell the

Senate on the idea of

a

SALT

II

Treaty by proving how "tough" his

administration was overall on military matters.

Ultimately, neither the

treaty nor his get tough attitude was particularly convincing.

In

the

end, part of Carter's pledge of honesty endured, at least on matters of

nuclear arms, as PD-59 confirmed the counterforce nature of weapons like
the MX, whose ostensible purpose is deterrence.

Bereft of

a

notion of

national security other than conventional adherence to anticommunism and

nuclear weapons as guarantors of peace, Carter became

a

war-fighter.
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From the beginning, President Reagan supported
the MX as vital to

national security.

Even moreso than his predecessor, Reagan
embraced

counterforce weapons and war-fighting doctrine.

He and his advisers

spent much time embellishing their rationale for the missile
with

elaborate fictions about the "decade

of

vulnerability," in part to justify

basing mode for

a

neglect" and the "window of

simply could not be invulnerably based on the ground.
special commissions returned

a

a

missile that
So after two

verdict of "vulnerable," the issue of

vulnerability was conveniently jettisoned from discussions
missile.

of

the

And production of the MX proceeded apace, to be joined at some

future point by

a

ballistic missile defense system whose "defensive"

functions are utterly indistinguishable from its contribution to

offensive counterforce warfare.
The case studies in chapters

3

and

4

obviously do not ignore the

kinds of details about governmental processes and inside administrative

maneuverings that mark the case studies conventional theories
presidency draw upon.
in

a

the

But these details hopefully have been marshalled

way that clarifies and underscores the underlying continuities

between the two presidencies.
of

of

presidential policy,

if

Structural theory must engage the means

for no other reason than to emphasize the

basic agreement about the ends of policy.

For the point of the story

behind the two administrations is that when all the internal disputes,
policy proposals, and competing interests have run their course, the
core imperatives of national security and economic growth emerge from
the fray.

While conventional accounts of the chief executive would

focus on the differences, to whatever degree they exist, as ends in
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themselves, structural theory looks to and questions
the deeper

principles and interests that shape and confine the
activities
presidents, regardless

of

all

of

party.

Furthermore, it bears notice here that the institutional
balance
of

power between the executive and legislative branches is in no
way

decisive or even particularly illuminative on QSHA or MX policy

in

these

Congress was just as willing as Carter and Reagan to exempt

cases.

firms from OSHA regulations and to see the 0MB gather power over

regulatory decisons.

And congressional

action on the MX can only be

described as wholesale capitulation to the idea that the MX would go on,
in

some shape or form.

The presidencies of Carter and Reagan --

different though they have been in terms of their strength vis-a-vis

Congress

—

as chief

state actors.

thus stand as testaments to the shared ends of presidents,
The structure of the presidency is most

forcefully constrained by, but is not reducible to, the pursuit
growth and national security.
on

no other matters are chief

of

Other issues surely are of concern.

But

executives as nearly imprisoned by

structure as on the two major imperatives.
The foregoing discussion is not meant to imply that

theory of the presidency is without need of refinement.
seem to me to merit attention.
of

structural

Two aspects

First, but of secondary import, theories

the state would benefit from greater stress on

As the political,

a

a

temporal dimension.

social and economic climate changes, social struggle

brings more or less pressure to bear on the state for concessions.

large part of the

dramatic rise in such movement activity accounts for

a

pressure on the state to adopt social regulations

the late 1960

in

A

s.
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Yet as the economy worsened and the imperative of economic growth became

exigent, social struggle had less impact and eventually little at all on

regulatory matters.

Understanding the conditions for these shifts is

absolutely crucial to understanding the parameters within which

presidents operate.

Too often, theories of the state are viewed as

either/or propositions.

One either studies the elites holding state

power, or studies the functional provision of growth as structurally
bound, or studies social movements and their efficacy.

A

conclusion of

this study however, is the need to situate these components

theories in time.

of

the

For as the climate of the political economy changes,

the component of state theory that has primacy may change as well, as it
did in the 1970's.

Primacy

is the issue,

though.

which theory definitively captures the essence

of

The drive to select
the state in

capitalist democracy seems futile, and needlessly devisive.
Second, and finally,

provide

a

a

18

structural theory of the presidency must

fuller, more nuanced analysis of public expectations than do

conventional theories.

Presidential scholars increasingly point to the

disjuncture between what people expect from their president and what

reasonably can be delivered.

But this very real

expectation and performance can be posed

in

the people for holding irrational desires.

public with disdain, as

a

gulf between

ways that wind up blaming
Such accounts can view the

mass of illusioned complainers who shun

political participation and thus bring their problems on themselves.
Harold Barger's recent text falls into such

a

trap.

Postulating that

no way to rid
the presidency has become "impossible," that there is

executive power,
people of their hopeless illusions about the nature of
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and noting the potential

that the hope for

a

danger to systemic legitimacy, he concludes

more realistic public is slim:

Few governments, of course, ever live up to the ideal
[of representative government! because most people
lack the knowledge, skills, or motivation to make
rational judgments about those who rule them....
Citizens ought to act more rationally and realistically, but we might just as well argue that sin or
greed should be eradicated from human nature 16
.

Blaming the people for the persistence of "illusions" about

presidential efficacy distorts the relationship between the citizen and
the state.

The work of political theorist William Connolly has helped

put this relationship into clearer perspective 17
.

even

a

will, to believe that they live in

a

People have

a

need,

country that does good

things in the world and can provide something like "the good life" for
them.

Moreover, our notion of ourselves as free people living in

a

free

society is intimately connected to our belief that the state -- and the

president as head

of

state

—

has within its range of currently

available tools the means to effectively deal with society's problems.
As Connolly argues,

"We define our grievances and policy agendas as

falling within the limits of action available to the welfare state so
that we can see the state, and ourselves, as free."

1

®

This need to

construe ourselves as free helps ossify our political dialogue within
very narrow but close-at-hand parameters, with "credible" options for
the political economy, for example, usually straying no farther than

variations on

a

relatively free market approach to the economy,

slightly more interventionary approach.
network, among other factors, plays

a

or

a

Obviously the policy planning

key role here in orchestrating

a
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limited range of "acceptable" thought, but the quest for personal

identity establishes the necessary the precondition for such management.
In

an era of

declining U.S. hegemony and concomitant economic

transformation, however

,

the state finds itself unable to generate the

kind of economic growth in accordance with previous notions of "the good

Constrained by the confines

life."

the state is in

a

of

range of options narrowly drawn,

bind, and so are the people.

appeal of Reagan as

a

candidate.

This helps explain the

As the quotes that frame this chapter

suggest, Jimmy Carter's diagnosis of the nation's ills was complex
it

(or

had the appearance of complexity), calling for sacrifice, soul

searching and at an early point even
international relations.

different way of looking at

a

But the reality of his program was nothing

more than relatively mild liberalism.

crises

(real,

When domestic and foreign policy

imagined, and manufactured) mounted, his only recourse was

to move more fully into the orbit of conservative political and economic
But Reagan, by contrast, was the real

thought, foreshadowing Reaganism.
article, offering

a

very reassuring message.

we need do is what we have always done.

us prosper;

To overcome our

ills,

all

Hard work and faith will make

more weapons will make us strong.

Presidents naturally have

reservoir of good will and deference

a

amongst the public, stemming in part from the awe commensurate with
being

a

head of state as well as

a

more earthly head of government.

Reagan's own reservoir has been very deep; he has been popularly

characterized as wearing

a

"teflon coat" or having

And these impressions have persisted

(the current

a

certain

magic.

Iran-contra scandal

notwithstanding) even though people often disagree with specific
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policies he pursues.

It

reassuring -- that appeals.

is his overarching

approach -- familiar and

But the fundamental problems of the

political economy remain intact.

And the crises the U.S.

faces in

international affairs certainly are no closer to being solved.
they have been exacerabated during Reagan's years.

solutions certainly will grow dimmer.

I

But that time will run out.

think, for those endorsing

approach to the presidency, is that

if

The luster of simple

Reagan has bought some time, much

more than Carter ever could hope to have.
The lesson here,

Indeed

a

structural

the presidency is ever to break

the grip of the imperatives of the state, which if left unattended

threaten

a

be recast.

crisis of state legitimacy, the imperatives themselves must
The quest of economic growth must be loosened from the

strictures of business confidence and corporate designs.

The economy

must be brought under more democratic planning and control.
will

the president, and the state,

Only then

actually have within their reach the

policy tools necessary to meet the expectations that accompany their

democratic accountability.

Additionally, the spiraling logic

of

consumption and corporate product priorities must be countered.

For

a

more democratically controlled economy would not have escaped the

escalatory logic
race
of

—

if

of

growth

—

the consumptive equivalent of the arms

the "more is better" logic goes unquestioned.

In

the absence

such changes, the public will be consigned to frustration over the

intractability of the problems which emerge in these times

of

economic

dislocation and crisis 20
.

Likewise, ideas about national security must be freed from their

moorings in the arms race, and especially the growing reliance on
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counterforce weaponry.
never true,

is even

as suggested

in

The equation of nuclear arms and security,
while

less so, and even more dangerous, today.

the previous chapter, the issue of the arms race
leads

right back into the issue of economic growth.
Of

Moreover,

The two are inseparable.

course, to even speak of redefining our notions of growth and

security sets the head spinning.

And such thoughts surely contradict

the short term insight of President Reagan
But the problems of

s

state crisis, presidential crisis, and public

expectations are intimately connected.

To begin to come to grips with

how difficult the solution to them would be,

such

solution.

a

simple, familiar messages.

is to begin to move toward

Wolfe's insight on the presidency seems appropriate

here, and applies to more than just the economy:

The American people will either have to accept a
presidency as contained and narrow-based as their
economic system or they will have to democratize
their economy to match their grandiose vision of
presidential leadership 21
.

The vision people hold of the president and the state is not irrational
or

unreasonable.

But it is demanding.

A

presidency empowered to more

closely meet those demands in the ways barely sketched above would
fact be

a

strong -- even "expansivist" -- chief executive.

be a democratic strength,

not

a

plebiscitary one.

efficient, sheer "NeoHami ltonian" type
of

of

A

in

But it would

centralized,

strength wed to the status quo

corporate power would be no improvement over the drift and delay

mainstream theorists so lament 22
.

Meaningful democratization of the

political economy would have to entail the simultaneous expansion
popular avenues of participation.

of
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As for

presidential scholarship, in the final analysis
we are left

with an enduring paradox.

The more we desire to understand the

presidency as an office and the many dilemmas

currently confronts,

it

the more we need to cast our vision beyond the
procedural confines of

the office,

and the personalities of those holding it, and
into the

broader realm of theories
the twin structural
and tamed,

of

the state and political economy.

For until

imperatives of the state are rethought, challenged

we can expect the presidency to remain in crisis.
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